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This dissertation seeks to explain variation in democratic governance in the Russian Federation, 
in particular, difference in the levels of democratic governance between the northwestern and the 
southern regions of Russia that are included in the regional dimensions of the European Union 
foreign policy: the Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy, respectively. Emphasizing a 
dynamic relationship among regional governance patterns in the EU-Russia regional cooperation 
and energy domains, regional ethno-cultural, historical, geopolitical, and economic contexts, and 
regional decision-making processes, it develops a model of sub-national democratic development 
and sub-national regionalism that links regional sustainable development and democratic 
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influence the behavior and strategic actions of regional actors and predetermine the configuration 
of relationships among them. The propositions of the model are tested empirically using both 
quantitative (econometric analysis of longitudinal data and longitudinal network analysis) and 
qualitative (interview data) methods. The findings of the analyses have implications for our 
understanding of sub-national regionalism in the Wider Europe and for the study of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
A. EUROPEANIZATION, DEMOCRATIZATION AND EUROPEAN 
NEIGHBORHOOD 
Democratization and fast economic development of the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEEC) are usually associated with their integration into the European Union (EU) 
(Ivanov, 2004). Different scholars of the EU enlargement assert that the European integration 
had a major influence on the CEE countries in a way that they have been subjected to the process 
of ‘external governance’: “the desire of most CEECs to join the EU, combined with the high 
volume and intrusiveness of the rules attached to its membership, have allowed the EU an 
unprecedented influence on the restructuring of domestic institutions and the entire range of 
public policies in these countries” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). Among the EU-
related factors  that enhanced democratization in the CEE countries scholars mention  intensified 
interactions of broad publics that served as a means of the promotion of democratic values, 
extensively discussed by Karl Deutsch (1954), and specific EU policies targeted at national 
governments. 
The EU conditionality is generally assumed to be the primary force that fostered 
democratic consolidation and change in governance policies in the EU accession states. 
According to Kopstein and Reilly (2000), there is a clear pattern of the spread of democratic 
governance policies from Western Europe to Central and Eastern Europe. However, the majority 
of the EU enlargement and integration scholars assert that non-candidate countries are not 
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subject to the EU-related democratization and can not benefit from the EU good governance 
policies due to the absence of the EU conditionality, meaning that there is no external force that 
would enhance governance reforms and establish the transfer of democratic norms to those 
countries (Schmitter, 2001). Therefore, the EU democratization and governance literature has 
been mainly focused on the accession and candidate countries with a nation-centered approach to 
democratization and very little research has been done on the European integration and EU 
enlargement processes in respect to non-candidate countries and regions of non-candidate 
countries sharing border with the EU.  
Focusing on the EU-Russia regional cooperation, this dissertation addresses this gap in 
the literature by offering an explanation of how in addition to the targeted measures of the EU 
institutions, the culturally, historically, economically, and geopolitically conditioned 
advancement of democratization processes from the EU in the form of regional cooperation 
networks can generate support for democracy among regional and provincial actors and improve 
governance in non-candidate countries at the sub-national level, even when national-level 
conditions are not favorable for the EU influences. This dissertation argues that depending on 
their configuration, the networks among the public, private, and civil society regional and 
provincial actors induced by cooperation with the actors residing in the EU can serve as effective 
actor-based mechanisms for the indirect transfer of the EU norms into regions’ internal policies. 
This study is important, because it offers the possibility of a more differentiated assessment of 
democratization and sustainable development than is generally offered in the studies of the EU-
induced democratization and economic development. It focuses on the phenomenon of 
democratic and socio-economic development taking place at widely different rates within one 
country. 
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The dissertation also explores the limitations of the EU- related democratization 
processes in respect to the Russian regions. I argue that the existence of natural resources in the 
region and the dense and centralized network of energy companies and oblast governments (in 
the Russian public administration system oblast is roughly equivalent to a province) negatively 
affect democratic governance in the region and impede EU-related democratization processes. 
The dissertation consists of six major parts. The first part is introductory and is devoted to 
the discussion of the research problem statement and the main research questions and hypotheses. 
The second part gives a comprehensive overview of EU-Russia relations and discusses the 
peculiarities of the sub-national level dynamics in the Northern Dimension and the Black Sea 
Synergy, two EU regional cooperation initiatives with the participation of Russia’s northwestern 
and southern regions. Second, it discusses the aspects of EU external governance in respect to 
the Russian regions. Third, it provides information on the EU-Russia energy relations and gives 
an assessment of energy issues at the sub-national level. And fourth, it discusses research design 
issues. 
The third part provides contextual information on the Russian provinces and presents 
longitudinal analysis of democratic governance in the provinces. First, it explores international 
activity of the provinces by treating them as international actors and discusses variation in 
democratic governance among the provinces. Second, it discusses the problems of resource-
based economy at the sub-national level. And fourth, it conducts longitudinal analysis of 
democratic governance in the 88 Russian provinces and identifies major factors affecting the 
level of democratic governance.  
The fourth part explores two variables that turned out to be significant in predicting the 
level of democratic governance in the Russian provinces- cooperation with the EU and energy- 
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in the context of the Russian northwestern and southern regions that are included in the regional 
dimensions of the EU Neighborhood Policy and therefore represent the most interesting case 
studies of the strength and intensity of the EU-related effects. In-depth network analysis of the 
regional cooperation networks and networks of energy companies and provincial governments is 
conducted to examine the embeddedness of the regions in the EU-related and energy structures, 
identify the key actors of these structures and evaluate their propensity to influence decision-
making processes in the regions. The fourth part also identifies the factors that predict the 
positions of power and centrality in the regional cooperation and energy infrastructures and 
discusses implications for democratic governance and sustainable development in the regions. 
The fifth part explores cultural, historical, geopolitical, and economic factors that explain 
the differences between the northwestern and southern regional cooperation and energy 
structures and broader governance patterns in the regions, and analyzes implications for 
democratic governance in the northwestern and southern regions.  
The sixth part of the dissertation, a conclusive one, is devoted to the discussion of the 
prospects for further development of the EU-Russia sub-national regionalism and democratic 
governance in the Russian regions.   
 
B. BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
     
Though the EU and Russia recognize each other as the most important strategic partner in 
Eurasia,  the current stage of the EU-Russia relations is called a ‘cold peace’ by some scholars: 
the parties had difficulties in extending the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which was 
the legal basis of the EU-Russia partnership for ten years; the EU criticizes Russia for its harsh 
energy policy, lack of commitment to economic diversification and eroding democracy, and 
5 
Russia in its turn accuses the EU of double standards and claims that Europe still perceives 
Russia through its experience with the Soviet Union. In addition, Russia’s August 2008 show of 
force in its brief war against Georgia made the EU highly critical of its politics and actions in the 
Caucasus. However, at the regional level, the dynamic is drastically different from the Moscow-
Brussels dynamic: cooperation with the EU has significantly increased in the Russian regions 
over the last ten years and the number of business initiatives, civil society and education 
programs, and environmental projects with the EU keeps growing (Stoliarova, 2007). 
Many EU integration scholars claim that Russia will not be able to benefit from the EU-
related democratization processes due to the lack of the EU conditionality, since Russia is not an 
EU candidate country and will not become one in the foreseeable future (Linz and Stepan, 1996). 
Scholars of the EU-Russian relations have primarily focused on the analysis of the EU-Russia 
supranational--national-level dynamics arguing that Russia is not and will not be part of 
European integration as it envisions itself as a regional power and is “profoundly ambivalent 
about integration with a Europe which insists on imposing its values” (Roberts, 2006).   
Is Russia completely impervious to the EU influences or does the analysis lack important 
sub-national variables that would help to observe processes occurring between the two sides in a 
more rigorous fashion? If no integration processes occur between the EU and Russia, then how 
can high and steady growth of the EU-Russia regional cooperation (despite fluctuations in the 
supranational--national-level relations) be explained?  Does regional cooperation with the EU 
have an impact on the democratic development of the regions taking part in cooperation projects, 
partnerships and initiatives? What local factors catalyze/impede EU-related influences? It seems 
like with a strong focus on the center-to-center dynamics some important aspects of the EU-
related democratization processes in the Russian sub-national units have been overlooked.   
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EU influence has been considered the primary external factor accounting for 
democratization and improvement in governance in Central and East European countries. As 
mentioned above, the EU integration literature widely discusses EU-conditioned changes in the 
accession and candidate countries (Moravcsik, 1998; Scott, 1995). At the same time, there have 
been very few attempts to explore the effect of the EU integration processes on democratization 
and governance in non-candidate countries.  
Several studies indicate that there is a significant variation in the level of democratic 
governance in the Russian regions and some scholars mention proximity to the EU and the 
degree of interaction with the EU (economic, trade, or social) as possible explanatory factors.1 
Lankina and Getachew (2006) conducted a panel study analysis of the relationships between 
proximity to the EU, EU aid, and democratization in the Russian regions and found a significant 
positive correlation between the three variables. Therefore, according to the scholars, regions 
that are closer to the EU and that are primary recipients of the EU aid tend to be more pro-
democratically developed than other regions. In addition, Lankina (2005) carried out a profound 
analysis of the politics of the EU’s involvement in the Russian regions in terms of aid projects 
(under the TACIS program). However, besides technical assistance programs there are all kinds 
of regional partnerships and initiatives between the EU and Russian regional actors that can not 
be regarded simply as aid programs as they have multiple sources of funding coming both from 
the EU and the Russian sides and are concluded to the mutual benefit of participating parties. 
                                                 
1  Obydenkova, A. 2006. “Democratization, Europeanization and Regionalization beyond the European Union: 
Search for Empirical Evidence”, European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 10, No. 1; Stoner-Weiss, K. 1997. Local 
Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Henderson, 
S. 2003. Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations, Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press; Petrov, N. 2005. “Regional Models of Democratic Development,” in McFaul, M., 
Petrov, N. and Ryabov, A. eds., Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform, 
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  
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There have been very few attempts to study the effect of such cooperative measures on 
democratic governance in the regions that have such cooperative activity.  
Obydenkova  (2006) explores cooperation between Europe and the regions of Russia (she 
applies the term ‘transnational regional cooperation’) and notices that the regions of Russia 
involved in cooperation with European countries and regions tend to be more pro-democratically 
developed than the others. However, the scholar is more interested in finding factors that explain 
the emergence of transnational cooperation rather than exploring its effects on internal processes 
in the regions involved in such cooperation and does not specify through what mechanisms 
democratization processes occur.   
Two cases are particularly important here: Russian northwestern and southern regions. 
Both regions are involved in the regional dimensions of the EU Neighborhood Policy labeled 
Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy, respectively. Both initiatives will be discussed 
in the next chapter of this dissertation. However, various scholars who conduct regional analysis 
claim that the northwestern region of Russia is much more advanced in terms of democratic 
governance than the southern region from economic and political openness and transparency of 
institutions, to provincial government strength and independence and the level of maturity of 
civil society and social capital (Petrov-Titkov, 2005; Lankina and Getachew, 2006). According 
to Petrov and Titkov’s panel analysis (2005), the northwestern region is at the top list of the 
regions ranked according to their level of democratic governance, while the southern region 
appeared to have much lower democratic governance scores. It is important to understand the 
factors accounting for these differences and explore whether EU-related influences have the 
same effects in both regions.  
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The EU is seeking to extend its influence and democratization processes in wider Europe 
and avoid dividing lines along its borders without further enlargement by proposing an 
alternative to membership, as Prodi called it offering ‘everything but institutions’. This study is 
important as it assesses the possibility of such an alternative and evaluates the effectiveness of 
the EU’s extended influence and internal factors that impede EU-related transformations.  
Although such countries as Russia and Belarus can be characterized as rather 
authoritarian, they are no longer closed systems like they were during the Cold War. The borders 
are open, and ideas, norms and practices penetrate into the systems and change them from the 
bottom up. However, this penetration might occur with different intensity. In addition, certain 
structural, geopolitical, and ideological conditions are necessary for the effective transfer and 
acquisition of democratic ideas and practices and norms of good governance. Besides, there are 
internal and external limitations to such exogenous influences and it is important to take them 
into account to be able to understand and predict the outcomes of the EU –induced processes in 
the wider Europe. This study takes all these aspects into account and develops a model for 
regional integration in wider Europe, which is based both on EU external influences and 
peculiarities of local environment.  
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This dissertation develops a series of research questions and tests several research 
hypotheses in order to answer these questions. 
 
Research questions:  
 
What factors account for the variation in the level of democratic governance in the Russian 
regions? 
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What factors account for the difference in the levels of democratic governance between the 
Russian northwestern and southern regions? 
How (through which mechanisms) do the EU-Russia regional cooperation processes influence 
democratic governance and policy-making in the Russian northwestern and southern regions? 
 
Research hypotheses: 
 
(1) Variation in the levels of democratic governance in the Russian regions can be explained by 
several factors, among which are the amount and scope of cooperative initiatives with the EU 
and energy, meaning the existence of oil and gas resources in the regions, the dependence of 
regional budget on the revenues from the energy sector, and the number of energy companies 
operating in the regions.  
(2) Higher levels of democratic governance in the northwestern region than in the southern 
region can be explained by the following factors:  
A. Effective functioning of the dense and decentralized network of public, economic, and 
civil society actors involved in the EU-Russia regional cooperation. 
I hypothesize that by being involved in cooperation network with the regions of established 
democratic EU member-states, the northwestern region follows the policy-learning model, 
adopting some of the good governance practices and democratic norms and values of its partners. 
Additionally, EU-Russia regional cooperation network creates intense civic connection, or social 
capital, in the region, which comprises trust, reciprocity, and community engagement by 
disseminating information, connecting citizens, enabling direct participation of people and their 
organizations in regional policy processes; improving the quality of representation (in provincial 
governments) and the relationship between representative –constituency, and enhancing 
motivation for people’s participation.  
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B. Compared to the southern region, low availability of oil and gas resources, and as a 
consequence, absence of energy exploration and production activities. 
C. Fragmented and decentralized network of energy companies and provincial 
administrations.  
Respectively, abundance of energy resources, highly centralized network of energy companies 
and provincial governments and less effective regional cooperation network account for the 
lower levels of democratic governance in the southern region.  
There are several factors that may explain why the social and governance infrastructures 
are different in the northwestern and southern regions and why the regional cooperation network 
with the EU is more effective and developed in the northwestern region: 
Historical factor: the northwestern region has had a long-term democratic tradition 
starting from Novgorod-the-Great 9th century polity, while the southern region became part of 
Russia in the 17-18 centuries in the course of the expansion of the Russian empire, suffered from 
different non-European influences and has historically developed more autocratic forms of 
governance and power. 
Ethno-cultural homogeneity: northwestern region is ethno-culturally homogeneous- 
composed of predominantly Slavic population, which is part of the common European ethno-
cultural and linguistic heritage. At the same time, the southern region is composed of more than 
80 ethnicities belonging to different cultural, language and ethnic groups different from the 
European ones.  
Geopolitical factor: due to its geographic location, the northwestern region has 
historically been part of Northern Europe and has been extensively involved in European trade 
and governance structures, while the southern region is located in a very diverse environment 
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further away from Europe, has historically been much less oriented towards Europe and has 
experienced a variety of external non-European influences.  
Economic factor: the southern region has abundant oil and gas resources and has a 
resource-based economy, while the northwestern region has a much more diversified economic 
structure with a considerable economic interdependence with Europe (especially Northern 
Europe), and according to different analyses, is heavily involved in European trade and 
investment infrastructures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
II. EU-RUSSIA SUB-NATIONAL INTEGRATION FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
A. OVERVIEW OF EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS 
Theoretically, the EU-Russia relationship is strategically important for both parties, but in 
practice interaction between the two sides was quite superficial for a long time. The relationship 
between the two parties has become much more dynamic since the fall of the Soviet Union in 
1991, and increased interaction resulted in a series of important cooperation agreements such as 
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1994, Common Strategy of the European Union 
and Russia of June 4th, 1999, and the EU-Russia Four Common Spaces of 2003.2   
However, recently a number of serous tensions have strained the relations between the 
two parties: disagreements over frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus and Moldova and 
Kosovo’s independence, criticisms by the EU directed at Moscow for its human rights record 
and issues of media freedom and democracy, Moscow’s harsh criticisms of the US plans to build 
missile defense shields in Poland and Czech Republic, end energy issues. “When taking into 
account Russia’s enormous geopolitical significance for the entire EU area as one vast continent-
sized buffer between Europe and Asia…, that is both a market for Europe and a potential zone of 
stability protecting Europe… and, conversely, the EU’s absolute vital importance for Russia as 
the world market integration avenue, the democratic institution-building frame of reference, etc., 
it becomes clear that EU-Russia relations ought to be far more intimate and dynamic” (Skak, 
2005).  
                                                 
2 The EU-Russia Archive; official documents and declarations, 5 
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The EU-Russia actual partnership started in 1994, when Russia and the EU signed a 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which, however, only entered into force in 
December 1997 because of the first Chechen war. The PCA covered a wide range of cooperation 
sectors. “Under it, Russia received Most-Favored- Nation (MFN) status, whereby no quantitative 
limitations are applied except on exports of certain steel products, representing less than five per 
cent of bilateral trade” (Sutela, 2005). The PCA laid out prospects for free trade between the EU 
and Russia sometime in the future. Various cooperation institutions were created under the PCA 
such as Cooperation Council at the foreign ministerial level that was later transformed into a 
Permanent Partnership Council; a Political and Security Committee with the Russian ambassador 
in Brussels, and expert-level subcommittees covering different areas of cooperation.  
At the EU-Russia St. Petersburg Summit of 2003, four road maps - economy; external 
security; freedom, security and justice; and education, research and culture – were designed to 
deepen cooperation between the two parties.3  
As far as the Common Economic Space is concerned, its main objectives are to gradually 
remove all barriers for bilateral trade and investment and enhance the development of market 
economy in Russia through the approximation of legislation and the harmonization of technical 
standards. Schuette (2004) argues that modernization of Russia is highly dependent on the 
country’s cooperation with the economically and technologically advanced West, in particular 
with the EU, which is Russia’s first trading and investment partner. According to the intensity of 
the dialogue in the economic field in such areas as trade, investment, and energy, there is 
considerable economic interdependence between the EU and Russia. However, in practice, there 
are certain inequalities in the EU-Russia economic relations and this interdependence is rather 
asymmetrical.  
                                                 
3 EU/Russia: The four common spaces, EU-Russia relations archive  
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For instance, when it comes to foreign direct investment, companies from the EU 
member states are the major foreign investors in Russia; however, opportunities for Russia’s 
investors in European economies are largely restricted due to political issues. As far as total trade 
volumes are concerned, the EU is Russia’s main trading partner, while Russia is only the EU’s 
fifth trading partner behind the US, Switzerland, China and Japan. The EU-Russia trade relations 
are rather asymmetrical with fuel and other natural resources representing the bulk of Russian 
exports in contrast with finished industrial and consumer goods imported from the EU. 
Energy is a very sensitive aspect in the EU-Russia relations, which is both economic and 
political. In 2005, the EU imported approximately 55% of its energy needs4. That figure is 
expected to rise to 70% by 2030. More than 50% of the EU’s imported energy in the form of oil 
and natural gas comes from Russia5. It is not only that Europe is dependent on Russian oil and 
gas supplies and this dependence is expected to grow; but also that Russia has considerable 
control over the major pipeline supply options, especially, in the Caspian region, Caucasus, and 
Central Asia. Furthermore, various scholars claim that Russia uses EU’s dependence on its 
energy supplies as a political and economic leverage (Bugajski, 2004). Since 1991, the energy 
lever has been used for putting economic pressure on Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, 
Belarus, Moldova, Georgia that subsequently affected most of Europe6. Russia has also used its 
energy as a tool to play EU member states off against each other. For instance, in the case of the 
Baltic Sea pipeline construction, Russia insisted on excluding Poland and Baltic states from the 
project, which antagonized them and strained their relations with Germany, the primary 
beneficiary of the project from the EU side. Some analysts claimed that Russia excluded Poland 
                                                 
4  “Geopolitics of EU energy supply”, March 23, 2006, Available 
at:  http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-142665-16&type=LinksDossier 
5 Ibid 
6 Ibid 
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and Baltic states from the project because of their ‘unfriendly policies’ towards Russia 
(Voevodin, 2006). Therefore, the EU is very cautious and critical about Russia’s new energy-
related assertiveness in Eurasia. 
The principles underlying the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice include 
democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including free 
and independent media and the effective application of common values by independent judicial 
systems.7 Cooperation in this space is related to the adoption of agreements on readmission and 
visa facilitation, which are supposed to promote and foster greater contact between the citizens 
of the EU and Russia via travel and tourism as well as facilitate business and official travel. The 
European Commission mentioned the benefits of facilitated travel for all Europeans and agreed 
to continue to examine with Russia the conditions for visa-free travel as a long-term 
perspective.8 The regular EU-Russia consultations on human rights, which were launched in 
March, 2003, fall within this space, as does cooperation on combating terrorism, organized crime 
and corruption. Human rights and freedom of press in Russia are the most sensitive aspects of 
this field of cooperation as the EU is becoming increasingly concerned with Russia’s side-
tracking on these aspects of democracy. 
The Common Space of External Security has been created to enhance EU-Russia 
cooperation to resolve the lingering frozen conflicts in Europe (Transdniestria, Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh) in accordance with the OSCE commitments.9  However, recent 
developments in the Caucasus and the war with Georgia created significant tensions in this 
aspect of EU-Russia cooperation. 
                                                 
7 For more information, see the EU press release, available at                                                                              
http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_4660_fr.htm 
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
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The Common Space of Research and Education, including cultural aspects, is generally 
considered less politicized and most successful area of cooperation. It aims at intensifying 
cooperation and integration of the E.U. and Russian research communities and strengthening 
cultural and intellectual heritage by identifying key measures to promote economic growth based 
on modern technology and strengthen competitiveness, reinforce links between research and 
innovation, encourage close cooperation in the field of education - including the convergence of 
university course formats and qualifications - and promote cultural and linguistic diversity.10 In 
2003, Russia has also become part of Bologna process, the creation of the European Higher 
Education Area by making academic degree standards and quality assurance standards more 
comparable and compatible throughout Europe, in particular under the Lisbon Recognition 
Convention.  
Cooperation in the EU-Russia four spaces capitalizes on the previous achievements as 
well as outlines new areas of interaction and provides a framework for intensified dialogue in the 
new sectors of cooperation. However, some scholars are quite skeptic about the Four Common 
Spaces agreement due to the fact that it is too broad, does not reflect the actual state of relations 
between the two parties in certain areas, and does not specify any convergence criteria. Emerson 
(2005) even calls it ‘a manifestation of the proliferation of the fuzzy’ as, according to him, the 
four common spaces are a weaker and fuzzier derivative of the E.U. neighborhood policy, 
“giving only token attention to democracy and excluding explicit reference to EU norms as the 
reference for Russian-EU convergence”.  
 
                                                 
10 For more information, see Overview of EU-Russia relations, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/deea20050523_11/deea20050523_11en.pdf 
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B. NORTHERN DIMENSION AND BLACK SEA SYNERGY REGIONAL 
COOPERATION INITIATIVES 
The Northern Dimension (ND) is a regional cooperation initiative in the European Union 
regarding the cross-border and external policies covering Nordic countries, countries 
surrounding the Baltic Sea and the northwestern region of Russia.11 The Northern Dimension 
covers a broad geographic area (Figure 1) from the European Arctic and Sub-Arctic areas to the 
southern shores of the Baltic Sea, including the countries in its vicinity and from northwestern 
Russia in the east to Iceland and Greenland in the west.12  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Northern Dimension 
 
ND addresses the specific challenges and opportunities arising in the region and aims to 
strengthen dialogue and cooperation between the EU and its member states, the northern 
                                                 
11 For more information on the Northern Dimension, see  
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/ 
12 The northwestern region of Russia that is included in the Northern Dimension is usually represented by all the 
northwestern provinces of Russia that are part of the administrative northwestern region of the Russian Federation, 
except for the Nenets Autonomous Okrug and Komi Republic.  
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countries associated with the EU under the European Economic Area (Norway and Iceland) and 
Russia.13 It covers a wide range of sectors, such as transport, the environment, nuclear safety, 
justice and home affairs, cooperation in the field of culture, the fight against organized crime, 
health care, nongovernmental cooperation and civil society development, the promotion of trade 
and investment, economy, business and infrastructure, cross-border cooperation, information 
technology, science, education and research.  
The Northern Dimension is financed from multiple sources including budgets of 
individual countries and regions of participating countries (including Russian sources), EU 
financial instruments (such as INTERREG and other CBC programs aimed at developing cross-
border cooperation and TACIS-technical assistance program, currently substituted by the ENPI 
instruments), international financial institutions (e.g. European Bank for Reconstruction and 
development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Nordic Investment Bank (NIB)), and 
the private sector. The principle of co-financing from Northern Dimension partners (including 
Russian public and private actors) provides for equality in cooperation processes as the EU 
actors are not performing the function of ‘donors’ or ‘developers’, but are engaged in 
cooperation that is created for the mutual benefit and interest of all the actors involved. 
The biggest and most important achievements of the Northern Dimension are the 
Environmental Partnership (NDEP) and the Partnership for Public Health and Social Wellbeing 
(NDPHS). Within these partnerships, all participating countries are equal and all contribute to 
them financially. According to the Northern Dimension Information System (2006), over 500 big 
projects were concluded, ongoing or under preparation within the frames of the Northern 
Dimension at the end of 2006. Besides, it is important to note that many regional actors from the 
                                                 
13 For more information, see the Russia and Eastern Neighbors report, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/russianis_en.htm 
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countries and regions covered by the Northern Dimension established contacts on their own and 
got engaged in joint initiatives and projects of various kinds supported by their own resources 
with only partial support from the ND instruments or even without adhering to the ND 
instruments. Taking into consideration this phenomenon, there is a multitude of partnerships, 
projects, investment initiatives, business deals, and exchanges of all kinds binding the territories 
covered by the Northern Dimension together. 
In addition, there are several so called ‘Euroregions’ in the Northern Dimension that 
represent special politically and economically integrated cross-border zones between Russia and 
the EU. According to Liikanen (2005), the concept of the Euroregion was first applied to the 
Dutch-German border in the 1960s, and later became a common model for advancing regional 
cross-border cooperation along the internal borders of the EU. With the enlargement of the 
European Union and the development of the European integration, the concept of Euroregions 
was extrapolated to the EU external borders and became an important instrument for the 
facilitation of the European integration and coordination of cross-border programs, activities, and 
partnerships. 
The first Euroregion binding Russian and EU borders was Euroregion Baltic (ERB) that 
was established in 1998 and represented an enhanced political and economic cooperation in the 
south-east of the Baltic Sea region, consisting of eight regions of Denmark, Lithuania, Poland, 
Russia and Sweden. The main aims of the ERB have been improving life conditions for its 
inhabitants, promoting bonds and contacts among local communities, and providing measures for 
a more sustainable development within the region.14 Comprising the regions from different EU 
member states and Russia, Euroregion Baltic “constitutes the operational network of substantial 
                                                 
14 For more information on the Euroregions, see the complete list of Euroregions, available at  
http://www.mcrit.com/espon_scenarios/visions_euroregions.htm 
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and effective links across the borders, facilitating the promotion of political dialogue and reform, 
as well as sustainable, economic, social and environmental development, and thus strengthening 
local democracy and fostering people-to-people contacts between civil societies; the cooperation 
actively involves both local and regional authorities, private and public sectors, and NGOs”.15 
At present, there are 9 such Euroregions between Russia and the EU: Baltic, Karelia, 
Neman, Saule, Sesupe, Peipsi, Latvia-Pskov, Estonia-Pskov, and Council of Cooperation of 
Border regions. Euroregion Neman represents political and economic cooperation between 
certain regions of Poland, Lithuania, Byelorussia, and Russia. Saule- Lithuania, Litva, Sweden, 
and Russia. Sesupe –Kaliningrad, Poland, and Lithuania. Peipsi- Estinia and Russia. Latvia-
Pskov- Russian Pskov province and bordering regions of Latvia. Estonia-Pskov - Russian Pskov 
province and bordering regions of Estinia, Council of Cooperation of Border regions – Russia, 
Estinia, and Latvia. And Euroregion Karelia is political cooperation between the Russian 
republic of Karelia and the bordering regions of Finland. Euroregions also play an important role 
in the implementation of the Northern Dimension policies. Figure 2 gives a visual representation 
of all the existing Euroregions in the Northern Dimension.  
 
 
 
 
                                     
 
 
Figure 2: Euroregions16 
                                                 
15 For more information on the Baltic Euroregion, see http://www.euroregionbaltic.eu/background.php 
16 Interactive map of all the ND Euroregions is available at http://www.norden.lt/templates/map/index.html 
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Administratively speaking, Euroregions have different organizational structures, but 
usually they include some sort of steering committee composed of regional and local authorities 
(Liikanen 2005). Liikanen (2005) discussed the importance of the Euroregion Karelia, which can 
be extrapolated to all the existing Euroregions between the EU and Russia: Euroregions are 
unique and important instruments of integration as they “reflect the simultaneous 
internationalisation and regionalization” of the EU-Russian borders and they “mediate between 
supranational, national and regional patterns of interaction”.  
Another important achievement of the Northern Dimension is a special agreement 
between the EU Commission and Russia’s Ministry for Regional Development concerning 
regional cooperation and regional development. In May 2007, the parties signed an agreement 
that helped to establish and support direct legal agreements between the regions of the EU and 
the Russian provinces in the border regions, bypassing national governments.17 The northwestern 
region of Russia, with St. Petersburg at its political and economic center, was set to become the 
test ground for the new forms of direct inter-regional agreements between Russia and the EU. 
The possibility to engage in direct administrative partnerships with the regions of the EU 
countries shows a completely new Russian and EU approach to regional cooperation. 
Another regional cooperation initiative involving a Russian region (southern region) is 
the Black Sea Synergy.18 The Black Sea Synergy is a recent initiative and it complements 
already existing regional cooperation policies of the EU (like TACIS, ENPI and CBC) and the 
EU member states in the Black Sea region. The Black Sea Synergy specifically focuses political 
attention at the regional level and aims at invigorating ongoing cooperation processes. The 
                                                 
17 For more information, see the article in St Petersburg Times, available at 
http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=22120 
18 For more information on the Black Sea Synergy, see http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/blacksea/index_en.htm 
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primary task of this new initiative is therefore the development of cooperation within the Black 
Sea region and also between the region as a whole and the European Union. The Black Sea 
Synergy also aims at linking and coordinating regional and local initiatives so as to prevent 
multiple initiatives working disjointedly towards the same goal. It is focused on supporting and 
enhancing various projects, programs, partnerships and initiatives between the southern Russian 
and European actors by identifying synergies of various partners and basing work on previous 
experience in the region rather than duplicating efforts. Cooperation in the Black Sea Synergy 
covers a wide range of sectors starting from trade, economic cooperation, business and 
investment and ending with environment and civil society development and culture. 
The Black Sea Synergy (Figure 3) completes the ‘chain’ of regional cooperation 
frameworks in the EU’s neighborhood, adding to the Euro-Mediterranean Regional Partnership 
and the Northern Dimension. 
 
 
            
 
 
Figure 3: Black Sea Synergy (blue) 
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Therefore, Russia with its northwestern and southern regions is involved in two EU 
regional initiatives: the Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy. Both the northwestern 
and southern regions are important for Russia in terms of regional and cross-border cooperation 
with the EU, and they are also the transit points of oil and gas to Europe, which is Russia’s main 
energy market. The main difference between the northwestern region and the southern region in 
respect to energy though is that the southern region is very rich in oil and gas resources and there 
is already a significant production and exploration activity in the region, while the northwestern 
region lacks significant energy resources and resources available in the Arctic are only potential 
due to the extraction difficulties. Figure 4 displays oil and natural gas exploration and production 
activities in Russia.  
Oil and Gas in the Russian regions
Oil and gas exploration and production in the Russian regions
 
Figure 4: Oil and Gas in the Russian regions 
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Energy issues are recognized as strategically important both for Russia and the EU and 
constitute a separate domain both in the Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy. 
However, the main declared goals of the two regional initiatives are enhancing stability, 
stimulating democratic and economic reforms, and improving governance in the EU neighboring 
countries.19  
Scholars of the regional cooperation mention that the regional cooperation between 
Russia and the EU is much more dynamic, productive and effective than the cooperation 
processes occurring at the national—supra-national political level (Obydenkova, 2006; Prozorov, 
2004).           
 
 
C. COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS, NETWORK GOVERNANCE, EU EXTERNAL 
GOVERNANCE AND RUSSIA    
1. Complex Adaptive Systems and Network Governance         
Public administration and public policy scholars have long considered governance to be 
important for the well-being of a country’s citizens. However, governance was traditionally 
associated with government, with the exercise of power by political leaders (Kjaer, 2004). Public 
administration paradigms were challenged by new social, political and economic realities, and 
there has been a considerable evolution of the concept of government: Wilson’s dichotomy of 
politics and administration was challenged by discretion exercised by administrators in policy 
design, Taylor’s scientific management and the effort to translate administrative problems into 
                                                 
19 Black Sea Synergy section of EU external relations, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/blacksea/index_en.htm; and on the Northern Dimension see 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/index.htm 
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technical–rational domains was only sometimes successful, and Weber’s strict hierarchy was 
significantly challenged by the total quality management movement, the ‘reinventing 
government’ tendency, and the move to devolve authority by involving employees in policy-
making (Fox and Miller, 1995). 
Governance was not used as a separate concept until 1980s. As the world became more 
global economically and politically, new actors entered the arena of public policy and 
administrative issues spilt across territorial boundaries, the concept of governance acquired a 
new meaning, now referring to something broader than government and including policy 
processes and actors outside the narrow realm of government (Kjaer, 2004). 
Yet no common definition of governance seems to emerge in the literature and different 
scholars give different approaches to governance. Some governance theorists still identify 
governance closely with government: “governance is the capacity of government to make and 
implement policy, in other words, to steer society” (in Pierre and Peters, 2000, p.1). This 
definition concerns traditional capacities of governments to steer from the top down and exert 
power and control over social and economic activities. From an institutional perspective, 
governance is about affecting “the frameworks within which citizens and officials act and 
politics occurs, and which shape the identities and institutions of civil society” (March and Olsen, 
1995, p. 6). Hyden (1999, p. 185) approaches governance from a rule-based perspective; he 
defines governance as “the stewardship of formal and informal political rules of the game”. 
According to the scholar, governance is about “setting the rules for the exercise of power and 
setting conflicts over such rules”.  
Marcussen and Torfing (2007) differentiate between ‘government’ and ‘governance’. 
According to them, the term ‘government’ is related to the formal state institutions that are 
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commonly divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches, but at the same time unified 
by their joint monopoly of legitimate, coercive power. ‘Governance’ refers to more or less 
deliberate attempts to govern particular policy areas through negotiated interaction between a 
multiplicity of actors, processes and institutions. 
More and more scholars start to argue that public administration in the 21st century is 
facing a problem that no governmental agency has full responsibility or the leverage to solve 
public and societal problems. According to Kettl (2002), the contemporary policy world has 
become more complex and the traditional hierarchical and authority-based administration system 
can no longer provide a guide to help governments resolve complex problems. Peterson (2003) 
discusses a similar idea that modern democratic governance occurs only rarely via traditional 
Weberian hierarchies or pure ‘markets’; rather, public policies are made via some kind of hybrid 
arrangement involving a wide range of different actors, including private and civil society sector 
actors. 
Recently, various public policy and public administration scholars have tried to tackle the 
problem of complexity of governance by a set of perspectives or frameworks called complex 
adaptive systems (CAS), which represents a systemic and a relatively new way of explaining the 
world and the world’s structures (Holland, 1995; Axelrod and Cohen, 1999; Watts, 2003; 
Comfort, 2002; Anderson, 1999 among others). The proposed theoretical framework is based on 
three different fields: evolutionary biology (adaptation through selection and reproduction), 
computer science (engineer perspective on how systems can be designed to work together) and 
social design (mostly structuralist aspects of organizational theory and strategic aspects of game 
theory). Complex adaptive systems approach treats universe as a non-linear entity; authors 
working in CAS framework claim that the simple rules of cause and effect adopted by the 
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bureaucratic paradigm do not work and it is not possible to understand the world by simply 
decomposing it into smaller parts, as the proponents of the classic public administration 
suggested. 
According to complex adaptive systems, there are different systems in the world 
interacting with each other, for instance, administrative, environmental, and economic systems; 
those systems are complex and constantly evolve and change. And the key to understanding the 
way the world is structured is to take a holistic view of these complexities.  Agents in complex 
systems constantly interact with each other thereby exchanging ideas, resources and information, 
and receiving feedback. CAS scholars claim that it is crucial to understand the relations and 
interactions between the agents and those interactions are more important than the properties of 
the agents (Fryer, 2008; Semitiel Garcia, 2006, p.8).20  
Complexity does not mean chaos, because chaos presumes disorder, whereas complexity 
still has structure and room for intervention and improvement (Edmonds, 1999). Though the 
world is a complex system, systems are nested within other systems and complexity has certain 
structure. And learning occurs through the interactions among agents and therefore the agents are 
able to initiate change and transform the whole system. One of the main questions asked by the 
public administration researchers and public policy scholars working in CAS tradition is how to 
manage complexity for improvement of governance (Comfort, 2002; Holland, 1995; Axelrod 
and Cohen, 1999). Complexity cannot be eliminated nor it can be absolutely controlled; it can 
only be understood, influenced and improved. Thus the authors assume that complexity can be 
an asset if we can understand its structure and dynamics (Holland, 1995; Watts, 2003). What we 
need to understand is leverage points and trade-offs of a complex system so that we can detect 
                                                 
20   Complex adaptive systems is not only a new theoretical framework, but also a set of developed practical models 
that are now largely used by various practitioners, for more information see Piter Fryer’s website:      
http://www.trojanmice.com/index.htm 
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the situations where there may be resistance to policy change or when small interventions may 
have large effects. 
There are certain principles underlying the complex adaptive systems framework 
(Axelrod and Cohen, 1999): 
• Agents interact with their environment, including other agents. 
• Each agent has a strategy to respond to its environment and to pursue its goals. 
• Agents change strategies according to their performance based on some measure of 
success.  
• Copying is an important practice that affects agent’s strategies. 
• Different types of agents and strategies co-exist in a system. 
• Systems have interaction patterns that determine which pairs of agents are likely to 
interact and which pairs are unlikely. 
• A system is complex when there are strong interactions among its agents so that current 
events heavily influence the probabilities of later events. 
• Systems can change through the change in agents and their strategies. 
• If a change leads to improvement according to some measure of success, it is called 
adaptation. 
• Complex adaptive system is the one that contains agents that seek to adapt. 
• Change in agents and their strategies leads to change in the system, which in return 
changes the agents—co-evolutionary process. 
• Complexity often results in features called emergent properties- properties of the system 
that the separate parts do not have. 
 
Complex adaptive systems’ approach to governance stipulates that socio-economic, 
political, and administrative systems are complex adaptive systems with feedbacks between 
multiple scales characterized by historical path- dependency, non-linear dynamics, and changing 
patterns of interactions among systems’ agents (Baker and Eckerberg, 2008). According to CAS 
framework, for better interpretation of governance in contemporary world it is important to take 
into consideration different public-private-civil society partnerships, joint projects and initiatives, 
and collaborative programs, and patterns of interaction among different actors participating in 
these programs.  
Kettl (2002) suggests ‘governance’ as a new approach for facing the public 
administration challenges in the 21st century. Today’s problems transcend any boundaries 
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between public, private, and non-profit sectors and the distinction of problems between all three 
sectors have become difficult to recognize, that is why, according to Kettl,  there is a need for a 
governance approach that acknowledges that all three sectors have to come together to solve 
problems. As public, private, and nonprofit organizations share in the delivery of public services, 
Kettl (2002) argues that there is a need for a model that encompasses this sharing and enhances 
the delivery of public services; such a model would take into consideration complex 
interorganizational networks that have been layered on top of hierarchical organizations and 
interorganizational processes that complement (or sometimes even substitute) traditional 
authority. Rhodes (1997, p.15) also discusses the ‘new use of governance’ and claims that in 
contemporary societies governance “refers to self-organizing, interorganizational networks 
characterized by interdependence, resource- exchange, rules of the game, and significant 
autonomy from the state”. 
The terms such as interorganizational networks, public-private-third-sector networks, and 
multi-level governance are now frequently used to describe the new ways of policy-making in 
the public sector (Powell, 1990). This new use of governance is referred to a multitude of 
different actors that have entered policy-making arenas and together with state actors and 
institutions participate in the authoritative allocation of values. Numerous scholars state that the 
new approach to governance involves a variety of actors from all the domains of social activity 
including private actors, markets and regulatory agencies, and civil society actors, and has to do 
more with how the center interacts with society and asks whether there is more self-steering in 
networks (Peters and Pierre, 1998).  
Network governance scholars claim that the discussion about governance is best 
understood as part of a wider debate about the growing porosity of national borders and its 
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possible consequences for political authority (Marcussen and Torfing, 2007). According to Pierre 
and Peters (2000), the traditional political authority has become largely displaced and 
fragmented as a result of political and economic globalization and regional integration processes. 
The epicenters of politics may no longer have clear geographic orienteers, because “the 
symmetry between traditional territorial boundaries and political authority that used to define 
politics is being undermined” (Della Sala, 2001).  
Various public policy and public administration scholars (Pierre, 2000; Pierre and Peters, 
2000; Strange, 1996; Cox, 1997) discuss the concept of a decline of the state, which occurs due 
to the new challenges to nation states such as transnational and sub-national forces and 
nongovernmental organizations and other parts of civil society. The fragmentation is reflected in 
the blurring of the boundaries between public and private realms, which are sometimes seen as 
obsolete domains preventing from finding appropriate solutions to emerging policy problems. 
Scholars claim that thinking in terms of binaries such as state-society or public-private is 
outdated and constitutes a possible obstacle to governing. Hirst (2000) calls this a “post-political 
search for regulation and accountability”.  
Network governance proponents claim that conditions in contemporary world lead to the 
conclusion that we need to find more flexible and indirect forms of governance to respond in a 
timely way to rapidly changing economic and social conditions (Ruzza and Sala, 2007). 
Different scholars and researchers emphasize that the large part of the regulation can now be 
carried out by a broad range of new actors in new policy arenas that do not fit in well with the 
hierarchical organization of political power associated with national governments (Della Sala, 
2001). Marcussen and Torfing (2007) argue that “modern society is subject to an ongoing 
differentiation process that results in the proliferation of an increasing number of relatively 
31 
autonomous systems, sectors and organizations”. Consequently, policy problems become more 
and more complex and the attempts to solve them face a series of contradictory demands and 
dilemmas. Many theorists tend to see the increasing prominence of governance networks in 
public governance as a functional response to the increasingly complex, fragmented, and 
dynamic character of the contemporary world.   
Modern governance, therefore, requires the information of complex adaptive systems of 
interorganizational interaction and coordination. For instance, Louise Comfort’s ‘Cities at Risk: 
Hurricane Katrina and the Drowning of New Orleans’ (2006) offers observations and 
recommendations for both local and federal public officials for preventing other cities from the 
failures that occurred in the management of the hurricane Katrina crisis. The recommendations 
include creating a model of civic engagement that includes participation of not only citizens, but 
the private sector and non-profit organizations and that establishes effective communication and 
coordination among different actors in varying states of emergency. 
According to the network governance model, the state does not withdraw from the 
policy-making arena and become completely impotent; rather it “loses the capacity for direct 
control and replaces control function with a capacity for influence” (Peters and Pierre, 1998). In 
the network governance approach, government actors are conceptualized in a continuous process 
of interaction and communication with the members of the relevant networks and governance is 
accomplished through complex decentralized structures of private, public, and civil society 
actors. Sorensen and Torfing (2005) define ‘governance network’ as  
• a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent , but operationally autonomous 
actors who interact through negotiations that involve bargaining, deliberation and intense power 
struggles; 
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• which take place within a relatively institutionalized framework of contingently articulated 
rules, norms, knowledge and social imaginaries; 
• that is self-regulating within limits set by external agencies and 
• which contribute to the production of public purpose in the broad sense of visions, ideas, plans 
and regulations. 
Reinicke and Deng claim that a typical governance network “combines the voluntary 
energy and legitimacy of the civil society sector with the financial muscle and interest of the 
business and the enforcement and the rule-making power and coordination and capacity-building 
skills of states and international organizations” (Reinicke and Deng, 2002). 
According to Sorensen and Torfing (2005, p. 197), governance networks can take many 
different forms: “they can either be self-grown or initiated from above. They might be dominated 
by loose and informal contacts or take the form of tight and formalized networks. They can be 
intra- or interorganizational, short-lived or permanent, and have a sector-specific or society-wide 
scope. The multiple forms of governance networks attest to the broad relevance of the concept 
for describing contemporary forms of societal governance.” Some scholars take a more narrow 
approach to governance networks specifying that they usually represent clusters of 
interconnected actors in a specific policy arena (policy network) with each actor having 
influence over policy-making processes and interested in policy outcomes (Peterson, 2003; 
Wright, 1988).  
From a functional perspective, the main goal of network governance is “to create a 
synergy between different competences and sources of knowledge in order to deal with complex 
and interlinked problems” (Dedeurwaerdere, 2005). Governance networks emerge for a variety 
of reasons instigated by the necessity and willingness to cooperate (Alter and Hage, 1993). 
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Network governance approach interprets policy making as the result of complex interactions 
among policy actors at different policy arenas, and assumes that the patterns of these interactions 
explain policy outcomes (Kenis and Schneider, 1991). According to the network governance 
literature, modern society is functionally differentiated and complex interorganizational networks 
control significant resources in different policy sectors and have an important impact on the 
design and implementation of public policies (Marsh, 1998).  
In the literature on network governance analysis, policy network is usually used as the 
main unit of analysis, but scholars differ on several methodological aspects including 
nomenclature, characteristics of relationships among network agents, and the importance of 
structure versus agency, whether agents are individuals or organizations, and whether to treat 
policy networks as independent or dependent variables (Mikkelsen, 2006). There is extensive 
criticism of contemporary policy network analysis due to the existence of these methodological 
differences and the debate on the importance of policy networks (which networks are important 
and which are not). Additionally, network model raises serious questions about appropriate 
measures of efficiency and accountability of overall network governance. 
As far as efficiency is concerned, due to competing interests, self-organizing networks 
can block implementation and become inefficient in delivering public good, or they can increase 
efficiency by cooperating in policy implementation. Pierre and Peters (2000) claim that in the 
new governance theory, networks can have both negative and positive impacts on steering 
capacity. This leads to a concern raised by all the approaches to governance: how to steer, but 
also how to improve accountability. According to Pierre and Peters, in this respect governance 
resurrects an old discussion about the relationship between legitimacy and efficiency. 
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As far as accountability is concerned, networks can be extremely hard to hold 
accountable; thus their strength that they blur boundaries and can change rapidly to meet 
changing social, economic and environmental conditions can turn out to be their major weakness. 
For instance, European Union networks are often criticized for the lack of accountability and 
democratic deficit: there are many instances when EU networks allowed more powerful 
stakeholders to succeed over smaller, often less experienced and resourced agents (Mitchell, 
2005). “This is due to the lack of formal structure inherent in the negotiations among EU 
institutions and regional or local actors. With so many actors and institutions contributing to the 
EU processes of policymaking, it becomes difficult to hold any one player accountable” 
(Mitchell, 2005). 
Another critique of the network governance model is that it seems to be most relevant in 
the European Union’s multi-level governance context and it might lack applicability to many 
other contexts. While the network model might be working in the European context, in other 
contexts, as Olsen argues, bureaucracy overlaps and coexists with more contemporary market 
and network organizations and still retains significant control and regulatory power (Olsen, 
2005). 
Another important issue is that depending on cultural and historical experience different 
countries have different views on network governance. For instance, according to Marcussen and 
Torfing (2007), in Northern and Western Europe and within the European Union, governance 
networks are increasingly seen as an effective, efficient and legitimate way of designing and 
implementing public policy. At the same time in Southern and Eastern Europe, many people look 
at EU governance networks with suspicion. In Southern Europe, people used to associate 
networks with clientelism, nepotism, corruption and mafia techniques, whereas in Eastern 
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Europe people often associated networks with the informal influence of elites and old communist 
cliques and old communist traditions. 
However, despite all the legitimate criticism, it is generally accepted that in some cases it 
is crucial to apply network governance model to the analysis of the complex structures of 
interaction among various policy actors involved in solving evolving complex economic, social, 
political, and environmental problems to be able to grasp the complexity of policy processes and 
accurately explain and predict policy outcomes.                                          
2. EU External Governance and Russia 
The literature on the EU governance distinguishes two types of governance: internal and 
external (Peterson, 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). The internal dimension 
concerns the design, formulation and implementation of public policies within the EU, while the 
external dimension is related to the export of the EU standards and policies to non-member states. 
Scholars who deal with the analysis of the EU-related democratization and governance 
transformation processes in candidate and accession countries are mostly concerned with the 
external dimension of EU governance. 
Scholars of the external dimension of EU governance discuss two aspects of external 
governance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). The first aspect concerns the question of 
how the policy transfer happens, for example, through which governance mode the policy is 
transferred or which form it takes. The second is related to the transfer of the particular EU 
governance model, network governance, which is identified as characteristic of the EU (Stephen, 
1997). Therefore, the second aspect is related to “the substance of governance modes, and to 
what extent these affect policy-making processes and relations between actors in external states” 
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(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). This dissertation focuses on the second aspect of the 
EU external governance.  
As mentioned above, networks are a distinctive form of governance and refer to 
governance structures that take the form of interconnected private, public, and civil society 
actors that interact in a horizontal and coordinated manner. Analysts of EU network governance 
are focused on explaining policy outcomes “by investigating how networks, which facilitate 
bargaining between stakeholders over policy design and processes, are structured in a particular 
sector” (Peterson, 2003). 
Hay (1998) defines EU governance networks as “strategic alliances forged around 
common policy agendas of mutual advantage through collective action”. Agents pursue 
strategies, which in turn have an impact on the structures in which agency takes place. Agents 
pursue strategies not in a static manner, but are involved in strategic learning, in a process of 
developing awareness of structures and constraints or opportunities in those structures. Structures 
on their part are strategically selective, favoring certain strategies above others (Hay, 1998). 
While EU network governance is widely studied within the EU political space, the 
academic field of EU studies still pays limited attention to the EU’s role as a network player in 
the policy-making processes in external states. Lavenex (2008, 2004) explores the modes of 
EU’s policy transfer to non-EU member states and argues that the scope and shape of policy 
transfer is conditioned on the institutional links between the EU and the non-candidate countries. 
However, besides institutional links, the EU is deeply involved in all sorts of cooperation 
projects with the neighboring states, and this cooperation is functioning in the mode of network 
structures composed by complex interactions among public sector actors, nongovernmental 
organizations, businesses, educational institutions, and other actors involved in cooperation 
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projects. There have been very few studies of how these cooperation networks affect policy 
making and influence relations among policy actors in the non-EU member states. Almost no 
research has been conducted to account for the effects of the EU-related networks on the policy 
making in non-member states at the sub-national level.  
Tiirmaa-Klaar (2006) asserts that more attention should be given to EU network 
governance in respect to non- candidate countries and gives an example of how the European 
Neighborhood Policy facilitates cooperation within the networks between the EU and non-EU 
actors and enhances the advancement of democratic governance in EU neighboring states and 
regions. 
Klitsounova (2006) argues that Russia is becoming more and more involved in the 
European governance networks. She analyzes human rights policy networks and finds that the 
interactions and cooperation between human rights NGOs at both Russian and EU levels have 
created important venues for exchange of information, ideas, resources, and practices. According 
to her, “many Russian NGOs have become deeply involved, either directly or through their 
umbrella organizations, in pan-European human rights policy networks – where NGO, 
government and international organization actors share the rhetoric, the language, and scholarly 
discourses that shape the terms of public debate over human rights issues and underpin relevant 
policies.” She claims that at present, considerable number of Russian human rights organizations 
seems to be integrated into the European human rights space and to be working on projecting 
European norms and practices into Russia. As another example, Franz Kumpi (2005) claims that 
the EU plays an important role as a network actor in promoting democracy through social NGOs 
in Russia by creating links between governmental/municipal organizations and NGOs regarding 
the provision of social services to beneficiary groups. 
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Although Russia is not an EU-member state or a candidate country, it has become 
involved in the European integration processes under different frameworks and modes of 
cooperation.  In the early 1990s, the EU TACIS (technical assistance to CIS countries) program 
enhanced Russia’s transition to a market economy and established economic and social ties 
between Russia and the EU thereby creating conditions for Russia’s integration into the common 
European space. The EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), the mutual 
cooperation strategies developed by each of the sides, and the EU-Russia Four Common Spaces 
framework provided basis for intensified interaction and cooperation between the two sides in a 
wide range of areas. Although at the national level certain political tensions sometimes slowed 
down cooperation, at the sub-national level cooperation has been evolving at a fast pace and 
according to different analyses has been more productive, concrete and specific than the work 
that has been done under the Moscow-Brussels agreements.   
The provinces of the Russian Federation extensively participate in different EU projects 
and initiatives; and at present, there are more EU cooperation programs with the Russian regions 
than with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus taken altogether.21 In addition to the EU programs and 
projects, which are specifically targeted at the Russian regions, Russia is also an important 
participant in the Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy regional policies of the EU, 
where Russian provincial and regional governments, organizations, companies, educational 
institutions, and other regional actors are engaged in regional cooperation with the EU partners 
(a variety of actors residing in the EU member-sates) and are linked together through 
participation in all kinds of cooperation projects. 
Scholars who conduct comparative analysis of various regions within a country claim that 
connectedness among organizations and between organizations and local governments can 
                                                 
21 See EU External Delegation to Russia resources, available at  http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/index.htm 
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substantially account for the variation in governance policies. For instance, Robert Putnam 
(1993) makes an intense comparative study of Italy’s regional governments (north versus south), 
and argues that the success of regional governments and advanced democratic development in 
the north are associated with ‘civic connection’, ‘a dense network of secondary associations.’ 
Putnam asserts that the northern regions of Italy are characterized by a dense network of various 
civil society organizations and a strong dialogue between regional governments and 
organizations, which creates an ‘active culture of civic engagement’ and builds social capital in 
the regions; it also facilitates the workings of the society as a whole by creating ‘horizontal ties 
of solidarity’. 
The EU-Russia cooperation processes at the regional level are establishing links among 
Russian civil society organizations, companies, and educational institutions and their respective 
EU partners, and most important, among all these constituents and provincial and regional 
governments of Russia and the EU member states. It is important to explore whether these 
networks can increase the level of democratic governance in the Russian regions involved in the 
regional cooperation processes and whether differences in the composition, configuration, 
strength, maturity, and effectiveness of these networks can account for the variation in 
democratic governance between the northwestern and the southern regions.  At the same time, it 
is important to explore local and regional factors that facilitate or inhibit regional cooperation 
between Russia and the EU. This is important for predicting the outcomes of the regional 
cooperation processes and future development of the regional cooperation, and social, economic, 
and political change in the regions.       
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3. Sub-national Integration Analytical Framework  
 
There are several theoretical models that are relevant for the research on the democratic 
governance in the Russian regions in connection with the EU-Russia regional cooperation. 
However, their thorough investigation is not the main purpose of this study; rather they are 
provided for better conceptualization of the regional cooperation and sub-national integration 
phenomena.  
First, certain aspects of the Europeanization theory (Morlino, 2002; Cowles, Green, 
Caporasso, and Risse 2001) can be applied to this analysis. According to the Europeanization 
framework, sub-national integration in the form of enhanced cooperation between the Russian 
regions and the EU may cause change at the domestic level as the regional cooperation networks 
between the Russian regional actors and European regional, national and supranational actors 
can allow for the gradual transfer of the EU democratic norms and values into the domestic sub-
national politics.  
Second, consideration of EU external governance models (Lavenex, 2008, 2004; 
Klitsounova, 2006; Tiirmaa-Klaar, 2006; Noutcheva, Emerson, 2005) can be helpful in 
understanding the EU’s involvement in the regional decision-making processes through the 
modes of horizontal interaction between the EU and the Russian institutions.  
Third, the aspects of the theory of regionalization (Obydenkova, 2006; Makarychev, 
2000) stipulating that regions bordering foreign countries might be more prone to external 
influences can be helpful in explaining the development of the sub-national regionalism between 
the EU and the regions of Russia bordering the EU.   
Fourth, Lankina and Getachew’s (2006) geographic incremental theory of 
democratization is useful in connecting the EU’s external influence in terms of assistance 
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programs and a region’s geographic location (in respect to closeness to the EU) factors to 
internal sub-national democratization processes.  
Based on these theories I develop sub-national integration analytical framework for the 
study of the EU-Russia relations at the regional level. The essential components of the 
framework are: 
? The level of democratic governance in the Russian regions depends on the intensity and 
depth of a region’s integration with the EU.  
? Integration is driven by enhanced cooperation between the regions of Russia and the EU 
regions, countries, and institutions in the form of the complex networks of interaction 
among the EU and Russian public, private and civil society sector actors; therefore 
integration is treated as a bottom-up process rather than a policy imposed from the above.  
? The density and the efficiency of the regional cooperation networks (therefore the 
intensity and depth of integration) depend on the regional social, ethno-cultural, 
historical and economic factors.  
 
 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN  
This dissertation employs multiple research methods: econometric analysis of 
longitudinal data, longitudinal interorganizational network analysis, multiple regression analysis 
using network data, and interviews. In general, it follows three pronged research methodology.  
The first part of the analysis is focused on the longitudinal analysis of democratic 
governance in the 88 Russian provinces over the period of 13 years (1991-2004) and 
identification of the major factors that have statistically significant impact on the level of 
democratic governance in the provinces.  
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The second part represents an in-depth comparative longitudinal network analysis of the 
variables affecting the level of democratic governance in the Russian regions: EU-Russia 
regional cooperation and energy structures on the basis of the northwestern and southern regions. 
These regions are treated as units of analysis and contexts of analysis. I investigate within-region 
relationships among energy companies and provincial governments (energy network) and public, 
economic, and civil society regional actors participating in the EU-related regional cooperation 
processes (regional cooperation network) and compare the regions in respect to the effectiveness 
of these regional structures. Tilly (1984) called this approach ‘variation-finding’, in the sense of 
comparing the relationships between the same variables in different regional settings.  The main 
strategy is to treat each region as a context that holds a set of embedded social, economic, and 
political structures relating to policy-making. Through the lens of the network analysis, I identify 
most central and powerful actors controlling the energy sector and regional integration processes 
at the regional level and examine the patterns of interorganizational interests, network 
centralization, network composition, and the probability of consensus and collective decision 
making in each region. I also explore the factors that affect and predict the positions of centrality 
and power in the regional energy and cooperation structures.  
The third part of the analysis explores historical, cultural, geopolitical, and economic 
factors that explain the differences in the composition, evolution and development of regional 
cooperation and energy structures in the northwestern and southern regions based on the 
interviews with the regional public officials, cultural and business leaders, NGO representatives, 
professors, and energy sector representatives. The third part also discusses important questions 
concerning the breadth of organizational interests in the regional policy issues, the participation 
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of regional actors in policy events, and the dynamics of cooperative efforts in influencing 
regional decision-making processes.  
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III. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN THE RUSSIAN REGIONS 
                                         
 
 
 
A. INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY OF THE RUSSIAN REGIONS 
The contemporary world economy and politics are characterized by complex multi-level 
processes.  One the one hand, the forces of globalization facilitate the rapid growth of 
international linkages, foster economic interdependence, and enhance the flows of capital, labor, 
and trade across the boundaries of nation-states. The power of national governments is constantly 
challenged by the new powerful actors such as transnational corporations, nongovernmental 
organizations, terrorist networks, and regional and global institutions. Rosenau even speaks 
about the bifurcation of global political system where a complex emerging autonomous multi-
centric world competes with the long-standing state-centric world of sovereign states (Rosenau, 
1992). The current financial crisis shows that the world has become interconnected to a great 
extent and events in one country/group of countries have a potential to affect the whole world 
and national governments are no longer able to respond to some of the challenges on their own. 
On the other hand, different scholars speak about the process of regionalization- 
increased regional cooperation and the formation of economically, socially, and politically 
integrated regional units consisting of either several countries (e.g. European Union, or ASEAN 
in East Asia) or countries and regions of countries (e.g. regional cooperation in the Northern 
Dimension, or regions of countries (e.g. Euroregions in the Northern Dimension or economic 
zone covering Russian Amur region and the bordering region of China). 
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According to Makarychev (2000), previously, international relations was the exclusive 
domain of the central government, while nowadays various sub-national units establish links 
with their foreign counterparts, which significantly impacts the formation of foreign policy and 
has important regional and international outcomes. According to the scholar, the patterns of 
regionalization often transcend the borders of states and regionalization is often conceptualized 
in terms of ‘complexes,’ ‘networks,’ ‘flows,’ or ‘mosaics.’ “Migration, markets, and social 
networks may lead to increased interaction and interconnectedness, tying together parts of 
existing states and creating new cross-border regions. The core of such ‘transnational 
regionalism’ might be economic (as in the development of industrial corridors, or networks 
linking major industrial centers), or it can be built around a high level of human interpenetration” 
(Makarychev, 2000). 
Western scholars tend to view Russia as a monolithic entity where foreign policy and 
participation in international relations is the sole prerogative of Moscow. However, after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian regions have been very active in establishing international 
contacts and have played a significant role in shaping Russia’s policies concerning its regional 
environment. Due to the economic factor (the EU is Russia’s primary trading partner and the EU 
countries account for more that 75% of foreign direct investment into Russia’s economy), 
Russia’s regions have been mainly focused on establishing links with their European 
counterparts, however, regions in the Far East, like Primorski and Amur region, have pursued 
regional economic integration policies towards Korea, China and Japan. Therefore, geographic 
factor is important in explaining international proactiveness of the Russian regions and the 
formation of regionalism along the Russian borders. 
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Present-day Russia consists of 89 subjects (roughly equivalent to provinces), which are 
called oblasts, republics, autonomous districts, and “krays” (areas). The Constitution of the 
Russian Federation (article 5.1) stipulates that republics, areas, oblasts, autonomous districts, and 
capital cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, enjoy equal rights. However, according to the regional 
expert Akimov (2004), it is not exactly true. The present composition of the Russian Federation 
is to a great extent inherited from the Soviet period, when various republics and autonomous 
districts based on the ethnicities that had previously been part of Imperial Russia, were created 
along with the ‘oblasts’ and ‘areas’ with the majority of the Russian population. At present, 
republics that are built on the ethnic basis (even though in most cases, the ethnic group after 
which the subject was named nowadays does not make the majority of the subject’s population) 
are given the right to use certain attributes of a sovereign nation-state: the heads of the republics 
are called ‘presidents’ (not ‘governors’), they have their own constitutions, both Russian and 
native languages of the title nations are considered official, etc. (Akimov, 2004). 
As far as the regions’ ability to engage in international activity is concerned, the 
Constitution stipulates that foreign policy and international relations, international treaties and 
foreign economic relations, and war and peace issues are the responsibility of the central 
government (article 71). Coordination of international economic and social activity of the 
subjects of the Russian Federation, and the implementation of international treaties, is considered 
to be the sphere of joint jurisdiction of the federal center and the subjects of the Russian 
Federation that are considered to be equal in their rights to pursue contact with foreign actors 
(article 72.1). According to the Federation Treaty, the subjects of the Russian Federation are 
autonomous participants in international contacts and regional actors may engage in any 
cooperation initiatives with foreign actors, but any treaties between the subjects of the Russian 
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Federation and foreign actors are concluded in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Makarychev, 2000; Pustovarov, 1994). The federal Law ‘On Coordination of International and 
Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation’, which came into force in January 1999, 
confirmed the ability of the Russian regions to establish international relations, for instance, open 
regional representative constituents abroad, sign agreements or engage in cooperative initiatives 
with international partners (Rizhkin, 2001). According to Makarychev (2000), politically 
speaking, there are two interrelated forms of international participation by the sub-national 
territorial units. First, they try to influence the decision-making process of the central 
government from within. Second, they may establish their own networks of transnational 
contacts and regional actors may engage in cooperation projects and partnerships with foreign 
actors. 
It is important to note that provinces that are part of the so called, ‘border regions’ 
(regions that border foreign countries) have been granted more autonomy to pursue independent 
policies concerning their engagement in international trade, attraction of foreign investment, and 
conclusion of agreements with the bordering foreign actors. Provinces in the ‘border regions’ 
have special bilateral agreements with the federal government concerning their ability to engage 
in intense international and inter-regional cooperation with foreign actors. Russian northwestern 
and southern regions have the status of border regions; therefore, northwestern and southern 
provinces have such agreements in force. Additionally, some of the republics that are not situated 
along the border of the Russian Federation (e.g. Tatarstan) have also acquired such bilateral 
agreements with the federal center.  
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Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the international activity of the Russian regions 
is regulated by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Federation Treaty, and individual 
bilateral agreements between the federal government and the subjects of the Russian Federation. 
According to Gella (2007), after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the guidance of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian regions actively worked at new agreements with 
international actors and by 2000, the area covered by various interregional agreements had 
increased greatly with the majority of the agreements concluded with European governments, 
ministries and departments. The scholar asserts that regional cooperation between the Russian 
regions and their foreign partners has a complex structure as it is carried out on two levels: 
bilateral (with individual foreign countries or their regions), and multilateral (with groups of 
countries or regions, e.g. Arctic Region’s Council, Nordic Council of Ministers, etc.), while the 
most common forms of cooperation are interregional relations encompassing economic, cultural 
and social contacts. Prozorov (2004) claims that from the perspective of public administration, 
regional cooperation unfolds at two levels: local or municipal government (micro-regionalism) 
and the regional (or Federal District) levels. 
Despite Putin’s notorious ‘vertical of power’ reforms that replaced the direct election of 
the regional executive-branch heads (including the presidents of the so-called ethnic republics) 
with a system under which regional legislatures confirm candidates nominated by the president 
by a simple majority voting, Russian regions retain considerable degree of autonomy and 
regional policies vary greatly, influenced more by local and external factors than by the federal 
government (Makarychev, 2000). Prozorov argues that the term ‘vertical of power’, applied to 
Putin’s administrative reforms, “is unfortunate since it connotes the hierarchical subordination of 
the lower levels of government to upper ones, which in contemporary Russia is made impossible 
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by the federative constitutional structure and the direct elections of local and regional 
authorities” (Prozorov, 2004, p.4). According to Prozorov and other scholars, Putin’s reforms did 
not alter the center-region power-sharing arrangement, laid out in the Constitution, nor did they 
increase the federal authorities’ influence and control over regional internal decision-making 
processes. The scholars claim that the reforms were rather targeted at reviving federal 
instruments of dealing with the violations of the Constitution and federal laws, frequently 
practiced by regional authorities, as in the 1990s federal governmental constituents in the regions 
gradually became subordinate to regional governments. 
Additionally, scholars argue that as far as the international activity of the Russian regions 
is concerned, it not only successfully continued under Putin, but the degree and scope of 
cooperation between the regions of Russia and international actors, especially the EU actors, 
have significantly increased over the past decade (Gella, 2007; Prozorov, 2004). Rather than 
hinder international regional cooperation, Putin’s presidency, actually opened new possibilities 
for regionalism that are relevant to the development of EU-Russian relations (Prozorov, 2004).  
Such possibilities include the development of local self-government through intense cross-border 
cooperation with the EU in the northwestern region, the establishment of the Euroregions, the 
participation of the southern provinces in the EU Black Sea Synergy regional cooperation 
initiative, and other regional opportunities outlined in the ‘1999 Russian Strategy on EU up to 
2010’. 
Scholars of EU external governance, EU neighborhood policy and regionalism tend to 
assume that the EU is the initiator of the regional cooperation and the Russian side is simply the 
recipient and has to adapt to the EU policies; however, they should take into account the fact that 
the Russian side (both regions and the federal center) has been very active in designing and 
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developing regional cooperation with the EU and Russian public, social, and economic actors 
have been co-financing regional cooperation projects, partnerships, programs, and events equally 
with the European actors, and Russian plans and approaches to regional development seem to 
overlap with the EU’s regional cooperation policies to a great extent. 
The EU and Russian regional cooperation policies create new opportunities for the 
Russian and the European public, social and economic actors functioning in the areas involved in 
the regional cooperation; however, it is up to the regional actors how they use these opportunities, 
and the development of the regional cooperation depends to a great extent on the regional actors’ 
proactiveness towards each other and on the local factors that either facilitate or inhibit regional 
cooperation. There have been no studies conducting comparative analysis of the regional 
cooperation with the EU in the Russian northwestern and southern regions and exploring its 
effects on the social, political, and economic infrastructure in the regions, as well as assessing the 
local factors that impede or foster regional cooperation. 
Although in the Russian foreign policy,  the EU neighborhood policy, and various 
regional statements, the EU-Russia regional cooperation in the North-West and the South is 
claimed to be ‘strategically important’ for both parties, according to the number and the breadth 
of regional initiatives (the variety of actors participating in a project/program) in the Northern 
Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy, cooperation between the Russian northwestern region 
and Europe (EU institutions, member-sates, regions of EU member-sates and European actors) 
seems to be far more intense than cooperation between the southern region and Europe. Scholars 
note that out of all the subjects of the Russian Federation, the northwestern provinces have been 
most active in shaping Russia’s foreign policy in respect to the bordering European countries and 
at the same time pursued their own strategy of establishing international contacts with the 
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European regions and countries thus becoming deeply involved in various regional cooperation 
networks (Prozorov, 2004; Obydenkova, 2006; Lankina, 2004). Table 1 displays regional 
cooperation initiatives in the northwestern and the southern regions in 2006 divided into the 
areas of cooperation.        
 
 
Table 1: Number of initiatives in the areas of cooperation 
 
 
    Area of cooperation ND 
Initiatives (2006) 
Black Sea 
Initiatives (2006) 
Public administration 73 17 
Social sphere, health and 
environment 
237 56 
Education, research, and science 79 23 
Economic sphere 552 98 
Mass media 75 11 
Cultural sphere 68 19 
Total 1084 224 
  
 
The main declared goals of both the EU Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy 
initiatives are fostering democratization, improving governance, and developing 
interorganizational networking in the North-West and the Black Sea region. Both Russian and 
Western scholars claim that Russian regions vary significantly in governance and have different 
levels of democracy (Golosov, 2004; Lankina, 2004; Hale, 2005; Hahn, 1994; Henderson, 1995, 
Meddras, 1999). According to various studies mentioned above, the northwestern region has a 
much higher level of democratic governance than the southern region. 
Scholars claim that geographic location and international contacts have had significant 
impact on the regional policy-making processes in the border regions (Pustovarov, 1994; 
Makarychev, 1997). Therefore, advanced level of regional cooperation in the Northern 
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Dimension might be an important factor explaining the difference in the levels of democratic 
governance between the Russian northwestern and southern regions.  In addition, besides the 
sheer number of cooperation initiatives in the regions, there might be important differences in the 
way the regional cooperation is structured (e.g. the level of decentralization of cooperation 
networks or the type of actors that occupy the most central positions in cooperation processes, 
etc.). There are no studies that would explore the differences between the northwestern and 
southern regional cooperation infrastructures and processes and assess their effects on the 
regional development and democratic governance in the northwestern and the southern regions. 
As mentioned above, both the northwestern and the southern regions are heavily involved 
in the transit of oil and gas to Europe. Both regions have also been used as key points for oil and 
gas exports by the sea (Baltic Sea in the northwest and Black Sea in the south). In addition, new 
transit pipeline projects are being developed in the regions: South Stream in the south and Nord 
Stream in the north. Nord Stream is a gas pipeline that will link Russia and the European Union 
via the Baltic Sea. From 2011, it will transport natural gas from Siberia to Greifswald in 
Germany, from where it will branch out west and supply both businesses and private households 
in Europe.22 The target markets for gas supply via Nord Stream are Germany, the UK, the 
Netherlands, France, Denmark and other countries. There are no transit countries on the Nord 
Stream’s route. The Russian onshore section of the Nord Stream is under construction in the 
town of Babayevo (Vologda Oblast) and the section will run from Gryazovets to the coastal 
compressor station at Vyborg in the St Petersburg province. The Russian section of the pipeline 
will also supply gas to the northwestern region of Russia and branch pipeline in Karelia will 
connect the onshore section of the pipeline to Finland. 
                                                 
22 For more information on the Nord Stream project, see http://www.nord-stream.com/en/ 
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In the southern region, in addition to the existing transit Caspian oil routes (e.g. Baku-
Novorossiisk; Tengiz-Novorossiisk that also transfers Kazakh oil) and also Russian oil transit 
(e.g. Suhodolno-Rodionovsk), there have been constructed a Blue Stream pipeline that brings 
Russian gas via the Black Sea to Turkey and then, to the EU.23 In addition, a new South Stream 
project is designed, which will bring gas via the Black Sea directly to the EU member states - 
Bulgaria, Greece, Austria, Hungary, Slovenia and Italy avoiding intermediate transit countries.24 
Due to the EU’s increasing dependency on the Russian oil and gas supplies, the new 
direct pipelines are now the major point of dispute in the EU Community, as the EU’s attempts 
to pursue energy diversification strategies. However, both Russian northwestern and southern 
regions are regarded as crucial points in respect to the existing and potential energy supply 
channels. 
The politics of transit pipelines in the Russian south and north-west is more a domain of 
the central government and energy companies involved in the delivery of resources to Europe. 
Due to the absence of resources, the northwestern region simply transfers resources from 
Siberian and Timano-Pechersky (Nenets autonomous district) oil and gas fields. The 
northwestern region mainly benefits from the transit pipeline projects in terms of investment and 
additional sources of regional revenues that come from the transit sections; however, due to the 
absence of resources of its own, the region is not a player in the domestic, regional, and 
international energy market. The southern region is on the contrary, rich in resources. Besides 
being involved in energy transits, it is also heavily involved in oil and gas exploration and 
production activities and a multitude of energy companies operate in the region. 
                                                 
23 For more information on the Blue Stream project, see 
http://www.saipem.eni.it/module.asp?sect=BlueStream&pag=project-description 
24 For more information on the South Stream project, see http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article27150.shtml 
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The literature on the regional cooperation lacks the elaborate discussion of the 
implications of the energy-related processes occurring in the Northern Dimension and the Black 
Sea Synergy for democratization and governance in the Russian northwestern and southern 
regions. Additionally, there have been very few attempts in the literature to conduct a 
comparative assessment of the impact of the EU-Russia cooperation and regional energy issues 
on the development of economic, social, and political infrastructure and decision-making 
processes in the Russian northwestern and southern regions.  
 
B. THE PROBLEM OF ‘RESOURCE CURSE’ 
As mentioned above, energy relations constitute a very important component of EU-
Russia relations and scholars claim that the dynamic in the field of energy is different from the 
dynamic in the other areas of cooperation, since energy is a very sensitive political issue both for 
Russia and the EU (Monaghan and Montanaro-Jankovski, 2006). 
As far as the energy field is concerned, both political economy and public administration 
literature widely discuss the problem of ‘resource curse’ and the negative relationship between 
energy and democratic governance (Ascher, 2000). Various scholars assert that countries that 
have abundant natural resources usually produce undemocratic policies and suffer from 
corruption and poor governance. Additionally, it is argued that resource-based economies have 
much slower long-term economic growth due to the fact that countries that heavily rely on 
natural resources tend to have very weak institutions and generate poor economic policies 
(Aditya, Rabanal, and Byskov, 1998; Oystein, 2002). 
In the literature on the resource-based economies the most extensively discussed 
argument linking natural resource dependence to poor governance is that resource wealth tends 
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to create incentives for rent-seeking (Gurvich, 2005; Rossii, 2005; Thompson, 2005). According 
to Thompson (2005), “both state and private actors in resource-rich economies may focus on 
capturing the resource rents rather than on wealth creation and may favor the development of 
institutions geared to rent-seeking rather than entrepreneurship”. The scholar also notes that 
“politically, the state’s ability to run on resource rents may well serve to make it less accountable 
than it would otherwise be to those it governs”. Ascher (2000) argues that natural resource rents 
are often the cause of poor governance policies, because public officials manipulate them to 
achieve unpopular or even illegal objectives. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, instead of 
focusing on economic development, Russian political and policy-making activity has been in 
many aspects centered around the conflict over resource rents. Moreover, the competition to 
capture natural resource rents by obtaining control over the energy enterprises and the export of 
primary commodities, especially oil and gas, started well before the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the privatization campaign.   
Another argument connecting natural resources to poor governance is that the 
opportunity to collect significant revenues from the natural resource sector reduces state’s 
incentive to improve its fiscal institutions (Esanov, Raiser, and Buiter, 2001). Additionally, 
resource wealth usually generates complacence in policy-makers and private-sector actors, which 
can significantly affect their motivation and interest in undertaking structural and other measures 
needed to stimulate economic diversification (Thompson, 2005). Resource-based economies are 
highly dependent on volatile commodity prices, and this is argued to be a big threat to economic 
stability and steady long-term growth.  
As far as the problem of natural resources is concerned, the unit of analysis in political 
economy and public administration literature has always been a state. There have been no 
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attempts in the literature to test the ‘resource curse’ theory at the sub-national level. I believe in 
the Russian context (given the size of the country and considerable variation in the regions’ 
energy exploration, production and exporting capabilities) it would be important to see how the 
presence of resources and the existence of energy companies in the provinces affect democratic 
governance at the regional level.  
There is substantial variation in dependence on the natural resources in the Russian 
regions: in some regions natural resources account for over 40 % of the region’s GDP, while in 
some regions they account for less than 5%. As far as the link between the energy companies 
operating in the region and their ability to influence policy making is concerned, Hellman and 
Kaufman (2000) assert that in trying to understand the policy process at any level of authority in 
Russia one inevitably faces the phenomenon of the ‘state-capture’, meaning conditions under 
which large enterprises are able to exert influence over the policy-making processes and 
enactment of laws through illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to public 
officials and politicians. Since Russian economy heavily relies on energy revenues, and many 
large enterprises are in the oil and gas sector, energy companies have substantial influence over 
the policy processes in the Russian regions. Therefore, the same phenomenon might be observed 
at the sub-national level as the network of the energy companies and provincial governments 
might have a significant impact on decision-making processes in the regions. 
As far as the northwestern and southern regions are concerned, both regions are 
strategically important for Russia in terms of energy transit lines to the EU (Perret, 2006). 
However, as mentioned above, in terms of energy resources, the southern region has vast oil and 
gas deposits and, as a consequence, is engaged in energy exploration, production, and export 
activities, while the northwestern region lacks resources of its own and simply serves as a transit 
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territory for oil and gas exports. Additionally, there are significantly more energy companies 
operating in the southern region not only because of its vast reserves, but also due to the fact that 
the region has been drawn into the global geopolitics as a transit territory for the Caspian and the 
Central Asian oil, while the northwestern region transfers only Russian oil and gas 
(Sharafutdinova, 2003). 
 
C. ETHNO-CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL PECULIARITIES OF THE 
NORTHWESTERN AND SOUTHERN REGIONS 
In addition to the differences in the energy resources, there are also important ethno-
cultural and historical differences among the Russian regions that might be important in 
explaining variation in their levels of democratic governance and intensity of cooperation with 
the EU.   
The Russian Federation is home to more than 130 national minorities. Besides the 
Eastern Slavic people (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians), who account for about 85 percent 
of Russia's population, three big ethnic groups (Altaic, Uralic, and Caucasus) and a handful of 
isolated smaller groups reside within the country. 
As far as the ethnic composition of the northwestern and southern regions is concerned, 
the southern region is one of the most multiethnic and multireligious regions in Russia and in the 
world represented by more than 80 different ethnicities. A multitude of ethnic subgroups 
belonging to the Caucasus ethnic group reside in the region: Adyghs, Kabardins, Dargins, 
Lezgins, Avars, Cherkess, Ingush, Aguls, Chechens, and other. The region is also home to Altaic 
subgroups- Mongolian Kalmyks and Kazakhs, Karachays, Balkars, Kumyks, and Noghay, and 
Indo-European Osetians and Armenians. It is important to mention that all of the above are 
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distinct peoples, however small they may be, with their own culture, languages, customs, 
traditions, costumes, arts, and architectures (Colarusso, 1997). Many are further subdivided by 
tribes, clans, and blood lines. According to Colarusso (1997) and other scholars, in linguistic, 
ethnographic, social, and political terms the southern region is like a ‘miniature continent’. 
Figure 5 displays complex ethno-cultural composition of the southern region.    
 
 
 
Figure 5: Ethno-linguistic groups in the southern region 
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Historically, the southern region has not had many interconnections with Europe for 
several reasons.  First, Caucasus (except for Osetians and Armenians that are Indo-Europeans) 
and turkik steppe peoples’ ethnic origin and languages are different from those of the peoples of 
Europe belonging to the Indo-European ethnic and linguistic unity. Only Cossacks who have 
historically occupied some parts of the southern steppes along the Don River share common 
European heritage. Some historians consider Cossacks to be run-away peasants of different 
ethnic origins (Slavic, German, etc.) that settled along the Don River in the Russian south. Other 
historians claim that Cossacks are descendants of Kurgan people. According to Kurgan 
hypothesis, in ancient times, migration of people to Europe and other regions originated from the 
Southern steppes of what is now Russia and Ukraine. There are multiple remains of proto-Indo-
European settlements on the territory of Don Cossacks’ settlements and according to 
archeological evidence, Cossack settlements are in the very center of the territory that was once 
populated by the Kurgan people. Therefore, historians adhering to the Kurgan hypothesis suggest 
that Don Cossacks did not migrate to the southern region of Russia from other parts of Europe, 
but rather descend from the Kurgan people that lived in this area before migrating to Europe, 
Iran, and India. However, these theories are not mutually exclusive as Don Cossacks might 
originate from Kurgan people and at the same time host run-away people of different ethnic 
origins who chose to move to their territory.  
The second reason why the southern region did not have many contacts with the EU 
countries is that geographically, southern provinces are not close neighbors of the majority of 
European states. The expansion of the European Union and the accession of Greece, and then 
Romania and Bulgaria brought the EU to the borders of the southern region, which is very recent 
history.  
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The third reason is the very turbulent history of the southern region as it has experienced 
many different influences, primarily non-European. According to historians, its Caucasus part 
was already populated by a multitude of different ethnic groups in the Neolithic period. In 
classical times, the Caucasus part was fought over by Rome and Persia. Persia prevailed and 
after the Caucasus region was conquered by the Arabs, Islam was introduced. In the early 
medieval times the region was occupied by Khazar Khanate, an autocratic entity with a distinct 
clan structure founded in the 7th century by semi- nomadic Turkic people in the Northern 
Caucasus along the Caspian Sea. Then the region became occupied by the Tatar-Mongol Golden 
Horde Khanate. In the middle ages, the Caucasus region was a battleground between Persia and 
the Ottoman Empire. With the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the expansion of the Russian 
Empire, it was annexed by the Russian state.   
As far as the steppe part of the southern region is concerned (Rostov, Krasnodar, 
Stavropol provinces and Kalmykia), according to historians, in the Neolithic period it was 
populated by Indo-European proto-Slavic tribes. As mentioned above, according to one of the 
theories, Don Cossacks are the descendants of those peoples. Then in the classical times, it was 
largely influenced by Greece as the settlements belonging to the northern part of Greek 
civilization are found in the region (for instance, Tanais in Rostov province is an ancient Greek 
city and a historical museum nowadays). In the early medieval times, steppe region was 
influenced by the nomadic Central Asian tribes and in the middle ages the area was under the full 
control of the Tatar-Mongol Golden Horde Khanate. After the defeat of the Golden Horde by 
Moscow prince Dmitry Donskoy, the Golden Horde Khanate split into several clans and soon 
Crimean Khanate was founded in the region. With the defeat of the Crimean Khanate, the area 
was gradually annexed by Russia. 
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Therefore, the southern region, in addition to its internal multiethnic and multicultural 
composition and clan-based structure of society, suffered from numerous external non-European 
influences and was affected by several very centralized and autocratic systems like the Golden 
Horde Khanate or the Ottoman Empire. This may have had a significant negative impact on the 
development of democratic governance and regional governance structures in the southern 
region.  
In contrast with the southern region, the northwestern region is one of the most ethnically 
homogeneous regions of Russia, composed mainly of Slavic population and a small Finnic 
minority belonging to the Uralic ethnic group and sharing common historical and ethnic identity 
with people in the bordering Finland. Figure 6 represents ethnic composition of Russian 
republics with red color marking native Russians, green –titular republic nationality, blue- minor 
nationality, and grey-other. People of Finnic origin mainly reside in the republic of Karelia; 
however, they also live in other parts of the northwestern region.  
 
62 
 
 
Figure 6: Ethnic composition of the subjects of the Russian Federation 
The northwestern region is considered to be one of the three main historical centers of the 
Eastern Slavic civilization (the other two are Kievan Rus and Moscow region). It has always had 
much more ethno-culturally homogeneous composition than the southern region. In ancient times, 
the European part of Russia was inhabited by Nordic Europeans, proto-Slavic tribes, coming 
from the common Indo-European ancestry. Indo-European family of languages is the biggest in 
the world and includes Italic, Celtic, Germanic, Balto-Slavic, Anatolian, Indo-Iranian, and other 
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language groups. Figures 7 and 8 display the early and the late distribution of the Indo-European 
languages with the red area marking the geographic origin of Indo-Europeans.  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Early distribution of Indo-European languages  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Medieval distribution of Indo-European languages  
 
In the Neolithic period, Finno-Ugric Uralic tribes arrived to the European part of Russia 
and northern Europe from the East. Finno-Ugric languages (e.g. Finnish, Hungarian, and 
Estonian) belong to the Uralic family of languages different from the Indo-European one. Finno-
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Ugric tribes peacefully coexisted with the European Balto-Slavic and Germanic tribes that 
differentiated from the European part of the proto-Indo-European family. In the northwestern 
Russia, Balto-Slavic tribes successfully integrated with Finno-Ugric ones in the course of inter-
tribal marriages and cultural exchanges. Finno-Ugric peoples and Germanic Scandinavians 
participated in the early formation of the Russian state and were quickly absorbed into the 
expanding Russian population and became completely Slavicised after a century. In the course of 
historical and social transformations tribal divisions were replaced by territorially administrative 
structures. 
The experts interviewed for the qualitative part of this dissertation argue that there was an 
important set of social and economic factors that led to the destruction of tribal relations and 
formation of class-based society in Novgorod- the-Great, early Russian polity that in the 8th 
century occupied the lands of the modern northwestern region of Russia.25 
First, growth of production based on a number of economic innovations. Rye became the 
main grain culture for Balto-Slavs and Scandinavians in the 6th centuries and advanced extraction 
of iron from the marsh ores led to the broad spread of iron agricultural instruments, which 
allowed for the effective use of force of draft animals in agriculture. This led to a steady increase 
in agricultural efficiency and conditioned a more settled way of life.  
Second, manufacture and craftsmanship became concentrated in permanent trading and 
craft centers- ‘grads’, or cities. Third, significant increase in the volume of trade and 
transportation capacity led to the development of European trading routes and routes connecting 
Europe with Asia.  
Fourth, it became necessary to protect Slavic cities from various attacks, which led to the 
formation of ‘druzhinas’, or military units and fostered territorial unification of cities into bigger 
                                                 
25 Chapter V of this dissertation is based on the interviews with the regional experts. 
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administrative entities. Therefore, by the 8th century, Slavic communities lost tribal relations and 
big cities emerged that also included people of other ethnic origins, mainly Germanic and Finnic. 
In Novgorod-the-Great, which by the 8th century became a major political and economic centre 
of a vast land from the Baltic region and Finland in the West to the Northern Urals in the East, 
about 30% of population was of Finnic origin (of merya and chud tribes). Novgorod-the-Great 
included all the northwestern lands of the modern Russia and in medieval times extended all the 
way to the White Sea in the north and beyond the Urals in the east. Therefore, the modern 
Russian northwestern provinces take their administrative origin in the Novgorod-the-Great polity. 
Novgorod-the-Great enjoyed a primitive form of democracy, being run by the assembly 
of ‘Boyars’, with the ‘Knyaz’ (prince) acting more as a hired military leader. It also had a 
developed culture and advanced literacy, as proven by the 900 birch bark documents that include 
letters from women and children, as well as informal notes on family and trading matters and 
events in the city (Baillie, 2002). At the end of the 9th century, Novgorod-the-Great extended its 
authority to Kiev (the capital of modern Ukraine), which at that time was a Slavic settlement, but 
controlled by Khazar Khaganate. Kiev was taken from the Khazar rule by Novgorod-the-Great 
and the so-called Kievan Rus was founded by knyaz Oleg of Novgorod in about 880. In a few 
years Oleg of Novgorod moved the capital of the state from Novgorod city to Kiev city.  
Figure 9 displays principalities of Kievan Rus state.  
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Figure 9: Principalities of Kievan Rus  
 
Novgorod-the-Great lands, called Novgorod Republic, became an autonomous part of 
this big Slavic state that included vast territories in the eastern and northwestern Europe. 
Republic of Novgorod was very prosperous in the Kievan Rus as it controlled important trade 
routes from the Volga River to the Baltic Sea (Curtis, 1996). Novgorod-the-Great and later on 
Novgorod Republic was one of the most powerful centers of international trade serving as a link 
between Northern Europe, southern Byzantium and Asia. In the 12th century Kievan Rus split 
into 15 independent duchies and Novgorod part became again an independent state officially 
called Novgorod Republic. 
Novgorod Republic has traditionally had a more participatory government than much of 
the rest of Russian principalities. The Republic had a highly institutionalized network of veches 
(representative legislature or public assembly, a tradition coming from Slavic tribal way of life) 
and a government of several ‘posadniks’ (mayors), ‘tysyatskys’ (originally the heads of militia, 
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but later judicial and commercial officials), other members of aristocratic families, and the 
archbishop of Novgorod (Kuchevskii, 1994).  
According to historical and archeological evidence, merchants, members of the urban 
population (e.g. craftsmen), as well as rural people, participated in the veche (the public 
assembly) and were involved in the political affairs of the republic. The knyaz’ power was quite 
reduced as he had to sign a contract stipulating his rights and responsibilities that protected 
Novgorod boyars. In addition, the veche could invite or dismiss the knyaz depending on his 
conduct, decisions, and contribution to the prosperity and safety of the Republic. Novgorod 
polity is often called a cradle of Russian and European democracy. Republic of Novgorod was a 
flourishing center of trade and culture and had active civic infrastructure.  
From the early formation of the Russian state, Novgorod-the-Great polity, Scandinavians, 
Balts and Finns were important neighbors and trading partners for Russia. Novgorod-the-Great is 
mentioned in Scandinavian Norse Sagas as four Viking kings sought refuge in Novgorod from 
enemies at home.  
In early medieval times Novgorod Republic was the largest state in the medieval Europe 
as it controlled territories from today’s Estonia all the way to the Ural Mountains. Later on vast 
parts of present-day Norway, Russia, Sweden and Finland were joint ‘tribute paying land’ 
(Norwegian: skattland) divided between Norway, Sweden and Novgorod principality. This 
included the Kola Peninsula and the present Norwegian coast to Malangen west of Tromsø.  
Novgorod relations with its northwestern neighbors were sort of a ‘love and hate’ 
relationship as the Republic struggled for centuries against Swedish, Danish, and German 
crusaders. However, despite frequent wars (which were common for medieval Europe) 
Novgorod had advanced diplomatic relations with its European neighbors. From the 12th century, 
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there have been various foreign embassies and trading and commercial centers in Novgorod (e.g. 
Dutch and German). Medieval Novgorod had close contacts and partnerships with the Hanseatic 
League of North-European cities, a developed international trade organization and a common 
market. The League had its permanent representatives and a trading branch in Novgorod. 
Therefore, the northwestern region, Novgorod Republic back then, in the medieval times and 
early modern period was very well integrated into the European political and economic 
structures. As Europe entered a period of royal state-building, Russian monarchy became 
intertwined with European monarchies- Prussian, Austria-Hungarian, Finnish, Swedish, and 
other. 
During the medieval times, Tver, Moscow and Lithuania duchies (that had more 
autocratic forms of governance) fought over control of the Novgorod Republic and its enormous 
wealth. Resisting Moscow oppression, Novgorod sought an alliance with Lithuania and Poland, 
which was perceived as a major betrayal by Moscow and Moscow Principality went to war 
against the Republic. In the 15th century, Novgorod Republic lost its independence and was 
incorporated into the Moscow principality, which later expanded into the Russian Empire. 
However, even in the tsarist Russia, Novgorod gubernia (province) had more autonomy than 
some other regions. With the foundation of St Petersburg with its powerful port, the Academy of 
Sciences, and numerous theaters, ballet and opera halls, the northwestern region strengthened its 
cultural and economic significance in Imperial Russia.  
Regional experts interviewed for this dissertation assert that St Petersburg, though a very 
young city (1703), quickly absorbed the northwestern spirit and historical path-dependency and 
became a vibrant cultural and political center of the region with Novgorod city remaining the 
guardian of the northwestern antiquities (it is now UNESCO heritage site) and glorious past.  
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Historically, the northwestern region has always been trying to pursue a foreign policy of 
its own and was often in sort of opposition to the central region governed by Moscow.  Some 
experts even juxtapose northwestern region as the cradle of Russian and European democracy to 
Moscow’s imperial heritage of political and economic centralization. 
In addition to being included in European political and economic space, the northwestern 
region has always been part of Europe geographically, as its territory has significantly 
overlapped with that of the neighboring Nordic states. For instance, from 1809 until the end of 
1917, Finland was part of the northwestern lands of the Russian Empire as an autonomous Grand 
Duchy of Finland. Russian northwestern republic of Karelia was part of the Russian Novgorod 
Republic; then in the late 13th century, various parts of Karelia were conquered by Sweden and 
incorporated into Swedish Karelia until they were returned by Russia in 1721. In 1941, Finland 
occupied large parts of Karelia, but was forced to withdraw in 1944 and Karelia became Russian 
again. Various regional experts claim that Karelia is among the top-priority topics in modern 
Finnish and Swedish politics.  
As another example, Kaliningrad, the administrative center of Kaliningrad province, the 
Russian exclave between Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic Sea, was originally Konigsberg, the 
Prussian and German town. The Kaliningrad province that administratively belongs to the 
northwestern region (though it is separate from it) became an exclave due to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. At present, the province has a developed network of partnerships with the EU 
actors and the EU Commission has a special economic program for Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad 
province enjoys increasing trade, economic growth, rising industrial output, growth of civic 
activity and according to different estimates, is growing faster than even its EU neighbors. 
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Even given existing differences between the northwestern region and the central, or 
Moscow region, Novgorod Republic and Moscow principality were both Slavic states and shared 
common ethno-cultural background, language, history, and culture. At the same time, the 
southern region has always been populated by a multitude of different peoples with their own 
historical backgrounds, languages, customs, and traditions, very different from the Slavic ones. 
The southern region became part of Russia in the course of the expansion of the Russian Empire, 
but was never part of its historical identity, especially the Caucasus part. Additionally, as 
mentioned above, the southern region suffered from several non-European autocratic influences.   
It is important to see whether these ethno-cultural and historical differences between the 
southern and the northwestern regions can be important factors impacting the current level of 
democratic governance in the regions and the intensity of their integration in the European space. 
Both regions are included in the regional dimension of the EU’s foreign policy, however, the 
actual political, economic and cultural processes between the regions and the EU might be very 
different due to the existing ethno-cultural and historical differences discussed above. The 
regional ethno-cultural and historical aspects will be extensively discussed in the fifth chapter of 
this dissertation, which is based on the interviews with the regional experts.  
 
D. LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN THE 
RUSSIAN REGIONS 
Before focusing specifically on the northwestern and southern regions, I conduct 
longitudinal analysis of democratic governance in all the Russian provinces and test a variety of 
factors possibly affecting the level of democratic governance in the provinces to acquire rigorous 
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statistical results that will help to outline major tendencies in the development of democratic 
governance in Russia.  
In certain instances, this longitudinal analysis is a replication of the analysis conducted by 
Lankina and Getachew (2006), as it uses the same dependent variable- the level of democratic 
governance in the Russian regions and it is also focused on the assessment of the relationship 
between democracy and EU influence. However, I employ a different model of analysis and a 
different set of independent variables. Additionally, I treat ‘EU influence’ as a more complex 
variable than targeted aid programs.  
 
1. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
Research question:  
What factors affect the level of democratic governance in the Russian provinces (by 
provinces meaning all the existing subjects of the Russian Federation – oblasts, krays, republics, 
and autonomous districts)? 
Research hypothesis: 
The level of democratic governance in the Russian provinces is, among other factors, 
affected by the EU influence in the province and province’s prominence in the energy sector.   
Control variables for the research hypothesis are: the level of province’s urbanization, 
composition of political elites, ethno-cultural composition, and distance from the EU. 
 
2. External and Internal Factors Affecting the Level of Democratic Governance  
 
Dependent variable: democratic governance 
 
In order to explore how various factors affect democratic governance in the Russian 
provinces over time, panel data set was constructed for the analysis. The measure of the level of 
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democratic governance was based on Petrov and Titkov’s indexes (in Russian, ‘otsenka 
demokratichnosti’).26 The indexes were calculated by annually asking a panel of experts to 
estimate developments in the provinces and assign scores on a five-point scale to each of the ten 
areas that were considered important for assessing the level of democratic governance in the 
regions.  
Petrov and Titkov use the following measures of democratic governance: 
1 — Economic and political openness 
2 — Elections: democratic/undemocratic 
3 — Political pluralism 
4 — Independence of mass media 
5 — Economic liberalization (liberal economic policies) 
6 — Civil Society 
7 — Accountability and transparency of institutions 
8 — Political elites 
9 — Corruption 
10 — Local self-government 
 
 
Three waves of data for the dependent variable were available for the analysis; therefore 
the panel for the analysis is composed of the three-period observations for each province. The 
data were available from 1991 to 2004 and were aggregated into the three waves by the 
researchers of the Nezavisimiy Institut Sotsialnoi Politiki (Independent Institute of Social 
Politics): democratic governance indexes covered the years 1991 -2001 (baseline), 1999-2003, 
and 2000-2004.27 The indexes for 1999-2003 and 2000-2004 were calculated by the ‘moving 
averages’ method.  
                                                 
26 The scores were calculated in the framework of the Moscow Carnegie Center's project. Petrov -Titkov scores are 
available at the web site of the Independent Institute of Social Politics, 
http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml 
27 The information about the Independent Institute of Social Politics and the project can be found at  
http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml 
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These data points were labeled as 1991, 1999, and 2004, for convenience. The data were 
available for the 88 provinces (excluding Chechnya due to unavailability of data), so there are 
264 observations in the analysis.         
Independent variables  
a) Cooperation with the EU  
 
Lankina and Getachew (2006) interpreted EU influence as targeted aid. In this analysis 
EU influence was coded as a complex measure composed of the total number of EU assistance 
programs in the province and also cooperation programs, projects, partnerships and business 
initiatives between the EU actors and the actors residing in the province. An original data set of 
EU-related business deals/projects/partnerships/programs/initiatives in the 88 Russian provinces 
from 1991 till 2004 was constructed and the data in the dataset were aggregated into the three 
waves for the consistency with the democratic governance data.28 
b) Province’s prominence in the energy sector 
 
Province’s prominence in the energy sector was coded as province’s dependence on oil 
and gas revenues (the percentage of the province’s GDP constituted by revenues from the energy 
sector, time-varying variable) and the number of energy companies operating in the province, a 
time-invariant variable.29    
                                                 
28 Basic information on Tacis can be found on “Europa,” the website of the EU                                                          
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/tacis/.  
For information on the new European Neighborhood Policy, see European Commission (2005).  
For the document describing new funding instruments that replace Tacis, see the report of the Commission of the 
European Communities, currently called the European Commission (2005). 
The information about regional partnerships was taken from the websites of the regional governments and Russian 
National Statistics Committee (GOSKOMSTAT) 
The information on different projects, business initiatives, and programs was taken from the Russian and the 
European local and regional newspapers, websites and brochures of local and regional organizations, and local and 
regional websites. 
29 The information on the percentage of the province’s GDP constituted by revenues from the energy sector was 
calculated using the information from the website of the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources (regional statistics 
section) http://www.mnr.gov.ru/,  and also websites of provinces (economic reports).  
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Since Russia’s oil and gas exports to Europe account for over 75 % of its energy exports 
and for over 70 % of its export earnings and 40% of its budget receipts, and the EU is highly 
dependent on Russian oil and gas, the energy variable is linked to the EU in the analysis.   
c) Urbanization 
As far as urbanization is concerned, various scholars found out that there is high 
correlation between urbanization and modernization, socioeconomic development, and good 
governance (Lankina and Getachew, 2006). According to Lankina and Getachew’s analysis, 
urbanization proved to be a very strong predictor of regional democracy in Russia. Other 
scholars discuss positive relationship between city size, governance and social 
interconnectedness of local organizations (Baglioni, Denters, Morales and Vetter, 2007). They 
argue that “in the large communities there is not only a higher need for accommodation via 
interorganizational contacting, but also a capacity to meet such a need through 
professionalization” (p. 229).  In addition, it is argued that high density and diversity are likely to 
enhance the conflict potential and the competitiveness of the local political arena including the 
need for the civil society to keep in close contact with public officials. It is important to include 
urbanization in the analysis to control for the level of urbanization and improve the estimates. 
The urbanization index is a time-invariant variable in the analysis.30  
d) Composition of political elite 
Composition of political elite was coded as the percentage of the seats in the provincial 
dumas occupied by the communist party. In public administration and political economy 
literature communist approach to economy and public administration has been associated with 
policies that resulted in poor governance (Bideleux, 1985; Ivanova, 2007).  Therefore, it would 
                                                 
30 Information on urbanization can be found at the web site of the Independent Institute of Social Politics, available 
at http://www.socpol.ru/atlas/maps/1_1_2map.gif 
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be interesting to see if the assumption still holds in respect to the Russian provinces. The data on 
the percentage of the seats in provincial governments occupied by the communist party were 
taken from the websites of the provincial governments and ‘regional newsletter’ monitor, which 
has been published since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The data were also aggregated into the 
3 waves for consistency with the democratic governance scores.  
e) Ethno-cultural composition 
 Ethno-cultural composition, a time-invariant variable, was coded as the number of ethnic 
groups residing in the province that constitute more than 3% of the total population of the 
province.31 In democratization literature it is argued that ethno-cultural homogeneity is important 
for democratic development as ethno-culturally heterogeneous areas are more prone to conflict 
and social and economic instability (Axtmann, 2007). 
f) Distance from the EU 
Distance from the EU, another time-invariant variable, was coded as distance from 
Brussels. This variable was included to see if proximity to the EU can be a significant factor in 
explaining variation in governance: if the provinces located at a greater distance from the EU are 
less likely to have high levels of democratic governance than those located in greater proximity 
to it. For instance, decisions about allocation of aid and establishment of certain partnerships in 
the Russian regions are made by the European Commission, which is placed in Brussels, thus it 
might favor those regions in Russia, which are geographically closer to the European Union. 
The distance from the provincial capitals to Brussels was calculated using google 
‘distance calculator’ technique.            
 
                                                 
31 Information on the ethno-cultural composition of the provinces was taken from the regional encyclopedia, 
available at http://www.mojgorod.ru/regs/list.html 
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3. The Model and the Method of Analysis 
           
Econometric approach to panel data is used to control for unobserved heterogeneity, or 
biases due to unmeasured variables that differ across units, and provide more efficient estimates 
of model parameters.   
The general model looks the following way: 
 
Where Y for a given region-year is function of an intercept, the regression coefficient (β1) 
for variable 1* X at its value for a given region-year, the regression coefficient (β2) for variable 
2*X at its value for the given region-year, through the coefficient (βj) for the jth variable*X, an 
error term for the region-year, and Ui, which represents all of the unobserved ‘stable’ factors in 
case or unit i. The error term in this model is composed of two parts: a unit-level effect that does 
not vary across time (Ui) and an idiosyncratic error term that varies across units and across time 
(εij), and the composite error term. 
In our case Y is democratic governance, X1 is cooperation with the EU, X2 is the share of 
natural resources in the region’s GDP, X3 is the number of energy companies operating in the 
province, X4 is the composition of political elite, X5 is ethno-cultural composition, X6 is 
urbanization index, and X7 is the distance from the provincial capital to Brussels. There are 4 
time-varying variables in the model: democratic governance, composition of political elite, 
cooperation with the EU, and the share of natural resources in the region’s GDP. The time-
invariant variables are the number of energy companies operating in the province, ethno-cultural 
composition, urbanization index, and distance between provincial capitals and Brussels. 
Panel-data estimators will help us avoid the shortcomings of traditional regression 
methods such as ordinary least squares (OLS) that ignore intra- or within-panel correlation. 
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4. Longitudinal Analysis 
 
First, fixed effects model is used as possible solution to the problem of unobserved stable 
unit effects. The fixed effect model assumes that the unit-level error is stable and may be related 
to the independent variables/estimators (X). The fixed effect model allows to get rid of these 
stable effects statistically, so the only things that are left are the pure error term and the variation 
of dependent and independent variables around their unit-level means.  
As mentioned above, urbanization, the number of energy companies, ethno-cultural 
composition, and distance between the capitals of the provinces and Brussels are time-invariant 
variables, thus they will drop out of the estimation of fixed effects anyways, so they are not 
included in the model. To account for heteroskedasticity problem, robust standard errors are 
included in the model.  Table 2 represents the results of the analysis of the fixed effects model.     
 
 
Table 2: Fixed effects model 
 
 
Dependent Variable: democratic governance  Coefficients 
Dependence on oil and gas resources -0.12* 
Cooperation with the EU  0.32** 
Independent variables 
Composition of elites -0.1 
R2    0.213  
sigma_u 2.1546998 
sigma_e 1.0329823 
rho .81311857 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
*   significant at the .05 alpha level 
** significant at the .01 alpha level 
 
 
As the results indicate, energy and cooperation with the EU turned out to be significant 
factors in explaining variation in the level of democratic governance in the regions. The 
dependence of a province on natural resources happened to be negatively related to the 
democratic governance (coefficient is -0.12), which means that with the increase in the share of 
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natural resources in the region’s GDP, there will be a decrease in democratic governance in the 
region. This is consistent with the literature discussed above. Cooperation with the EU proved to 
have a strong positive impact on the level of democratic governance in the region. The 
composition of provincial political elites coded as the percentage of the seats in the regional 
dumas occupied by the communist party turned out to be an insignificant factor in explaining 
variation in the democratic governance in the Russian provinces. 
The value of sigma_u is higher then that of sigma_e, this tells us that the individual 
specific (unit level) error is higher then the idiosyncratic error. The value of rho tells us that 81% 
of variance in the composite error term comes from unit-level error U.  With this model we 
explain 21 % of variance.  
Table 3 reports the correlation between the unobserved unit effects and the independent 
variables/estimators. 
Table 3: Correlation between XB and U 
 
 
 fixedu fixedp~d 
   
fixedu 1.0000 
fixedpred  0.5923 1.0000 
 
 
The correlation coefficient between XB and U is reported as 0.5923. This means that the 
unobserved unit effects are correlated with the independent variables/estimators (X) at 0.5923. 
The 2-way fixed effects model (Table 4) suggests that there is a statistically significant 
positive effect of the year 2004 over the year 2002.   
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Table 4: 2-way fixed effects model 
 
 
Dependent Variable: democratic governance  Coefficients 
Dependence on oil and gas resources -0.14* 
Cooperation with the EU  0.34* 
Year 2  0.27 
Independent variables 
Year 3  0.39* 
R2    0.192  
sigma_u 2.0708754 
sigma_e 1.0198486 
rho .80481027 (fraction of variance due to u_i)     
*   significant at the .05 alpha level 
** significant at the .01 alpha level 
 
This may be explained by a significant increase in business initiatives, projects and 
cooperation programs between Russian and EU actors between 2002 and 2004. This model also 
shows that natural resources and EU influence are still significant in explaining variation in 
governance: energy variable is negatively related to democratic governance (-0.14), and 
cooperation with the EU is positively related to democratic governance (0.34). 
In the fixed effects model the time-invariant variables drop out; however, they might be 
important in assessing the effects of cooperation with the EU and energy on democratic 
governance. Therefore, the random effects model will allow for the estimation of the impact of 
the time-invariant factors. The random effects model begins with the assumption that the unit 
level error and the idiosyncratic error are a result of random processes/ Assumption 1. Random 
effect model also assumes that there is no autocorrelation in idiosyncratic error term and that the 
variance in both unit level error and idiosyncratic error are constant for all estimators 
/Assumptions 2 and 3. Most important, however, the random effects model assumes that the two 
errors are unrelated to independent variable estimators/Assumption 4. This last assumption is 
very problematic and is a complete opposite of fixed effect assumption. Besides, we can already 
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observe U correlated with all of X at 0.59. Table 5 reports the results of the analysis of the 
random effects model.  
 
Table 5: Random effects model 
 
 
Dependent Variable: democratic governance  Coefficients 
 Dependence on oil and gas resources -0.09* 
Cooperation with the EU  0.29* 
Composition of elites  -0.06 
Ethno-cultural composition -0.15* 
The number of energy companies -0.11* 
Distance from Brussels  0.00079** 
Independent variables 
Urbanization  0.37* 
R2    0.221  
sigma_u 1.5851156 
sigma_e 1.0329823 
rho .70191099 (fraction of variance due to u_i)     
*   significant at the .05 alpha level 
** significant at the .01 alpha level 
 
The results indicate that urbanization has a positive correlation with democratic 
governance, which is consistent with the literature. Cooperation with the EU and the dependence 
of a province on natural resources still have significant effects on democratic governance. 
Additionally, the number of energy companies operating in the province turned out to be a 
statistically significant factor negatively affecting democratic governance in the Russian 
provinces. Composition of provincial political elites is still insignificant. Ethno-cultural 
composition appears to be negatively related to democratic governance implying that more 
ethno-culturally heterogeneous provinces will have lower levels of democratic governance. 
Distance between the regional capitals and Brussels happened to be a significant factor, and 
though the value of the coefficient is small, it still indicates the tendency that the provinces 
located further away from Europe will have lower levels of democratic governance.  
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The Random Effects model shows that overall R2 has increased compared to the fixed 
effects model from 0.213 to 0.221. The unit level error has declined in this model; however it is 
still higher then idiosyncratic error. Theta is reported at .65. As theta value approaches 1, it 
means that more and more of the composite error variance is composed of unit-level variance. 
This is the case here. This is in agreement with the previous analysis of unit error vs. 
idiosyncratic error. Also, as we see from the value of rho, the composite error term contains 70% 
variance from unit-level error. 
According to random effects model assumptions, the correlation between unit level error 
U and independent variables X is assumed to be 0. However, as mentioned above, this is not the 
case. Thus there are reasons to think that the random effects model is biased and inefficient. It 
seems like the fixed effects model is more preferable. However, it is necessary to conduct tests to 
prove this. Appendix of this chapter reports the results of the tests of the efficiency of the models.  
The results of the tests indicate that the random effects model assumptions do not hold. 
So, the fixed effects model is preferable. However, the real disadvantage of the fixed effects 
model is that it can not estimate time-invariant variables. Because the fixed effects model uses 
only the ‘within’ variance and ignores the ‘between’ variance, the effect of time-invariant 
estimators are also swept out with stable unit effect. Fixed effects model also poorly deals with 
variables that have very little ‘within’ variation, or change very slowly overtime. The Plumper-
Truger’s method, which the authors call the ‘fixed effects vector decomposition’, allows keeping 
the benefits of the fixed effects model while also including time-invariant variables in the model. 
This is possible by decomposing the unit fixed effects into those that are explained by time 
invariant variables and those that are unexplained.  Table 6 reports the results of the analysis of 
the Plűmper-Trauger’s model.      
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Table 6: Plűmper-Trauger’s model 
 
            
Dependent variable: democratic governance  Coefficients 
 Dependence on oil and gas resources -0.11* 
Cooperation with the EU  0.27* 
Composition of elites  -0.09 
Ethno-cultural composition -0.19* 
The number of energy companies -0.12* 
Distance from Brussels  0.00084** 
Independent variables 
Urbanization  0.31* 
R2    0.46  
*   significant at the .05 alpha level 
** significant at the .01 alpha level 
 
 
Plűmper-Trauger’s model gives the best R-square so far, as the model explains 46% of 
variance. The compromise model gives the correct estimates of standard errors and the estimates 
of the time-invariant variables’ effects on the democratic governance controlling for their 
possible correlation with the unit effects. The results indicate that cooperation with the EU, 
dependence of a province on the natural resources and the number of energy companies 
operating in the province have statistically significant effects on the level of democratic 
governance (energy –negative, cooperation with the EU-positive), as theoretically expected. 
Composition of provincial political elites is still an insignificant factor, while urbanization and 
distance from Brussels are significant positive factors indicating that the level of urbanization 
and geographic location of a province in respect to the EU have a positive impact on its level of 
democratic governance. Ethno-cultural heterogeneity is a statistically significant factor 
negatively affecting the level of democratic governance in the provinces, as also theoretically 
expected.  
In order to find out if the model needs to be corrected for possible autocorrelation of the 
idiosyncratic disturbances, it is necessary to determine whether there is first order autocorrelation 
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between the idiosyncratic error terms. That is a direct effect from the error term as one time 
period to its value in the next time period. 
Woolridge test is used for identifying possible autocorrelation.  The test compares the 
correlation of the residuals from the first difference model to its expected value under the null 
hypothesis. This value is -.5. The null hypothesis suggests no autocorrelation. Prob > F =    0.91, 
this is under the critical value of significance. Therefore, the null hypothesis that there is no first 
order autocorrelation is accepted. So, it is not appropriate to apply the model that corrects for 
possible autocorrelation of idiosyncratic disturbances. 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the Plűmper-Trauger’s model is the most 
preferable one for this kind of analysis and this model’s estimates should be considered most 
accurate in explaining variation in democratic governance in the Russian provinces. 
The analysis seems to have interesting results, which are consistent with the literature, 
except for the composition of political elites, but there are certain explanations to this.  The fact 
that the percentage of seats in the provincial governments occupied by the communists happened 
to be an insignificant factor can be explained by the Russian context, where the communist party 
adapted to the realities of the market economy, and at the same time democratic parties, such as 
LDPR or DPR can not boast of much better policies and more efficient approaches to 
governance than the communist party, because still the whole system largely lacks accountability 
and transparency and the economy is too dependent on commodity exports. Additionally, 
resource wealth seems to be playing a role in fueling the growth of sub-national bureaucracies 
and adoption of inefficient policies (no matter if the local government is communistic or 
democratic). The analysis proved that at the ‘natural resources curse’ theory widely discussed in 
political economy literature can be applied to the sub-national level of analysis. The results also 
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indicate that there is strong positive correlation between cooperation with the EU and the level of 
democratic governance in the province. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the results of 
the analysis support the research hypothesis.  
 
E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The analysis showed that there is a statistically significant positive correlation between 
cooperation with the EU and the level of democratic governance in the Russian provinces. 
Therefore, the provinces involved in cooperation with the European Union are likely to enjoy 
higher levels of democratic governance than the regions that do not interact intensely with the 
EU. 
While proximity to the EU happened to be not a very big factor in explaining variation in 
democratic governance in the Russian regions, it is still significant indicating that regions located 
much further away from the EU will have lower level of democratic governance. 
Another important result of the analysis indicates that the dependence on natural 
resources and the existence of energy companies in the provinces hamper their economic 
development and hinder the adoption of good governance policies.  As mentioned above, this 
finding is consistent with the wider political economy literature on the resource-based economies. 
It is also important to note that urbanization positively affects and ethno-cultural heterogeneity 
negatively affects the level of democratic governance in the Russian provinces.   
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IV. EU-RUSSIA REGIONAL COOPERATION AND ENERGY STRUCTURES 
 
 
 
A. NETWORK PERSPECTIVE 
 
 Longitudinal analysis of democratic governance showed an overall tendency that  
cooperation with the EU has a statistically significant positive effect on the level of democratic 
governance in the Russian provinces, and energy (region’s dependence on natural resources and 
the number of energy companies operating in the region), in tern, negative. However, it is 
important to see through which mechanisms these effects take place and what the structural 
properties of the variables are. Both factors have a complex infrastructure in the regions: regional 
cooperation is composed of multitude of projects, initiatives and partnerships involving all kinds 
of regional actors and relationships among them, and energy companies also form certain 
structure in the regional energy sector. Regional cooperation and energy variables should be 
further analyzed in respect to their strength, intensity and structural characteristics. Russian 
northwestern region and southern region form a good basis for the analysis of the regional 
cooperation and energy variables, as both regions are involved in specific EU-related regional 
structures – Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy; however, the level of democratic 
governance in the northwestern region is significantly higher than in the southern region.  
Regional cooperation between Russia and the EU and regional energy structures are 
complex network systems. Different types of agents in the regional cooperation arena- 
organizations, provincial governments, firms, public institutions, universities- interact with each 
other by participating in EU projects, establishing joint initiatives and organizing joint events 
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with their respective partners in the EU countries; the agents seek to adapt to emerging 
cooperation opportunities and the whole system constantly evolves and changes. As far as the 
energy structures are concerned, energy companies interact with provincial governments over a 
number of issues and both types of agents seek to adapt to new regional circumstances. The 
present analysis of the EU-Russia regional cooperation and regional energy structures is focused 
on the properties of the whole systems of regional interaction and aims at explaining systemic 
differences and structural changes in the Russian northwestern and southern regions. It is 
important to understand patterns of interaction and agents’ strategies in the complex regional 
systems to be able to predict later events and systems’ impact on social, economic and political 
life in the regions. 
A practical approach to studying complex network systems is network analysis. Network 
analysis is based on multidisciplinary science, but at the same time with its own distinct way of 
analyzing complexity. According to Semitiel Garcia (2006, p.6), by specifying how connected 
systems are connected and by examining the relationship between the structure of networks, the 
patterns of interaction among network actors, and collective dynamics, the science of networks 
can help us explain the world. In social sciences, the network perspective is usually called a 
research methodology that provides a distinct view for the study of actors of any type as related 
social actors (Newman, Barabási, and Watts, 2006, p. 4; Semitiel Garcia, 2006, p.6). A social 
network is broadly defined as a social structure made of nodes/actors/agents (which are generally 
individuals or organizations) that are linked by specific types of interdependency, such as 
friendship, kinship, financial exchange, trade, common projects or initiatives, business deals, etc. 
(Semitiel Garcia, 2006; Freeman, 2006; Wellman, Barry and Berkowitz, 1988; Scott, 1991). The 
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resulting graph-based structures are usually very complex and dynamic. Networks can develop at 
various levels – individual, organizational, interorganizational, and international. 
This study focuses on interorganizational networks at the regional level. For the purposes 
of this study, regional cooperation network can be defined as a structure consisting of network 
nodes (or agents) represented by all kinds of cultural, educational, economic, and civil society 
organizations and provincial governments and links among those agents- complex interactions 
through regional projects, partnerships, business deals, and cooperation initiatives. As far as 
energy network is concerned, it can be defined as a structure consisting of agents- energy 
companies operating in the regions and provincial governments- and links among those agents- 
interactions through formal relations (e.g. regional public officials serving on companies' board 
of directors or participation in common energy regional projects) or informal relations (e.g. 
personal connections or lobbying activities). 
There is an extensive literature dealing with the analysis of interorganizational relations 
and presenting theoretical explanations of the emergence of complex systems- 
interorganizational networks- at different levels (Oliver and Ebers 1998; Alter and Hage, 1993; 
Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz, 1993; Jarillo, 1993; Ebers and Jarillo, 1998; Sydow, 1998; Borgatti 
and Foster, 2003; Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, and Tsai, 2004; Monge and Contractor, 2004). 
Different aspects from the following theories can be applied to this study in order to 
explain the emergence and the development of regional cooperation and energy networks:  
• Theory of self-interest: theory of social capital and transaction cost  
Regional cooperation framework creates an opportunity structure that provides economic, 
social, and cultural benefits and geographical mobility for various organizations, institutions, 
firms, and provincial governmental bodies in the Russian northwestern and southern regions. 
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Therefore, different actors voluntarily enter this structure and deliberately choose to use the 
resources offered by it: additional financial support, opportunity to make foreign partners, 
improve information processing capabilities, lower uncertainty and reduce transaction costs by 
fostering economic activity; opportunity to learn more about regional environment by 
establishing strong contacts and socializing with diverse regional actors, and a chance to occupy 
a prominent position in the region by becoming connected to important actors in the regional 
socio-economic, cultural and political arenas. As far as the energy structures are concerned, 
energy companies are motivated to establish contacts with provincial governments so that they 
can influence political situation in the regions for their own economic benefit, and provincial 
governments are interested in connections with energy companies because of revenues for 
provincial budgets and bribes. In Russia, the oil and gas sector is one of the most prone to 
bribery of public officials, corruption and state-sector capture. Energy companies operating in 
the regions often exert undue influence on the policies, decisions and practices of provincial 
governments by ‘otkati’, big bribes to public officials. 
• Theories of mutual self-interest (jointly rather than individually self-interested) and 
collective action: collective action and adoption of innovations and collective action and 
mobilization  
Participation in regional cooperation projects and partnerships enables Russian and 
European actors to share information and develop innovative strategies to deal with common 
cross-border or region-wide problems (e.g. solving environmental problems in the Black Sea and 
the Baltic Sea regions or building regional transportation systems); facilitates exchange of 
technology and managerial practice, strengthens local structures and increases the awareness of 
mutual interdependence through constant interaction and collective action. Russian and 
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European civil society organizations and human rights groups are interested in mobilization and 
enhancing capacity for joint action to tackle common ethnic and cultural issues such as 
preserving the culture of Finno-Ugric people living in the Russian republic of Karelia and 
bordering Finland. 
The overall activity of the civil society sector in Russia has declined in the last few years 
owing to the new NGO regulations and the lack of financial support; therefore, regional 
cooperation with the EU is seen as a crucial opportunity by civil society organizations in the 
Russian northwestern and southern regions.32  
Energy companies are more individually rather than jointly interested in establishing 
contacts with provincial governments due to the competition for occupying controlling positions 
in the provinces; however, both in the northwestern and the southern regions there are important 
trans-regional energy projects such as Nord Stream and Blue Stream, around which companies 
jointly cooperate. Additionally, from time to time energy companies form strategic alliances to 
exert stronger pressure on local governments. For example, in 2004 in the southern region 
several energy companies allied together to raise gasoline prices by about 25% and put pressure 
on provincial governments so that they do not question the sharp increase in prices (Golomolsin, 
2004).   
                                                 
32 On April 17, 2006, the Russian Federal Law “On Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the 
Russian Federation” (knows as “NGO Law”) entered into effect. It introduced a number of new requirements for 
public associations (PAs), non-commercial organizations (NCOs), and foreign nongovernmental non-commercial 
organizations (FNNOs). The new requirements enhanced the supervisory powers of the state over civil society 
organizations and expanded the grounds upon which an organization's application to register can be denied by the 
registration authority, known as Rosregistration. However, civil society organizations participating in the regional 
cooperation with the EU appeared to be least affected by the new regulations due to the peculiarities of the regional 
cooperation legal framework and constant financial support offered by regional partnerships. For more information, 
see ‘Some Issues Related to Russia's New NGO Law’ By Natalia Bourjaily, The International Journal for Not-for –
Profit Law, Volume 8, Issue 3, May 2006 
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• Cognitive theories: network organizations and knowledge structures, cognitive social 
structure and cognitive consistency 
Network is a system of interconnected actors who interact and establish relationships 
with each other for mutual assistance or support. Networks facilitate communication and 
negotiation among agents, promote knowledge sharing, contribute to organizational learning and 
foster a culture of innovation and change (Cannarella and Piccioni, 2008). Different 
organizations on the Russian and the EU side form networks and use connections to each other 
as a tool for effective knowledge exchange. For instance, Russian northwestern ethno-cultural 
organizations used partnerships with their European colleagues and links to the European 
Heritage Network to develop expertise on the sustainable use of cultural heritage and acquire 
good practices for innovative heritage strategies, for example in respect to the management of 
historic sites in the northwestern region (Lagunin, 2007).  
As far as the energy structures are concerned, by interacting with each other and with 
provincial governments, and also by collaborating with European partners on the regional energy 
projects, energy companies share information and knowledge on new exploration and production 
technologies, develop subsea expertise,  learn to respond to emerging regional trends, anticipate 
risk effectively, improve performance and operate more efficiently. At the same time, through 
close contact with provincial governments, energy companies learn about and take measures 
against various regional actors that might negatively affect their business such as environmental 
organizations, human rights groups, and labor associations.  
• Exchange and dependence theories: leadership, resource dependency theory and power in 
interorganizational networks 
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Dependence theories view organizations as complex entities that interact intensely with 
their environments rather than operate independently from external factors. Pfeffer (1981) 
defines organizational success in resource dependency theory as organizations maximizing their 
power or, in other words, their ability to control resources. Dependence theories interpret the 
links among organizations as a set of power relations based on exchange of resources. According 
to the resource dependency theory, organizations lacking resources and information will seek to 
establish relationships with other organizations, thereby becoming dependent on them, to obtain 
needed resources (Wallis, 2008). Resources are controlled by the political, economic and social 
actors and can be capital, technology, commodities, commercial markets for goods and services, 
labor, equipment, knowledge, and expertise (Hatch, 1997, p. 78). As the environment becomes 
more complex and uncertain and dependencies increase, organizations seek closer relationships 
to facilitate information and resource exchanges. Also, organizations are interested in changing 
their dependence positions, therefore they try to minimize their own dependence or increase the 
dependence of other organizations on them (Ulrich and Barney, 1984). Within this perspective, 
organizations are viewed as actors constantly changing their structural positions and patterns of 
interaction to obtain needed resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Thus organizations try to 
modify their power to acquire the external resources. 
Regional cooperation between Russia and the EU offers important resources for all sorts 
of organizations and firms such as additional financial support for concrete projects and 
initiatives, legal framework for establishing direct contacts and making partners, opportunity for 
information and knowledge exchange. Therefore, different actors in their attempt to use the 
offered resources interact with each other by engaging in joint initiatives and concluding deals 
and partnerships. These complex interactions form a network and create dependencies in this 
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network. As dependencies in the system increase, actors seek closer relationships to improve 
information exchange, acquire better knowledge of changes occurring in the system and enhance 
their stability in the system. The power of actors in the network comes from the degree to which 
an actor within a network has many relationships and is at the center of those relationships, 
thereby performing a coordinating function. Since there is competition for resources, actors try to 
manage their dependencies and form coalitions; those coalitions or groups then try to adapt to 
new regional circumstances and alter their structure and patterns of behavior to acquire and 
maintain resources emerging from the regional cooperation. Therefore, different centers of 
power emerge in the network and certain groups of actors become more powerful and less 
dependent on other groups in the system. Any change in interaction patterns leads to change in 
power in the network. 
The same holds true for the energy structures: competition for resources (e.g. shares in 
regional energy projects, joint deals, raw materials, exploration and production opportunities, 
capital, economic benefits, ability to control and influence political situation in the region, 
information on regional actors) makes energy companies establish contacts with provincial 
governments and each other. This web of interactions and relationships forms a network with its 
own structural peculiarities.             
• Theories of network evolution 
Organizational communities are usually defined as populations of organizations that that 
are linked together by networks of relations in overlapping resource niches (Monge, Heiss, and 
Margolin, 2007). Organizational and evolutionary theorists and researchers have traditionally 
studied organizational populations by examining organizational attributes (such as size, diversity, 
learning capabilities, etc.) rather than the kinds of relationships among organizations and ties 
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linking them. However, recently various scholars have shifted attention from attributes, interests 
and motivations of individual organizations to the properties of the groups of organizations and 
more complex networks in which organizational activity is reproduced; they started to emphasize 
the need for considering structural relationships among organizations to be able to fully 
understand the evolution of organizational communities (Banks and Carley, 1996; Doreian and 
Stokman, 1997; Young, 1998; Jackson and Watts, 2002; Monge, Heiss, and Margolin, 2007 
among others). Monge, Heiss, and Margolin (2007) apply evolutionary theory to networks of 
different organizations and examine evolutionary principles explaining the emergence, 
development, maintenance, and demise of network connections.  
According to the evolutionary theory, organizational survival, development and success 
are dependent on the development of inter-organizational linkages and the changes in structural 
position of an organization in the network. The evolutionary theory emphasizes the importance 
of path-dependency: the future development of an organization in the network and the 
development of the whole network are affected by the path they have traced in the past (Grabher, 
1997). Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) argue that “organizations enter alliances with each other to 
access critical resources, but they rely on information from the network of prior alliances to 
determine with whom to cooperate”. Prior linkages can supply trustworthy information about the 
availability, capabilities, success, and reliability of potential partners. According to scholars, the 
new linkages modify the existing network, thereby creating a dynamic between interactions 
among organizations and network structure allowing for the emergence, formation, and 
development of interorganizational networks. 
From the evolutionary perspective, the present structure of regional cooperation and 
energy networks and their effectiveness are path-dependent on previous interactions and linkages 
94 
among the actors of these networks.  Therefore, it is important to examine these networks from a 
longitudinal perspective to be able to predict future development of these complex systems and 
draw implications for social, political, and economic activity in the regions.  
 
B. NETWORK METHODOLOGY: PRINCIPLES, CONCEPTS, TOOLS, TECHNIQUES, 
AND ADVANTAGES 
A particular characteristic of the network methodology is its structuralist nature, because 
the main focus for analysis is the linkages among the actors, rather than individual actors. “The 
networks and their structures are studied by analyzing the relations maintained among agents, in 
contrast to traditional analyses focused on the attributes of the actors” (Semitiel Garcia, 2006, 
p.8). Therefore, network analysts define network variables and categories in terms of the patterns 
of interactions and relations among actors, rather than attributes of individual actors. Information 
about network structure is used to test theories; however, information about attributes of 
individual agents can be used to complement the analysis. For instance, it can help determine 
whether there are systematic factors that have an impact on the interactions among agents of the 
network. 
Wasserman and Faust (1994), outline the following principles of the network perspective, 
which are relevant for this study: 
• Actors and their actions are interdependent rather than independent, autonomous units. 
• Linkages between actors are channels for the flow of resources of any kind. 
• Network models conceptualize social, economic, and political structure as lasting patterns 
of relations among actors.  
 
“The network perspective has certain basic concepts, which contribute to the 
development of a proper method of analysis and the acknowledgement of the perspective as a 
methodology, or even a paradigm” (Semitiel Garcia, 2006, p.6). These concepts include 
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networks, embeddedness, weak and strong ties, bridges, structural holes and social capital; all of 
these focus on the understanding of diverse types of groups of related social actors (Burt, 1992; 
Semitiel Garcia, 2006; Jackson, 2008). As mentioned above, the network methodology can be 
applied to the analysis of groups of related actors of any kind: individuals, firms, organizations, 
institutions, regions and countries, groups of countries, or even whole world economic, political, 
and social systems. The unit of analysis in the network methodology is an entity (structure) that 
consists of a collection of actors, and the relationships (linkages) among those actors. The 
network methodology is applicable to the present analysis of EU-Russia regional cooperation 
and energy systems, as there is a collection of agents in these systems that are acting in a social 
structure as related agents. 
Structuralist perspective assumes that the structural position of agents in their relational 
set explains the constraints and the opportunities emerging for them in the system and the 
patterns of their behavior, and influences the probability of achieving some objectives (Semitiel 
Garcia, 2006). The focus of the network analysis is therefore the structure of relations in a group 
of actors and the properties of the whole system where the actors interact and exchange 
information, resources and ides. According to Semitiel Garcia (2006, p.8), “from a 
methodological point of view, the network perspective is not reductionist but holistic, as opposed 
to individualistic, and interdisciplinary; …actors are purposeful, intentional agents, with social 
and economic motivations, and their actions are influenced by the net of relations in which they 
are embedded”. From the network perspective, the agents’ behavior and the results of agents’ 
actions can be explained by the structure of the network. At the same time, it is not only that the 
actions of the agents are influenced by the structure, but the structure of the network is in turn 
shaped and influenced by the agents’ interactions. Degenne and Forse (1999, p. 2) claim that 
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“Network Analysis analyses overall relations in an inductive attempt to identify behavior 
patterns and the groups of social strata that correlate with those patterns;… it… identifies the 
concrete constraints of structure on behavior at the same time as it uncovers constraints on 
structure from group interactions”.  
Therefore, actors in a network have a capacity to modify the original network structure 
through the effect of interactions among them (Semitiel Garcia, 2006, p.9). Social network 
analysis scholars argue that complex interactions among network agents create structural 
interdependences among them, and agents also have a capacity to impact each other through 
these interdependencies (Wellman 1988; Wasserman and Faust 1994). Therefore, links among 
network actors have important consequences for every participant of the network: the 
relationships a given actor has with others in the system affect its perceptions, norms, beliefs, 
values, visions, ideas, and behavior. 
Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) stress the importance of both direct and indirect (through 
other actors) connections among actors in explaining social networks. Granovetter (1973) is 
concerned with qualitative characteristics of links between agents. He differentiates between 
strong and weak ties. Actors that belong to the same group and interact with high frequency are 
argued to be linked by strong ties, and the member of a group is linked to the member of another 
group by a weak tie. “High cohesion of the network with many strong ties, and therefore, high 
density, implies feasible cooperation and coordination among the agents building the network” 
(Semitiel Garcia, 2006, p. 12).  
At the same time, the actors linked by a weak tie belong to different groups and the weak 
tie serves as a bridge between groups. Strong ties are important for cohesion in networks; 
however, according to Granovetter (1973), systems lacking weak ties will be fragmented and 
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incoherent hindering the exchange of information and resources and the spread of new ideas, and 
network subgroups will be separated by social class, professional field, or any other 
characteristics. The abundance of strong ties and the lack of weak ties can lock actors into a 
clique and prevent information from spreading and changing the system. Weak ties are crucial in 
networks, because they bridge groups, facilitate information exchange between networks of 
strong ties and provide actors of the network with access to resources of different kind beyond 
those available in their own groups (Granovetter, 1973). Weakly connected networks form what 
Burt (1992) calls ‘structural holes’.     
A structural hole is “a separation between non-redundant contacts” (Burt, 1992). An 
agent/group bridging the gap and connecting two otherwise disconnected agents/groups is 
playing a liaison, or broker, role (Scott, 1991; Burt, 1992, 2001). In interorganizational networks, 
brokers filling structural holes are claimed to have important strategic advantages in the system 
by controlling communication and the flow of ideas, information and resources. Agents 
occupying central positions in networks are also strategic, as other agents are dependent on them. 
Central positions are associated with power, control, authority, and prestige (Bonacich, 1987; 
Boje & Whetten, 1981; Galaskiewicz, 1979).  According to Semitiel Garcia (2006, p 17) 
“organizations in strategic exchange positions with other organizations are key diffusers of 
knowledge and behavior strategies”. The relational structure of the network is a resource 
emerging from it that can be used to the benefit of all the agents of the network, or exploited by 
certain agents or groups of agents, depending on the structural peculiarities of the network. 
Network analysts believe that the structural perspective is “deductively superior to 
normative action”, as it allows deriving hypotheses from rigorous algebraic representations of 
network systems by analyzing various network models (Semitiel Garcia, 2006, p. 11; Burt, 1982). 
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Network structures and substructures can be rigorously analyzed using a set of network 
analysis tools, which are uniquely designed and developed to address specific research questions 
of interest. Social network analysis is characterized by a distinctive methodology encompassing 
techniques for collecting data, statistical analysis, visual representation, etc.33 Depending on the 
focus of research and the level of analysis, scholars may study structural attributes of nodes in a 
network such as centrality, different characteristics of ego-networks (a focal node (ego) and the 
nodes to whom ego is directly connected to plus the ties among them) such as strength of ties, 
size, density, composition; or they may analyze network clusters or structural features of the 
whole network such as group centrality, core-periphery relations, power structure, network 
centralization and network cohesion. 
This research is mostly focused on the analysis of the network-level characteristics of the 
EU-Russia regional cooperation and energy systems, since the main aim of the study is to 
compare whole systems in the Russian northwestern and southern regions and look for structural 
explanations of regional differences. This is what Kilduff and Tsai (2003), among others, refer to 
as focusing on the ‘whole network.’ Over the past decade, there has been a steady increase in the 
number of studies focusing on whole interorganizational networks; however, network-level 
research has primarily been theoretical or based on descriptive case studies performed at single 
point in time (Provan, Fish and Sydow, 2007). 
The social, political, or economic environment in which agents operate is characterized 
by a particular structure in which they behave according to their interests and preferences 
(Semitiel Garcia, 2006, p.9). Nohria (1992) points out that the most significant elements in an 
organization’s environment are other organizations and the patterns of relations among them. 
                                                 
33 For more information, see Analytic Technologies website: http://www.analytictech.com/networks/whatis.htm 
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According to Uzzi (1996, p. 675), the type of network in which an organization is embedded 
defines the resources and opportunities potentially available; its position in the network and the 
types of inter-organizational ties it maintains define its access to those resources and 
opportunities. By structurally defining the organizational environment, network analysis makes it 
possible to answer behavioral research questions. Sociologists and organizational scholars have 
made considerable progress in explaining behavior of organizations in terms of their 
embeddedness in networks (Putnam, 1993; Granovetter 1973, 1985, 1992; Powell and Smith-
Doerr 1994; Stevens, Rooks, and Brown, 2008).  
Although network perspective has mostly been applied to the interorganizational analysis 
of non-profit organizations and associations (where social interaction is seen as an indispensable 
attribute of organizational life), there have been several comparative empirical studies of whole 
networks in economics that explained the behavior and performance of economic organizations 
as interacting and exchanging economic actors (Scott, 1987; Krachkardt, 1992; Perrow, 1992; 
Swedberg 1994; Uzzi, 1996; Semitiel Garcia, 2006). Norhia (1992) speaks about the importance 
of applying the network perspective to economic analysis, especially the study of the emergence 
of new economic actors, the expansion of industries, the formation of regional districts, and the 
dynamics of economic systems. According to Granovetter (1985, 2005), interactions among 
economic actors are embedded in a net of social relationships, and abstracting economic actors 
from such a net will lead to problems with internal validity. Uzzi (1996, p. 674) argues that 
“embeddedness refers to the process by which social relations shape economic action in ways 
that some mainstream economic schemes overlook or misspecify when they assume that social 
ties affect economic behavior only minimally or, in some stringent accounts, reduce the 
efficiency of the price system”.  
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Coleman (1988, p. S97) claims that the embeddedness is an “attempt to introduce into the 
analysis of economic systems, social organizations and social relations not merely as a structure 
that springs into place to fulfill an economic function but as a structure with history, continuity 
that gives it an independent effect on the functioning of economic systems”. Wilkinson (1983) 
offered a similar approach for the study of economic actors: he argued that it is important to 
consider social connectedness among economic agents.  
Though a lot of attention has been paid to the analysis of interproganizational linkages, 
studies of interorganizational systems have mostly focused on agents of a particular type: NGOs, 
firms, economic institutions, or productive sectors. There have been very few studies that 
focused on intersectoral interaction: interaction between private and non-profit actors, or public 
and private actors, or among actors from all three sectors. This study contributes to the 
intersectoral network research by looking at how actors from different sectors interact and 
behave in the regional cooperation and energy domains in the Russian northwestern and southern 
regions. 
Network analysis has important methodological advantages relevant to this study. First, a 
network representation provides a holistic view of existing structures. Network data represent 
accurately measured relations among network actors and can be rigorously analyzed in order to 
examine interconnectedness of the network actors and the results of analysis are visualized in a 
clear and transparent fashion. It is possible to recognize at first glance the structure of all 
connections among network agents and distinguish between central and peripheral network 
components. Moreover, connections between components are shown in terms of quality and 
quantity, which reveals the strong and the weak spots in the analyzed network and enables to 
identify missing links. 
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Second, network analysis method provides useful tools for addressing one of the most 
important (but also one of the most complex and difficult), aspects of social structure: the 
sources and distribution of power (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). As mentioned above, network 
analysis suggests that the power of individual agents is not an individual attribute, but arises 
from their relations with others, specifically from occupying advantageous positions in networks 
of relations. Whole social, economic or political structures may be seen as “displaying high 
levels or low levels of power as a result of variations in the patterns of ties among actors” 
(Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). The degree of inequality or concentration of power in a 
population may be indexed and rigorously assessed by using network analysis techniques. This 
can be very useful in the analysis of regional cooperation and energy structures, as understanding 
the distribution of power in these systems is key to understanding the complex dynamics 
between various actors and groups of actors of these systems and assessing their weight in the 
decision-making processes and their capacity to influence policy-making in the regions. 
Third, network analysis is a strategic tool in policy analysis. It can help explain policy 
development by examining networks of actors preoccupied with a given policy problem, across 
the public and private arenas and throughout different levels of governance (Mikkelsen, 2006). 
The analysis of regional cooperation and energy networks is crucial for the evaluation of the 
regional cooperation and energy policies and participatory monitoring, as it is able to show the 
roles played by different network actors and the nature of linkages and relationships that develop 
among firms, organizations, institutions, provincial governments, and other regional actors over 
time. Understanding of resources, weaknesses, and strategic options of these regional systems 
can be significantly improved through the application of network analysis. For instance, network 
analysis can help an organization involved in the regional cooperation better understand its 
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opportunities for improving relationships and its status within a network; or it can help actors 
interested in the development of regional cooperation (e.g. EU institutions, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Russian Vneshtorgbank and other regional actors) see missing 
links in the cooperation system and determine the areas that need more support and 
encouragement. The principle of cause and effect in social network analysis means that 
knowledge generated by the analysis can be immediately put into practice. Knowledge of the 
structure and the composition of the network simplifies the calculation of the effect of measures 
taken and minimizes the risk of false assessments and poor decisions for policy-makers.34 
 
 
C. NETWORKS, SOCIAL CAPITAL, CULTURE, NORMS, VALUES AND TRUST 
 
The relational structure of the network is a particular resource that can be used to the 
mutual benefit of the network agents (Semitiel Garcia, 2006, p.13). This structural resource is 
called social capital. “By analogy with notions of physical capital and human capital-tools and 
training that enhance individual productivity- ‘social capital’ refers to features of social 
organizations, such as networks, norms, and trust, which facilitate coordination and cooperation 
for mutual benefit. Social capital enhances the benefits of investment in physical and human 
capital” (Putnam, 1993, p.2). 
There are many definitions of social capital and there is a considerable debate between 
scholars who take a functionalist approach to defining social capital and others who see it 
primarily in terms of particular structures and the resources that they convey. Functional 
definitions of social capital focus on social resources that constitute social capital (such as 
culture and values) and enable cooperation and collective action (Twigg, 2003; Fukuyama, 1995; 
                                                 
34 For more information on the practical advantages of the network analysis, see FAS.research group, available at 
http://www.fas.at/business/en/whysna/index.htm 
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Newton, 1999; Coleman, 1990). For instance, Newton (1999, p. 4) defines social capital as the 
extent to which citizens are willing to cooperate with each other and engage in networks on the 
basis of interpersonal trust. Structural approach focuses on relational structure of networks and 
interprets social capital as a structural resource generated by collective action (Burt 1997, 2000; 
Borgatti, Jones, and Everett, 1998; Brass, 1992, and others).  
In practice, both approaches have much in common, as functional approach identifies 
interpersonal and interorganizational networks as essential mechanisms for encouraging 
cooperative behavior, improving the efficiency of society by generating coordinated actions and 
achieving common goals. Coleman states that “unlike other forms of capital, social capital 
inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors. It is not lodged either in the 
actors themselves or in physical implements of production” (Coleman, 1988, 98). Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal’s definition of social capital, which interprets social capital as both the network and the 
resources that may be mobilized through the network, is most relevant to this study: “social 
capital is the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and 
derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit. Social capital 
thus comprises both the network and the assets that may be mobilized through that network” 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, p. 243). 
According to Putnam (1993), relationships among social actors and norms existing in 
network structures instigate coordination and cooperation for the collective benefit of network 
actors. Social capital is also an important resource for individual agents, as through it each agent 
has access to and controls network resources such as information, knowledge, and benefits 
coming from collective action.  Additionally, social capital reduces vulnerability of network 
agents depending on one or very few other agents to maintain their relationships in the network. 
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All social interactions, relations and structures facilitate some forms of social capital; 
therefore, social capital is generated by any network, regardless of its form, shape and size. 
However, social capital functions with different intensity depending on the structure of the 
network, because it emerges from the relations or links maintained among the actors constituting 
the network (Semitiel Garcia, 2006, p.13). Burt (2000) argues that depending on the structure of 
the network, the social capital factor may be more or less intense. Colemann (1988) highlights 
the importance of density in social networks as in a dense network participants will interact in 
more than one arena, which helps to create the conditions for generating social capital. It is 
generally accepted that the networks with strong links inside them, with high closure (density), 
and many weak ties acting as bridges through structural holes linking them with other networks 
are rich in social capital (Burt, 2000).  
Burt (2001) defines social capital in networks in terms of network mechanisms such as 
network contagion and prominence, structural holes, and network closure. Network contagion 
and prominence mechanism concerns the social structure of a network that facilitates the 
transmission of knowledge, norms, beliefs, values, visions, ideas, and practices among network 
actors, which leads to shared expectations and interpretations and similarity in perception. With 
interaction come open communication, mutually defined goals, and trust. Network relations 
“lead to trust and, in tern, to embedded ties trust generates subsequent commitments, which leads 
to reciprocated exchanges, to concrete trust, and concrete trust again to embedded ties” (Semitiel 
Garcia, 2006, p 15). Structural holes mechanism refers to linkages to other groups and access to 
resources and information circulating in those groups. Network closure mechanism is about 
network density: denser networks have lower risks of cooperation and greater facilities for 
information and resource exchange.  
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In dense networks by creating an environment of trust and open communication, actors 
are able to strengthen relationships, resolve conflicts, meet needs more effectively, and increase 
individual and group effectiveness. Therefore, the structure of a network provides important 
information about its social capital. Depending on the structure of the network- as a function of 
its density and structural holes- social capital will be greater, coordination and collaboration will 
be easier, and therefore knowledge, resources and information will flow in a more efficient 
manner (Semitiel Garcia, 2006). Putnam (1993) discusses another structural feature that 
influences the intensity of social capital- network differentiation, which can be vertical (tape 
like) or horizontal (fabric like). The scholar argues that vertical networks represent hierarchy and 
dependency, which impede the development of social capital. 
Social capital is currently seen as a crucial factor for democratic, economic, social, 
cultural, political and institutional development at any level (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993; 
Semitiel Garcia, 2006; Gabriel, Kunz, Robteutscher, and Van Deth, 2002 among others). The 
emergence and development of social capital in modern societies is usually connected with the 
development of the civic (or third) sector- broad and diverse range of non-profit organizations, 
secondary associations, intermediary organizations, community associations, and think tanks 
which exist in almost every western society (Newton, 1999, p. 10). “The high numbers of 
associations in a locale increases civic vibrancy simply because associations are easy to reach 
and the costs for joining are low” (Maloney and Robteutscher, 2007, p. 53). Non-profit 
organizations and associations of various kinds are viewed as a key mechanism for fostering 
cooperation between citizens and enhancing trust in a society by providing a framework in which 
cooperative action facilitates the emergence of consensus and shared social norms and values (de 
Hart and Dekker, 1999; Putnam, 1993; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1995; Coleman, 1988, 
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1990). For instance, Putnam (1993) showed how in northern Italy the density and scope of local 
civic organizations facilitated the widespread dissemination of information and increased social 
trust among community members, thereby creating conditions for good governance, economic 
development, and democracy.  
A particular feature of the civic sector is its network character, as various organizations 
engage in interorganizational networking by uniting for joint action, launching joint projects, 
participating in campaigns and concluding partnerships. Dense linkages among third – sector 
organizations help connect people with access to different information, resources, knowledge 
and opportunities for the collective good of citizens. Recent interorganizational network studies 
show that societies endowed with rich networks have better capacity to share knowledge and 
expertise and implement successful development projects (Galasso and Ravallion, 2001), 
alleviate poverty (Moser, 1996; Kozel and Parker, 2000), and resolve conflicts (Schafft and 
Brown, 2000). According to Narayan (2002, p 60), Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, 
which have historically been characterized by high economic development, social cohesion and 
high levels of civic engagement, have the highest levels of cross-cutting ties in the world. Most 
comparative research on participation, interorganizational cooperation and civic activity places 
Nordic countries at the top of the list.  Different scholars associate the unique northern European 
models of welfare and democracy with high level of interorganizational networking, which has 
been particularly efficient in the production of social capital (Rothstein, 2001; Gabriel et al, 
2002; Maloney and Robteutscher, 2007). 
Higher levels of social capital and democratic governance in the Russian northwestern 
region can be connected with the networking activity of the region, as it is highly engaged in 
regional cooperation with the northern European countries, while southern region cooperates 
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more with the southern European countries, which are characterized by less dense and developed 
networks. In general, in Russia there is the lack of legitimate social structure through which ‘the 
natural impulse towards sociability’ expresses itself (Woodcock, 2002; Fukuyama, 1995; Twigg, 
2003). Regional cooperation with the EU both in the nonwestern and the southern regions creates 
such a structure, where various third-sector organizations engage in networking activity, thereby 
facilitating the development of social capital and generating trust and activism in the society.  
Networks generate trust among their neighbors and norms and values arise from trust and 
reinforce trust (Streeten, 2002). It is generally accepted that networks are effective mechanisms 
of diffusion of norms and values. According to Ostrom, “networks of civic engagement foster 
robust norms of reciprocity” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 206). Morgan, Putnam, and Semitiel Garcia argue 
that norms and values are major factors in the social capital generated by networks (Putnam, 
1993; Morgan, 1997; Semitiel-Garcia, 2006). Morgan (1997) claims that norms and values that 
emerge in the relational structures of networks facilitate cooperation and coordination and 
constitute the main root of learning in networks. The scholar points out that the current capitalist 
system is a learning economy and knowledge, competence, skills and organizational culture are 
the key flows in the interorganizational networks. Therefore, cooperation with European partners 
facilitates the transfer of European norms and values into the Russian local and regional arena 
and leads to shared culture and values.  
Additionally, according to institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), in the 
process of interaction, organizations often mimic other organizations and start to become more 
similar to one another, a phenomenon called isomorphism. Galaskiewicz and Wassermann 
(1989) found out that under conditions of uncertainty, non-profit organizations were likely to 
imitate those organizations to which they had some connections. As mentioned above, for many 
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Russian non-profit organizations participation in the regional cooperation is a means of survival, 
therefore in this condition of dependence on their EU partners, Russian organizations are likely 
to mimic their organizational culture. As besides third-sector organizations regional cooperation 
involves actors from other sectors, they are also prone to EU influence through linkages to their 
European partners. Joiner (2001) found that local firms in less developed/developing countries 
often changed their organizational culture to mimic the culture of successful organizations from 
the more industrialized nations. Therefore, cooperation between more advanced European and 
Russian economic and business actors might positively influence business culture and foster 
economic development in the Russian regions. The same can be true for political organizations 
and educational institutions. 
Regional cooperation provides a framework for intense interaction among civil society 
organizations, educational institutions, regional mass media, provincial governments, business 
and economic actors, thereby creating linkages among and within civic, private, public, and 
education sectors. Linkages among and within all these sectors are crucial for consensus, trust, 
and social learning in a society. According to Narayan (2002), links between different social 
groups are critical to both economic opportunity and social cohesion. In Democracy in America, 
Toqueville (1969) discovered that through such linkages Americans transferred their attitudes 
and practices from private sector to politics and vice versa, transporting the learning from thier 
connections in one field to the other. “It is essential for citizens and civil groups to have access to 
timely and reasonably independent information about governmental action and performance” to 
include in decision-making processes those previously excluded from formal governance 
structures (Narayan, 2002, p 75).  
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Connection between civil society, education and private sectors is important for 
improving social responsibility of business. Through cooperation and collaboration, all the 
sectors can pool together scarce regional resources, knowledge, skills, technology, expertise and 
all other critical factors to strive for optimal regional growth and development. Regional 
cooperation projects and partnerships enable to identify regional environmental, economic, 
societal, and other problems and help to mobilize broad public support for solving these 
problems. Interconnectedness of actors participating in regional cooperation is critical for the 
success of cooperation, as “diffuse sets of social ties are crucial to the provision of informal 
insurance mechanisms and have important impacts on the success of development projects” 
(Woodcock, 2002; Galasso and Ravallion, 2001; Isham, Narayan , and Pritchett, 1995). 
In the Russian context, collaboration among all kinds of regional actors is essential, 
because apart from regional cooperation with the EU, there is no consistent policy of 
intersectoral cooperation (Borodkina and Smirnova, 2007). However, for the proper functioning 
of a network in terms of successful implementation of projects, timely information exchange, 
generation of social capital, and diffusion of norms and values, there should be high level of 
cross-cutting ties in the system, which would make the system horizontal (Narayan, 2002). 
Otherwise, primary groups of actors will be exploiting the system for their own benefit and the 
system will be functioning only to the betterment of those groups. Such asymmetry of power in 
the system will lead to bribery, cronyism, corruption and stagnation (Narayan, 2002). A big 
problem in today’s Russia is the underdevelopment of civil society and increased governmental 
control over mass media, private and non-governmental spheres. This could be reflected in the 
way the cooperation networks are structured. Therefore, it is important to see whether 
cooperation networks have high level of cross-cutting ties and equal distribution of power, 
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thereby providing equal opportunities for the network agents, or are vertical and centralized 
around provincial governments hindering the diffusion of norms and values, and generation of 
social capital and trust in the regions.  
Social capital theory stresses the importance of trust for the well functioning of civil 
society, enhancement of cooperation, civic engagement and democracy, and economic 
development (Putnam 1993; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1995; Uslaner 1999). Scholars 
differentiate between thin and thick trust: thick trust is generated by intensive and daily contacts 
between people, often of the same ethnic group, class, or local community (Newton, 1999, p. 12; 
Williams, 1988, p. 8), while thin trust is looser, more general and more sporadic social contacts, 
the product of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973). Thin trust is claimed to be generated by 
interorganizational networks and constitute strong basis for social integration and cohesion in 
modern societies (Newton, 1999, p. 15).  
As interorganizational networks often cross the boundaries of nation-states, different 
researchers find out the emergence of trust and social capital not only in the same country, but 
also across international boundaries (van Deth, Maraffi, Newton and Whiteley, 1999; Anheier 
and Katz, 2005; Bennett, 2005). According to Niedermayer, there is evidence that the level of 
trust within the European Community is increasing (Niedermayer, 1995, p. 237).  Aalto, 
Blakkisrud and Smith (2008) discuss the emergence of trust between Russia and the EU at the 
regional level due to increased people-to-people interaction through interorganizational 
cooperative initiatives, exchanges, partnerships and joint activities in the Northern Dimension, 
which foster mutual understanding, stability and development in the region. 
Anheier and Katz (2005) point out that there is the need to study organizations as a 
network, with linkages in trade, economic partnerships, organizational culture, investment, travel, 
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cooperation, culture and knowledge-sharing which cross territorial boundaries. The scholars 
claim that network approach allows for the geographical extensity and internal intensity, or 
network density, to be modeled and mapped, where low network prevalence and density are 
associated with economic and geographical isolation, underdevelopment of civil society and lack 
of social capital and trust (Anheier and Katz, 2005; Pharoah and Williamson, 2008). Therefore, 
high interorganizational density of regional cooperation structures will be an important marker of 
high levels of trust and social cohesion in the northwestern and southern regions. Currently there 
are very few comparative empirical studies of interorganizational networks that stretch across 
territorial boundaries, and there are even fewer studies of sub-national-level interorganizational 
networks. This study contributes significantly to the interorganizational network research, as it 
offers comparative assessment of regional network structures and their impact on regional 
development. 
Although all the networks are claimed to facilitate some forms of social capital and trust 
among network agents, it is not that such social capital and trust are always positive for the 
society. According to Levi (1996), under certain circumstances networks may generate 
‘unsocial’ capital. Newton (1999, p 7) argues that different networks and associations have 
different capacities to produce social capital, at the same time some social networks have a 
capacity to produce unsocial capital. Isham, Kelly and Ramaswamy (2002, p5) express the same 
idea that social capital facilitated by networks can generate negative or positive externalities. 
Networks may stimulate inward and insular views and there are many cases where the social 
capital generated by the network was detrimental for certain groups or sectors of society or even 
for the whole society (Maloney and Robteutscher, 2007, p 8; Levi 1996, Coleman, 1990, Fiorina 
1999, Robteutscher 2002). Terrorist organizations or networks of extremist groups like skinheads 
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are readily apparent examples of this. According to Robteutscher (2002), associational networks 
during the Weimar Republic impeded democratic development and fostered the rise and success 
of National Socialism. Therefore, networks and social interaction can promote detrimental 
ideology and/or cause illegitimacy, bribery, corruption, nepotism, cronyism, and crime (Streeten, 
2002, p 44).  
At present, scholars of social capital focus on examining under which conditions, which 
types of networks produce social capital that has a positive impact on democratic governance and 
economic development, and which types produce unsocial capital. Scholars argue that to produce 
positive social capital and function for the betterment of society, networks should be safe, 
participatory, inclusive, serve for common purposes and further collective interests, and 
comprise broad collective norms and values (Forrest and Kearns, 2001; Rose and Clear, 2002). 
Some scholars (Laïdi, 2006) specify that networks should promote democratic norms and values. 
EU-Russia regional cooperation networks satisfy these requirements, as regional cooperation 
policy and its activities are based on “internationally recognized principles, such as good 
governance, transparency and participation, sustainable development, gender equality, the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities, cultural diversity, social cohesion, fair working conditions 
and corporate social responsibility, non-discrimination, the protection of indigenous peoples and 
the support of further strengthening of the civil society and democratic institutions”.35 Therefore, 
it is possible to say that social capital and trust generated by the regional cooperation networks 
have positive externalities, though might function with different intensity.  
As far as the energy networks are concerned, longitudinal analysis demonstrated that 
energy companies have a negative impact on democratic governance and economic development 
                                                 
35 For more information on Northern Dimension Policy Objectives, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/ 
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in the regions due to rent-seeking effects, manipulation of resources by public officials to meet 
unpopular or even illegal objectives, complacency in policy-making, and creating absence of 
interest in economic diversification. Energy networks are not socially inclusive and they function 
only to the betterment of certain rent-seeking interest groups. Bribery and corruption are 
common interdependencies in energy networks. Instead of social cohesion and equality they 
generate unsocial capital and are detrimental for regional development. Therefore, the regional 
cooperation networks are qualitatively different from the energy networks, as the former 
facilitate social capital, while the latter generate unsocial capital. The structural characteristics, 
and also the functioning and development of these networks have diametrically opposite 
implications for democratic governance in the regions.    
 
D. NETWORKS AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
Interorganizational networks that produce social capital with positive externalities have a 
positive influence on democratic governance (Putnam, 1993; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 
1995; Kendall and Knapp, 1996; Warren, 2001). Their contribution to the development of 
democratic governance is multifaceted: they function as a barrier against totalitarianism and 
authoritarianism, provide a check on the excesses of government, create countervailing advocacy, 
facilitate social integration, promote cooperation, generate trust and reciprocity in a society, and 
serve as important venues for community members who wish to take part in decision-making 
processes (Robteutscher, 2005; Kendall and Knapp, 1996; Tocqueville, 1969; Maloney and 
Robteutscher, 2007). Different mechanisms through which interorganizational networks 
influence democratic governance are extensively discussed in the interorganizational literature. 
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Different scholars claim that interorganizational networks facilitate and encourage a 
vibrant political society: “associational vibrancy in the political sphere is the by-product of 
associational vibrancy in the social realm” (Maloney and Robteutscher, 2007, p 10; Putnam, 
1993). According to Maloney and Robteutscher (2007), there is reciprocity between the social 
and political organizational dimensions and all associations and nongovernmental organizations 
have a potential to act politically. In addition, even non-political activities in the civil society 
sector can have important political consequences. Putnam (1993, 2000) and Toqueville (1969) 
perceived civil society networks as integrative social elements and important mediators and 
coordinators between citizens and public sector. Putnam (1993, pp. 89-90) argued that third-
sector associations contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic government 
through ‘internal’ effects on individual members and ‘external’ effects on the wider polity and 
society. Internal effects are “the habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public spiritidness” and 
external ones are effective social collaboration and interaction between public and civic spheres 
generated by a dense network of secondary associations.  
It is generally accepted that networks of third-sector organizations facilitate social and 
political participation and through integrative and participatory functions contribute to societal 
and democratic health. According to Warren (2001, pp.71-6), associational vibrancy creates 
developmental, public sphere and institutional democratic effects. Developmental effects refer to 
developing political skills (negotiation, bargaining, compromise, accommodation, etc.) and 
cultivating democratic norms and values (tolerance, mutual respect, respect for justice, the rule 
of law, minority rights and the rights of others etc.). Public sphere effects are related to the 
“formation of public opinion and public judgment”, as associations perform a public 
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communication function and play an essential role in bringing important community issues and 
problems into light. Institutional effects are about making and implementing public decisions. 
Zmeril and Newton (2007, p 235) claim that the democratic potential of the third-sector 
organizations lies in their capacity to engage in networks with similar organizations, because 
connectedness is a necessary condition for organizations for achieving success in “putting 
community concerns on the public agenda and in making the interests of their constituents count 
in the public domain”. The authors argue (p. 241) that from a democratic perspective four 
aspects are important: organizational cohesion and diversity in a locality, interorganizational 
social and political connectedness, and the intra-organizational degree of voluntarism and 
activism. Newton (1999, p 15) expresses a similar idea that overlapping and interlocking 
organizations, which create a set of cross–cutting ties in a society, form the basis of pluralist 
democracy. Narayan (2002) explores interorganizational networks engaged in development 
projects and provides evidence that a high level of cross-cutting ties fosters good governance 
leading to positive social and economic outcomes. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, p. 84) provide 
rigorous statistical support for the thesis that involvement in organizations and 
interorganizational collaboration promote political activism. 
According to Olsen (1972, pp. 318), social involvement and cooperation increase the 
propensity for political involvement for a number of reasons: 
1) social interaction and cooperation facilitates people-to-people interaction and individuals 
involved in organizational activities have a chance to meet with many new and diverse people; 
the resulting connections involve them into social affairs and then into public affairs and political 
activity,  
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2) participation in activities and joint events increases one’s information, develops his/her 
negotiation, communication, and leadership skills and provides resources necessary for effective 
political action,  
3) collaboration broadens people’s horizon of knowledge and interests and attracts attention to 
important public issues and problems; therefore, public affairs become more salient for people.  
Maloney and Robteutscher (2007, p.5) discuss important features of participatory 
democracy, which include nourishing the democratic spirit of individuals, making institutions 
more effective instruments of democracy, building community, encouraging cooperation and 
facilitating the  generation of positive social capital outputs. Berry et al. (1993, pp. 55-56) are 
concerned with parameters of participation such as breadth and depth. Breadth of a participation 
effort refers to the extent that participation is inclusive and offered to every community member 
at every stage of the policymaking process. Depth concerns the extent to which the citizens who 
seek to participate have an opportunity to influence policy outcomes. 
Some scholars are quite skeptical about participatory democracy warning against ‘too 
much democracy’. For instance, Huntignton (1975) claimed that problems of governance in the 
United States stemmed from an excess of democracy, when political system experienced too 
much involvement on behalf of various social groups. Olson (1982) was also quite critical of 
excessive group activity making public sector pursue private interests of different groups. 
However, scholars are unanimous on the fact that some participation in political public realm is 
absolutely necessary for democratic governance, as the lack of participation in public affairs 
isolates many people from power sharing and hinders transparency and accountability of the 
public sector. 
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In Russia, in general, there is a critical problem of low levels of political activism and 
participation, as citizens are disconnected from public affairs at different levels- local, regional, 
national. Common citizens can hardly contact public officials and civil society organizations and 
various social groups have extremely limited access to politics. Explicit goal of non-
governmental organizations is to influence policy–making (Maloney and Robteutscher, 2007, p. 
53); in Russia organizations have very little opportunity to do so. EU-Russia regional 
cooperation creates an important bridge between the public sector and the needs of the 
community. Through inteorganizational collaboration and participation in various regional 
projects, initiatives, public forums and conferences, regional residents have an opportunity to 
meet with public officials, discuss common regional problems and find solutions to them, which 
ensures a more sustainable regional development in Russia and makes local governments more 
responsible to local needs and accountable to local citizens. Regional cooperation networks 
facilitate higher levels of transparency and public accountability in the regions by distributing 
information and generating knowledge that empower regional residents to make greater demands 
through more informed scrutiny of regional officials, business and cultural leaders.  
According to Maloney and Robteutscher (2007), for democratic governance there have to 
be linkages between civil society and both the state and the market, as civil society has to 
“mobilize and activate influence on state-market mechanisms”. EU-Russia regional cooperation 
networks create such linkages. The participation opportunities that various actors taking part in 
regional cooperation offer for broader public increase social cohesion in the regions and foster 
the development of democratic competences. Additionally, by frequent interaction with their 
European colleagues, Russian political, economic, business, cultural and civic actors get exposed 
to European political, economic and organizational norms and values, and also culture and 
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perceptions existing in European Community. As EU countries are more advanced in terms of 
democratic governance, close relationships with European partners socialize Russian actors into 
a democratic culture, thereby fostering the development of democratic governance in the Russian 
regions. However, the effects of regional cooperation networks on democratic governance in the 
northwestern region and the southern region might have different intensity depending on the 
structural characteristics of cooperation networks.           
  
E. REGIONAL COOPERATION AND ENERGY NETWORKS 
 
Chapter II of this dissertation extensively discussed the peculiarities, characteristics and 
dimensions of EU network governance and policy networks existing in various policy arenas. 
The EU is often described in the public administration and public policy literature as a 
postmodern power that heavily relies on decentralization, participation, and multi-level 
governance involving complex networks in designing and implementing policies and delivering 
public goods. Public – private collaboration is common in Europe and there is a variety of 
linkages among public, private and nongovernmental actors. Institutionally, there is a significant 
number of various kinds of boards, councils and committees that incorporate into their 
membership individual citizens and members of the public.  
In Russia, the government still relies on internal, hierarchical control mechanisms which 
are often ineffective and unable to address complex emerging problems. The government 
currently makes certain attempts to collaborate with nonprofit organizations and private agencies 
in delivering public goods, but it experiences serious fiscal problems due to high levels of 
corruption and lack of accountability mechanisms. Additionally, it tries to increase control over 
private and non-profit actors, which does not contribute to openness and cooperative spirit. 
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However, as discussed above, Russian regions vary a lot in terms of democracy and approaches 
to policy-making; therefore, there is significant variation in the patterns of governance at the 
regional level. 
This study is focused on the regional cooperation networks, which are peculiar forms of 
regional network governance as interdependent interconnected private, public, and civil society 
actors cooperate in a more or less institutionalized infrastructure to address common regional 
problems – environmental, social, economic, cultural, and other, which often transcend the 
borders of single national governments and provincial authorities. In some areas cooperation 
arises from shared interests and values and common cultural and historical background or 
benefits that come from collective action such as common economic projects or building 
common transportation system.  
Joas, Kern, and Sandberg (2007) explore transnational governance networks in the 
environmental sector in the Baltic Sea Region (which is geographically part of the Northern 
Dimension) and define them as ‘hybrid networks’ as they consist of diverse public, private and 
third-sector actors and are often constructed with a specific purpose to benefit from the 
heterogeneity of the actors. “According to the basic insights of interorganizational theory and 
political theory, hybrid networks give access to resources otherwise out of reach and also serve 
as arenas for actors who otherwise would not be able to influence policymaking” (Joas, Kern, 
and Sandberg , 2007). The scholars find out that governance for sustainable development in the 
Baltic Sea Region requires a combination of governance modes within as well as beyond nation-
states and hybrid networks are extremely effective in solving complex regional problems.  
The authors also claim that hybrid networks are beneficial for the funding organizations 
as they opened access to different kinds of information, expertise and knowledge, as well as to 
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economic advantages, and “gave the funding institutions (especially the EU) an opportunity to 
steer governance efforts independently from political actors at the national level”. At the same 
time, for non-profit organizations and general citizens the hybrid networks provided easier 
access to the regional decision-making than the more traditional forms of political participation 
did. These aspects of Joas, Kern, and Sandberg’s study are relevant to the present research, as it 
is also focused on the ways in which the EU influences governance at the sub-national level in 
the Russian regions that are involved in the EU-Russia regional cooperation initiatives. 
It is possible to apply the term ‘hybrid networks’ to regional cooperation networks 
between the EU and Russia, which are based on the same principles as the Baltic Sea Region 
networks and involve multiple actors from public, private and third sectors. The main aim of this 
study is to examine the effects of the regional cooperation on governance, democracy, and 
interorganizational networking in the Russian northwestern and southern regions; therefore, it is 
mostly focused on the interorganziational networks that emerge on the territory of the Russian 
northwestern and southern regions as a result of participation of various regional actors in the 
regional cooperation processes. To grasp the full picture of the regional networking, this study is 
not limited to one particular policy sector, but tries to encompass all the areas of regional 
cooperation and applies structural longitudinal approach to evaluate the structural changes and 
the development of cooperation networks. It might happen that in the one region cooperation 
networks have a stronger influence on governance and policy-making and in the other they might 
be less effective.  Structural characteristics of the networks will be important indicators of their 
effectiveness. 
As far as the energy networks are concerned, they do not represent a pure form of 
network governance, where actors from all the sectors- public, private and civil society – engage 
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in a cooperative action to solve complex problems for the benefit of the whole society. On the 
contrary, energy networks serve to the betterment of particular interest groups and often hinder 
policy processes. For instance, using their formal and informal relationships with provincial 
governments, energy actors frequently interfered with regional environmental policy processes 
and impeded problem-solving performance by putting pressure on public officials to make 
decisions favoring their own interests (Chernitsin, 2008).  Therefore, energy structures in the 
Russian context represent networks with negative externalities. However, it is crucial to take 
them into consideration as they have an effect on governance processes in the regions. By 
analyzing and comparing structural characteristics of the energy networks in the northwestern 
and southern regions, it will be possible to explain the intensity of their effect on policy-making 
in the regions.     
 
F. NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE REGIONAL COOPERATION AND ENERGY 
STRUCTURES 
1. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Network Analysis as a Method  
 
At present, there are two traditions in network governance analysis: policy network 
studies and social network analysis. These two traditions differ in research focus, methodology, 
analytical tools and data handling. Policy network studies focus on resource attributes of network 
actors and the process of negotiation and bargaining in an institutional format with a goal of 
achieving public purpose.  
Social network analysis focuses on patterns of relations and structural attributes of 
nodes/agents in a network (whole network or ego network). As far as analytical tools and data 
handling are concerned, policy network studies use context-sensitive interpretation and 
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explanation and qualitative case studies, while social network analysis employs rigorous 
algebraic representations of network systems, structural/quantitative variables and formal model 
hypothesis testing. 
This study is an example of social network analysis tradition. Analysis of resource 
attributes of network actors and the actual interaction processes is important for understanding 
how individual network actors function in the system and how the process of 
communication/negotiation/bargaining occurs. However, to be able to understand how certain 
network groups or the whole structure function, evolve and develop, it is necessary to study 
systemic features and peculiarities of network structures. Social network analysis allows 
analyzing structures consisting of a multitude of actors and enables to find actors or group of 
actors playing a pivotal role in the network exchange processes. The aim of the study is to grasp 
the full complexity of the regional cooperation and energy systems by analyzing their structural 
features and studying their development from the longitudinal perspective. Therefore, the 
regional cooperation and energy networks are treated as both dependent and independent 
variables, and it is hypothesized that different network configurations have different network-
level effects on governance in the regions. Information about resource attributes of network 
agents will be also considered in this study to complement the analysis. 
The main advantage of the network analysis as a method is that it allows capturing the 
configuration of the relations among a multitude of actors thereby making it possible to study 
systemic features of different interorganizational processes. Additionally, the network 
methodology has a developed set of tools that help to rigorously differentiate, systematize and 
evaluate different patterns of interconnectivity existing in the system and rigorously assess their 
impact on the system’s exchanges. Network analysis is a very useful tool in the 
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interorganizational studies, as it allows for discovering the tendencies and the patterns in large 
systems that explain the way the systems function. In addition, according to Moloney and 
Robteutscher (2007, p 153), “social science knows a good deal about the sorts of people who join 
organizations, how many and what kind of people join, and the consequences of such 
membership for political attitudes and behavior. The great richness of individual survey data, 
however, contrasts with the black hole that surrounds our knowledge of interorganizational 
networking and contacts on the part of both voluntary associations and business organizations”. 
Therefore, in the case of complex systems existing in the energy and regional cooperation 
domains, where a multitude of different public, civil society, and private-sector actors engage in 
relationships that are characterized by different levels of strength and intensity, network analysis 
would be a very helpful tool in studying those systems. 
As far as the disadvantages of the network analysis method are concerned, the main 
challenge of the method is deciding which actors to include in the network, or in other words, to 
define the network boundaries (Rowley, 1997). Selection subjectivity can affect the results of the 
analysis. In our case, threats to internal validity and reliability of the network data due to the 
subjectivity of the selected ‘target population’ were addressed through several means. First, a 
representative sample of actors interacting in the regional cooperation and energy domains was 
constructed for the analysis. The energy sample is exhaustive, as it involved all the significant 
actors in the regional energy sector and all the provincial administrations involved in the regional 
cooperation with the EU (for consistency with the regional cooperation data). As far as the 
regional cooperation sample is concerned, a big number of the actors chosen for the analysis 
(100 actors) and diverse range of actors (with all the sectors of cooperation represented by more 
or less same number of actors) enhance the credibility of the data and reduce selection error. In 
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addition, in our case, the main goal of the network analysis is to grasp the major tendencies and 
patterns of relationships existing in the complex regional cooperation and energy systems, 
therefore, a small sample selection error will not seriously affect the results of the analysis. 
Another disadvantage of the network analysis is that it ignores the micro-level of 
individual actors and does not allow an in-depth analysis of their resource attributes. The 
network method is also not able to assess the context in which the regional cooperation and 
energy networks function. Understanding regional specifics is extremely important in explaining 
the factors that shape these structures and account for the structural changes over time, as 
regional cooperation and energy networks emerge and develop in a certain ethno-cultural, 
historical, geopolitical, and economic context that conditions their operation and development. 
However, this analysis is specifically focused on the systemic features of the processes 
occurring in the regional cooperation and energy domains, and the experience of individual 
actors and regional specifics will be considered in the next chapter of this dissertation, which 
based on the in-depth interviews with various regional residents and experts.   
2. Hypotheses 
The study develops a series of hypotheses, which will be tested using Social Network 
Analysis tools and instruments.  
Network-level hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1 (Network Centralization): both regional cooperation and energy networks are more 
decentralized in the northwestern region than in the southern region. Both networks become 
more decentralized in the northwestern region over time, while in the southern region the 
networks develop higher levels of centralization.  
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Hypothesis 2 (Network Centralization): the regional cooperation system in the southern region is 
centralized around one particular group of actors, while the northwestern regional cooperation 
network’s most central actors are from different cooperation sectors.   
Hypothesis 3 (Network cohesion): the northwestern cooperation network has higher degree of 
cohesion than the southern cooperation network and its cohesion degree becomes higher over 
time, while the cohesion of the southern cooperation network does not increase significantly over 
time. On the contrary, energy network is more cohesive in the southern region and the degree of 
cohesion increases significantly over time, while the level of the northwestern energy network’s 
cohesion does not increase significantly over time.   
Hypothesis  4 (Power): power is more equally distributed in cooperation and energy networks in 
the northwestern region than in the southern one; power relations become even more 
asymmetrical in the southern networks over time. 
Hypothesis 5 (Core- periphery relations): core is bigger and more diverse in the northwestern 
networks than in the southern ones and core-periphery relations become more balanced over time 
(more organizations move to the core) in the northwestern region than in the southern region.  
Hypothesis 6 (Network structure): the direction in which network exchanges take place is 
different in the regions. In the northwestern cooperation and energy networks the direction of 
exchanges is horizontal, while in the southern regions – vertical. 
Hypothesis 7 (Strength of Cooperative effort): the strength of cooperative effort is higher and 
more evenly distributed in the northwestern regional cooperation networks than in the southern 
ones. The strength of cooperative effort increases in both regions over time. 
Hypothesis 8 (Consensus and effect on decision-making): cooperation network in the 
northwestern region has better structural conditions for information exchange and achieves 
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consensus much faster than the southern cooperation network, therefore the northwestern 
network has higher impact on the regional decision-making processes. On the contrary, energy 
network has much better structural conditions for information exchange and convergence to 
consensus in the southern region than in the northwestern region.  
Group–level hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1 (Cohesion within and among groups): cooperation networks in the northwestern 
region have more or less equal densities within groups and among groups; therefore, there is a 
high level of cross-cutting ties in the system. In the southern cooperation networks, there are 
lower levels of cross-cutting ties as there are big differences in the degree of density within and 
among groups.  
Hypothesis 2 (Intersectoral linkages): in the northwestern cooperation network, all the policy 
areas are well-linked, while in the southern cooperation network there are absent linkages 
between some policy areas.  
Node-level hypotheses (based on node structural and resource attribute data):  
Hypothesis 1: An agent’s degree of centrality and power in the northwestern cooperation 
network is a function of its size, level of activity in local environment, alliance proactiveness, 
and international competence. Power and centrality of an actor in the southern cooperation 
network depend on its size, budget/income, and whether it comes from the public sector. 
Hypothesis 2: Power and centrality of an actor in the southern regional energy network is a 
function of its size and income.  
Regional cooperation-intervention hypothesis:  
Regional cooperation with the EU has statistically significant positive effect on the growth of 
linkages among various actors in the Russian northwestern and southern regions and on the 
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development of interorganizational networks in the Russian regions. However, in the 
northwestern region, EU –related effects are expected to be higher.   
3. Modeling Regional Cooperation and Energy Networks  
 
Regional Cooperation networks (partially analyzed in Turkina, 2009):  
 
It is important to note that the northwestern and the southern regions that are included in 
the EU’s Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy do not coincide exactly with the 
administrative boundaries of the Russian Northwestern Federal District and the Southern Federal 
Districts. Certain provinces that are located further away from the borders are excluded from the 
majority of partnerships.  
Representative samples of one hundred regional actors in each region were selected for 
this study.36  The actors were selected from 8 provinces in the Northwestern Federal District 
excluding the Nenets Autonomous district and Komi Republic (as they are not covered by the 
majority of cooperation initiatives and are usually not included in regional partnerships since 
they are located further away from the Russian-EU northwestern borders) and 9 provinces in the 
Southern Federal District excluding the Republic of Chechnya, the Republic of Dagestan, and 
the Republic of Ingushetia (due to unavailability of data), and Volgograd province (as it is not 
covered by the majority of cooperation initiatives and is usually not included in regional 
partnerships as it is located further away from the southern borders).37 
The actors selected for the analysis include provincial administrations existing in the 
regions, economic and business actors, various non-governmental organizations and associations 
and other third-sector actors, educational institutions, local newspapers and media agencies, 
environmental organizations, and other regional actors participating in the regional cooperation 
                                                 
36 Appendix of this chapter represents centrality and power scores of the 10 most central/powerful organizations 
37 For the complete list of the provinces, see Appendix of this chapter 
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with the EU. The data on the organizations were taken from the EU project databases, EU 
regional cooperation reports, the Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy on-line 
resources, Euroregion’s websites, Russian organizations’ documentation and websites 
(information on European partners),  and different local and regional newspapers, journals, and 
brochures.38  
The organizations were selected in a way that each sector of the regional cooperation was 
represented by a more or less equal number of organizations. In addition, the samples were also 
composed of more or less equal number of private and third-sector actors. 
The literature on interorganizational networks mentions several ways of measuring 
relationships between organizations. Certain studies favor measuring the strength of the tie 
between two organizations in the network on the basis of a three-point, five-point, seven-point, 
or nine-point scale, where the highest number corresponds to the strongest alliance between the 
organizations (Singer and Kegler, 2004; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Contractor and Lorange, 
1988; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991). Some studies measure network relations with binary data 
representing the presence (1) or absence (0) of a relationship (Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt, 
2000). Some studies use the measure of intensity or frequency of interaction; this is usually 
calculated as the number of transactions occurring per unit of time (Kalleberg, Knoke, and 
                                                 
38 For information on Tacis, see the “Europa,” the website of the EU:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/tacis/; For information on the Northern Dimension initiatives, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/doc/index.htm; For information of the Black Sea cross-border 
programs, see http://www.blacksea-cbc.net/index.php?page=MAP;  
For information on the neighborhood initiatives, see http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_647.htm; 
For information on cooperation partnerships, see http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_258.htm; For ENPI programs, 
see http://www.together50years.eu/EN/mn3_hr/enpi.htm, For external cooperation programs, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/enpi-cross-border/index_en.htm; 
For Euroregions, see http://www.siauliai.aps.lt/saule/about.html, http://www.euroregionbaltic.eu/members.php, 
http://euregio.karelia.ru/site/?lang=eng 
Baltic Euroregion Network http://www.benproject.org/en, For the information about regional partnerships, see the 
websites of the provincial governments and Russian National Statistics Committee Reports (GOSKOMSTAT) 
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Marsden, 1995). Other studies interpret the intensity of the network tie as the number of joint 
activities or projects held together or the number of partnerships that an actor has, which reflects 
the degree to which an actor has relationships with other actors through a number of partnerships 
linking them together (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; 
Koka and Prescott, 2002; Soh, 2003).  
This study follows the last approach to measuring the strength of a network tie, but 
applies normalization to achieve consistency in dynamic range for the set of data. It employs 
normalized cooperative activity as a measure of an interorganizational tie. The normalized 
cooperative activity (NCA) is the number of joint EU-related 
projects/initiatives/deals/programs/activities that existed between two regional actors divided by 
the total number of cooperation efforts in the system. The NCA is an adequate measure of 
interorganizational relations in the regional cooperation systems, as the whole concept of 
regional cooperation and practical implementation of regional cooperation are based on joint 
cooperative measures and projects that help to link different regional actors together and form 
regional alliances. The normalized cooperative activity between two actors estimates well the 
level of cooperative effort and interaction among organizations involved in regional cooperation. 
This study aims at assessing the complexity of regional cooperation systems and 
encompassing a multitude of organizations involved in regional cooperation. The data for this 
study were gathered from multiple sources: EU datasets of regional cooperation initiatives, 
Russian regional administrations’ websites (they have elaborate sections on activities occurring 
in their regions), Russian database of trans-regional cooperation, Russian and European regional 
newspapers, organizations’ websites, and other available sources.39 In many cases, besides the 
actors enumerated in official program design documents, other regional actors were involved in 
                                                 
39 For the complete list of data sources, see Appendix of this chapter 
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the implementation of cooperation program/initiative/partnership/project, therefore, it was 
important to consider them in the analysis. For instance, in the southern region it sometimes 
happened that provincial administrations were not mentioned in the project design 
documentation; however, in practice they took active part in the project by making decisions 
concerning public events designed by the project, or/and subjecting project finances to 
bureaucratic control, or making decisions concerning actors that had to be involved in or 
excluded from the project, or participating in project activities at different stages of project 
implementation. Or, as another example, many initiatives that were primarily designed for 
establishing cooperation among various economic actors included civil society actors, like in the 
case with the joint EU / Finnish /Swedish and Russian development program (northwestern 
region) called ‘Euro-Russia regional development’, which was designed to improve the 
investment conditions and networking of companies across the border between Russia and the 
EU through investment projects, however in its implementation process the program involved 
many actors from other sectors like Northwestern Association of Workers, Russian Institute for 
Radio Navigation and various environmental organizations. Or in some cases, actors that were 
initially included in the project design documents did not participate or withdrew from the 
program/project/initiative at an early stage of its implementation for different reasons.  
Therefore, information about actual project participants was checked and verified with 
multiple sources including local newspapers, provincial websites, organizations’ brochures and 
websites, and any information available on project events. Thus, the data on the relations 
between actors in the systems corresponds to the actual real information on cooperative activities 
in the regions. 
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The data was also checked with multiple regional cooperation experts to ensure that the 
samples selected for this study adequately represent regional cooperation and include all 
prominent actors in different sectors of regional cooperation.40 
At first, two-mode cooperation program/initiative/partnership/project by organization 
matrix was constructed for each region at time 1 (1999), when the majority of regional 
cooperation programs were already taking place since all sorts of regional partnerships in 
addition to already existing TACIS programs were launched in 1997 under the PCA agreement, 
and some of the regional programs including business and economic contacts were established 
before 1997; and then at time 2 (2006), when the latest consistent data on the regional 
cooperation were available. Then these four two-mode matrixes were converted into four square 
matrixes (organization by organization) and the data in the matrixes were normalized by the total 
number of cooperative activities in the system, so that the relationships between organizations in 
the matrix corresponded to the level of cooperative effort between the two actors. Therefore, the 
resulting matrixes represent valued graphs, where the strength of relationships in the diagrams is 
the normalized cooperative activity that existed between two actors. The data in the matrixes 
were symmetrized due to their reciprocal character. 
The resulting matrixes were then converted into UCINET, NETDRAW and MATLAB 
files and analyzed with UCINET, NETDRAW and MATLAB tools and techniques. 41  The 
                                                 
40 For the complete list of experts, see the Appendix of chapter V. 
41 UCINET is a comprehensive program for the analysis of social network data as well as other 1-mode and 2-mode 
data. The program is capable of reading and writing a multitude of differently formatted text files, as well as Excel 
files. It can handle a maximum of 32,767 nodes (actors). The analysis methods include centrality measures, 
subgroup identification, role analysis, elementary graph theory, and permutation-based statistical analysis. In 
addition, the program has strong matrix analysis routines, such as matrix algebra and multivariate statistics. For 
more information, please see http://www.analytictech.com/ucinet.htm 
NETDRAW is a program written by Steve Borgatti for visualizing both 1-mode and 2-mode social network data. It 
can handle multiple relations at the same time, and can use node attributes to set colors, shapes, and sizes of nodes. 
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combination of these programs was necessary for the strength of the analysis, as each of the 
programs has its own advantages and disadvantages in measuring network characteristics and 
parameters.            
Energy networks: 
 
As far as the energy networks are concerned, all the significant energy companies 
operating in the regions and provincial governments were taken into consideration. As 
mentioned above, the southern region is rich in oil and gas resources compared to the 
northwestern region, therefore, there are considerably more energy companies in the southern 
region. Energy companies in the southern region are engaged in exploration and production 
activities as well as Caspian oil and other energy transit issues. Companies that operate in the 
northwestern region are mostly concerned with the transit pipeline issues and participation in 
new joint transit energy projects such as Nord Stream. Thus there are 23 actors in the southern 
energy system and 13 actors in the northwestern system. The network ties were measured by the 
strength of the relationship between two actors based on a four-point scale, where the highest 
number corresponds to the strongest relationship.  
The strongest relationship (3) was considered a case when some share of an energy actor 
officially belonged to provincial government or a representative from a regional administration 
was officially serving on board of directors of an energy company; or two provincial 
administrations took joint measures in respect to regional energy policy issues, or if there was a 
strategic alliance between two energy companies that presupposed certain structural integration. 
If two actors participated in an energy-related project or any other cooperative initiative together, 
                                                                                                                                                             
MATLAB is a numerical computing environment and programming language. Maintained by The MathWorks, 
MATLAB allows easy matrix manipulation, plotting of functions and data, implementation of algorithms, creation 
of user interfaces, and interfacing with programs in other languages. 
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or if there were proven important informal links between two actors such as evidence of 
lobbying activities, or bribes (in the case of provincial governments), or personal connections 
(relatives of public officials occupying important positions in energy companies), their 
relationship was estimated as ‘2’. If two actors had any minor joint activity (participated together 
in a public event or consulted each other on certain issues) their relationship was estimated as ‘1’. 
The absence of relationship was coded as ‘0’. The data on the network relationships were 
gathered from multiple sources: national, regional, and local newspapers, media agencies and 
regional websites, websites of energy companies and provincial governments.42  In addition, 
representatives from energy companies were interviewed for the qualitative part of this 
dissertation, and during the interview they were also consulted on the strength of the relationship 
between the companies in the regional energy systems. 
Therefore, 2 square matrixes were constructed for each region: one for 1999, and the 
other for 2006 to provide consistency with the analysis of regional cooperation systems. Since 
the data in the network are reciprocal, the data were symmetrized for the analysis. 
The resulting matrixes were then converted into UCINET, NETDRAW and MATLAB 
files and analyzed with UCINET, NETDRAW and MATLAB tools and techniques. 
4. Regional Cooperation Networks: Analysis 
 
Network-level hypotheses:  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 /Network Centralization 
 
While collaboration has become common in different areas, there are few methods to 
assess and evaluate the effectiveness of cooperative initiatives. In the interorganizational field, 
network analysis can rigorously assess the degree to which and by whom information and other 
resources are exchanged in the network (Provan and Milward, 1995; Valente and Davis, 1999). 
                                                 
42 For the complete list of data sources see the Appendix of this chapter 
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For that reason, network analysis is the widely preferred method for evaluating the evolution and 
effectiveness of cooperative partnerships (Tanjasiri, Tran, Palmer, Valente, 2007). Network 
analysis provides statistical measures of intensity of cooperative efforts within a network and the 
degree to which all the actors of the network have equal access to network resources, exchanges 
and opportunities. 
It is generally argued that effective governance in collaboration networks depends on the 
degree of network decentralization (Putnam, 1993; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1995; 
Tanjasiri, Tran, Palmer, Valente, 2007; Joas, Kern, and Sandberg, 2007). Decentralization is 
associated with more efficient information flows, advanced intelligence and greater knowledge 
of cooperation processes and possible changes in cooperation structures (Zmerli and Newton, 
2007). Decentralization and participation strengthen governance and build social capital in 
interorganizational systems (Narayan, 2002). 
Network centralization in network analysis measures the degree to which an entire 
network is focused around a few central actors (Scott, 1991), which can affect the spread of 
information, resources, ideas and practices around those points (Tanjasiri, Tran, Palmer, Valente, 
2007). Irwin and Huges (1992) define network centralization as the degree to which a network is 
“dominated by a few places” and Tichy (1980) defines it as the degree “to which relations are 
guided by the formal hierarchy”.  
In a centralized network, only one or a few actors are at the center of many network 
linkages, while in decentralized networks linkages are more or less equally dispersed around all 
the network actors. In centralized networks, central actors have significant influence and control 
over the circulation of information, resources and ideas and the spread of network resources to 
other actors. Once central actors receive a new idea in a centralized network, it may spread 
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rapidly; however, in most cases, given the position of control and power in the network, central 
actors act as bottlenecks and slow diffusion (Valente, 1995).  
Another important negative feature of centralization is that if central actors in a 
centralized network are removed or damaged, the network quickly fragments into unconnected 
sub-networks (Krebs, 2008). Therefore, a highly central node can become a single point of 
failure in interorganizational networks. Krebs (2008) argues that “a network centralized around a 
well connected hub can fail abruptly if that hub is disabled or removed…while networks of low 
centralization fail gracefully”. Additionally, in a centralized network, if central actors get things 
wrong, or are pursuing their own agenda, they can easily hurt the whole network.   
A less centralized network is considered a much better structure for cooperative effort, 
since it is “resilient in the face of many intentional attacks or random failures” as even if many 
actors or links fail, the remaining actors will still be able to reach each other over other network 
paths (Krebs, 2008). A less centralized network also better approximates the model of network 
governance extensively discussed in the previous sections. Therefore, centralization helps to 
measure how resilient cooperation networks are and how effective cooperation processes are in 
terms of equitable sharing of information, resources, influence, power, and decision-making 
capabilities among network actors. 
Network centralization can be easily measured by means of UCINET program. The 
eigenvector approach is used to measure centralization of cooperation networks. Eigenvector 
approach is based on the measure of eigenvector centrality, which evaluates the overall 
importance of an actor in a network. The eigenvector measure is based on assigning relative 
scores to all network actors and treating actors that have links to high-scoring actors more central 
than those that have equal links to low-scoring actors.  
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Figure 10 represents regional cooperation networks visualized in NETDRAW at time 1 
(1999), Figure 11 depicts networks at time 2 (2006), and Table 7 reports the networks’ 
centralization indexes calculated by the eigenvector routine.  
 
 
Figure 10: Regional Cooperation Networks, 1999 
 
 
Figure 11: Regional Cooperation Networks, 2006 
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Table 7: Network Centralization 
   NETWORK CENTRALIZATION (N = 100)a 
 Centralization  
Southern Cooperation Network 1999 61.32% 
Southern Cooperation Network 2006 59.58% 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 1999 32.17% 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 2006 15.22% 
a The closer the centralization is to 100%, the more centralized the network. 
 
            
It is even visually noticeable that the southern systems are more centralized than the 
northwestern ones. Centralization scores show important tendencies in the systems’ evolutionary 
development. The southern cooperation network was more centralized from the very beginning 
than the northwestern cooperation network (61.32% compared to 32.17%) implying higher 
inequality in the distribution of distances across the actors. Therefore, the southern network was 
organized around several key actors who controlled and coordinated regional cooperation 
processes, while in the northwestern network coordination of cooperative efforts was more 
equally divided between network actors. In 2006, the southern cooperation network shows a 
slight decrease in centralization; however, it remains a very centralized system. The southern 
2006 network is 4 times more centralized than the northwestern network. Therefore, in the 
southern system, the power of individual actors varies rather substantially, and this means that, 
overall, positional advantages are rather unequally distributed in the network. At the same time, 
the northwestern cooperation network develops into a really decentralized system in 2006 
(15.22% compared to previous 32.17%), which means that the network developed into a system 
with a much more equitable sharing of resources and influence. 
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It is important to see around what kind of actors regional cooperation networks are 
centralized as this information will show the actors that are most influential in cooperation 
processes in the regions. For this purpose the network actors were divided into groups according 
to their fields (e.g. economic, education, culture), and the ‘actors by sector’ networks were then 
visualized in NETDRAW. Due to the geographical peculiarity of the regional cooperation 
(northwestern Russia borders northern Europe), in the northwestern region there are important 
northern Europe –related organizations like the Office of the Nordic Council of Ministers, 
Finnish Cultural and Academic Institute, and Regional Support Bureau, which were included in 
the analysis as a separate block as they are devoted to several cooperation aspects – economic, 
social, civil society, environmental and educational. Besides, compared to the multitude of 
projects aimed at improving transportation systems between northwestern Russia and northern 
Europe, there was only one transportation cooperation initiative in the southern region in 1999, 
and it was primarily concerned with improving sea-line routes for trade and economic 
cooperation, therefore, organizations participating in that project were not included as a separate 
entity, but as part of the economic and business sector. 
Actors occupying central positions maintain contacts with numerous other network 
actors; therefore, they are capable of controlling network exchanges (Wasserman and Faust, 
1994). Most central actors in governance networks are those who have important decisional and 
coordinative roles. Such actors are the key to understanding the circulation of ideas and 
allocation of resources in the network and decisions to act collectively (John and Cole, 1998). 
From governance perspective, centrality is referred to whether the network is dominated by 
public, private, or civil society decision makers (John and Cole, 1995 in John and Cole, 1998).  
A central actor maintains many relations and occupies a favorable structural position in the 
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network that serves as a source or conduit for larger volumes of information exchange and 
various resource transactions in the network.43 Scott (2000) defines actors with high centrality 
scores to be ‘gatekeepers’ as these actors control others, because less central actors depend on 
more central ones in terms of obtaining access to network resources, or central actors can 
facilitate network exchanges and connect other actors with each other, depending on the structure 
of the network. Central actors are located at or near the center in network diagrams. In contrast, 
peripheral actors have few or no links to other actors and therefore, are located spatially at the 
margins of a network diagram.  
Figure 12 depicts the southern cooperation network (1999) as having provincial 
administrations holding ‘global’ network central positions, which implies that they are the most 
influential network actors in collaboration processes. Moreover, cooperation activity seems to 
occur most intensely within provinces and there is the lack of inter-provincial interorganizational 
linkages.  Rostov, Krasnodar, Stavropol provinces and the republic of Adygeya (the right part of 
the picture) seem to have some interconnectedness, while the republic of Karachaevo- 
Cherkessia and Astrakhan province (the left part of the picture) have intra-provincial activity, 
which is largely isolated from other provinces.  
 
                                                 
43 For more information, see Centrality and Prestige based on Wasserman, S. and Faust, K. 
(1994), Social Network Analysis, Methods and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
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Figure 12: Southern cooperation network, 1999 
 
In contrast with the southern network, according to Figure 13, the center of the 
northwestern network (1999) is shared by organizations coming from various sectors: economic, 
education and science, social sector, culture, journalism, and public sector; though overall, 
economic actors prevail in the central positions and perform ‘connector-function’, as many of the 
interorganizational linkages among different sectors go through them. As far as public sector is 
concerned, St. Petersburg and Novgorod provincial administrations and the administration of 
Republic of Karelia are more influential in regional cooperation processes than other 
administrations. Additionally, important actors in the regional cooperation processes are 
organizations specifically focused on the integration of the northwestern region with Europe: the 
Office of the Nordic Council of Ministers, Finnish Cultural and Academic Institute, and Austrian 
Cooperation Bureau KulturKontakt. Another important feature of the northwestern network is 
that there are many interorganizational linkages that transcend the geographic boundaries of the 
northwestern provinces, meaning that organizations from different provinces extensively 
cooperate with each other.  
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Figure 13: Northwestern cooperation network, 1999 
As Figure 14 shows, in 2006 southern cooperation network remains highly centralized 
around provincial governments. The number of inter- provincial inteorganizational linkages 
increased, meaning that various organizations from different provinces established cooperative 
contacts, however, actors from the republic of Karachaevo- Cherkessia and Astrakhan province 
(right part of the picture) remain quite isolated from the rest of cooperative structure. It is 
important to note that actors from the journalism sector form a cohesive cooperative alliance 
close to the center of the network, while in 1999 they were largely isolated from each other. The 
same holds true for the social sector actors. This means that in the highly centralized 
interorganizational system where control and power positions are occupied by the public sector 
actors, these actors try to find their own niches of influence and act strategically to benefit from 
the exchange processes occurring in the system.  
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Figure 14: Southern cooperation network, 1999 
Figure 15 depicts the northwestern network (2006) as a highly decentralized system with 
the center of the network shared by the representatives from all the network groups. While in the 
1999 network cooperative effort was largely segmented into collaboration areas, in 2006 the 
composition of cooperative effort became much more diverse. It is also important to note that the 
governments of Novgorod province and republic of Karelia moved away from the network 
central positions, while the government of St Petersburg province remained an influential actor 
in the system. 
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Figure 15: Northwestern cooperation network, 2006 
 
Network analysis rigorously assesses centrality of the network actors by providing 
statistical centrality indexes for each actor. By obtaining centrality scores for each actor, it is 
possible to exactly define the organizations that hold most central network positions. There are 
several approaches to measuring centrality in networks including the most widely used measures: 
degree centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality. 
Degree centrality developed by Linton Freeman can be defined as the number of adjacent 
links to or from an actor, that is, the number of network ties that emanate from an actor (Freeman, 
1979). High centrality of an actor implies that it occupies a central position highly linked, in 
relative terms, to all other actors inside the network and is involved in many ties. Borgatti (2005) 
interprets degree centrality as a measure of immediate influence concerning the ability of an 
actor to impact other actors directly or through one path.  
In cooperation networks actors who have more links to other actors occupy advantaged 
positions, because they control the flow of information and are aware of the whole process of 
regional cooperation, therefore, they can influence the politics of the regional cooperation. 
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Additionally, they have alternative ways to satisfy needs as they have access to resources of the 
network as a whole, and hence are less dependent on other actors.  
Degree centrality measure is often criticized because it is only concerned with the 
immediate links that an actor has, rather than indirect links to all others. For instance, an actor 
might be linked to many other actors who might be disconnected from the network as a whole. In 
this case this actor is central only in a local group, but not in the whole network.  
Closeness centrality (or as some scholars call it ‘access centrality’) approach takes into 
consideration the distance of an actor to all others in the network. An actor’s closeness centrality 
is the sum of distances from all other actors, where the distance from an actor to another is 
defined as the length (in links) of the shortest path from one to the other (Freeman, 1979; 
Borgatti, 2005; Borgatti, 1995). In interorganizational networks, an actor that has high closeness 
centrality score can quickly interact with many other network actors without going through many 
intermediaries (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). However, in large and complex cooperation 
networks this measure might be misleading as the measure for an actor who is close to a small 
and fairly closed group within a larger network, and distant from many of the other network 
actors can be similar in magnitude with the measure of an actor who is at a moderate distance 
from all of the network actors. In large networks, according to closeness centrality, the second 
actor would be more central than the first one, because it is able to reach more of the network 
with same amount of effort (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). 
Another well-known centrality measure is betweenness or control centrality. 
Betweenness centrality characterizes a central actor occupying a ‘between’ position in the paths 
connecting many pairs of other actors in the network (Freeman, 1979). In interorganizational 
cooperation networks, as an intermediary between many other actors,  a ‘between’ actor controls 
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the flow of information and exchange of ideas and resources; therefore, ‘between actors’ usually 
perform the function of third-parties and deal makers in exchanges among others, and are able to 
benefit from this brokerage. 
Bonacich (1972, 2007) proposes to measure centrality by eigenvector: unlike degree, 
which weights every contact equally, the eigenvector weights links to others according to their 
centralities. “Eigenvector centrality can also be seen as a weighted sum of not only direct 
connections but indirect connections of every length” (Bonacich, 2007). Therefore, the 
eigenvector approach takes into account the entire pattern of communication and interaction in 
the network. 
Regional cooperation networks are large complex systems; therefore, for the accuracy of 
the analysis, multiple centrality measures were conducted in UCINET. Appendix of this chapter 
lists 10 most central organizations in each network and reports their centrality indexes and also 
presents visualized models of the networks rotated according to the centralization parameters 
where it is clearly seen what kind of actors occupy most central positions. Centrality indexes 
support previous findings that both in 1999 and 2006 provincial governments occupied most 
central positions in the southern cooperation network. The only other organization that happened 
to be among top 10 most central organizations in the 1999 southern cooperation network is 
Kuban University.  In 2006, two other organizations came to occupy central positions- big non-
governmental organization ‘Ekologika’ based in Rostov focused on environmental and social 
issues and regional education association with offices in Stavropol, Krasnodar and Rostov cities. 
Therefore, it is possible to say that the center of the 2006 network became slightly more diverse; 
however, centrality indexes of provincial administrations increased while indexes of many other 
actors decreased meaning that the whole system became more asymmetrical. Big standard 
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deviations for centrality measures (both in 1999 and 2006) show that in the southern cooperation 
networks centralization is unequally distributed in the system as there is a big difference between 
highly centralized and highly peripheral actors. Highly peripheral actors in the southern regional 
cooperation networks are highly constrained by the limited access they have to other network 
actors. 
In correspondence with the previous findings, the center of the northwestern network is 
shared by many organizations coming from various sectors. However, in 1999 network one third 
of the 10 most central organizations belonged to economic actors. In 2006, the network center 
became very diverse. Standard deviation figures for centrality indexes show that there was not a 
very big difference between most central and least central actors in the 1999 northwestern 
network unlike in the southern cooperation networks, but in 2006 northwestern network the 
difference became much smaller, which implies that the network became very decentralized and 
broad. These finding go in line with the European integration theories that stipulate that 
economic interaction is the driving force of integration and the spillover effect from economic 
interaction and economic interdependencies will quickly create strong incentives for integration 
in further sectors. Another important feature of the 2006 northwestern network is that (as 
centrality indexes show) almost all the central actors from the 1999 network conceded their 
central positions to other actors. This shows strong mobility and adaptability of the northwestern 
cooperation system. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that the regional cooperation networks in the southern region 
are more centralized than in the northwestern region proved true. The proposition that with time 
the southern cooperation network develops higher centralization degree did not prove true and 
has to be rejected. However, the southern network shows only very slight decrease in 
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centralization and remains a highly centralized system. As a contrast, the northwestern network 
becomes a highly decentralized system over time. The hypothesis that the regional cooperation 
system in the southern region is centralized around a particular group of actors while the center 
of the northwestern network is diverse proves true as well.  
 
Network-level hypotheses:  
Hypotheses 3 / Network cohesion 
 
Network cohesion is associated with the level of interconnectedness and embeddedness 
of network actors in the networking structures. High network cohesion is important in 
interorganizational networks, as the degree of network cohesion correlates with the levels of trust 
and social capital in the system (Putnam, 1993; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). 
There are different approaches to characterizing the extent of interconnectedness and 
form of ‘embedding’ of actors in networks. Social network analysts usually use the combination 
of different approaches. The most popular ones are:    
Network density  
 
Density is usually interpreted as the extent to which all the actors in the network are 
connected. It shows the general level of connectedness among network actors and measures the 
ratio of the number of existing links in the network to the number of possible links, if each 
network actor were linked to every other actor.44 If all actors have links to one another, the 
network is assumed to be complete and have a density of 1 or 100%. (Scott, 2000).  
According to different network theorists, the density of a network gives important 
information on the closeness of relationships and their importance to the network participants. It 
                                                 
44 For more information, see “Analyzing Urban Tourism Stakeholder Relationships: A 
Network Perspective” paper by Timur Seldjan, available at 
http://www.linkbc.ca/torc/downs1/AnalyzingUrbanTourismStakeholderRelationships.pdf?PHPSESSID=61bce1524
470c5131c3c7eef3fa3cd08 
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has been also argued that the dense network structure allows for fast and efficient diffusion and 
exchange of resources and information, and also norms, values and ideas. The denser the 
network is, the more effective is the communication among the network actors, and the more 
similar is the actors’ behavior in the network. In addition, opportunities for effective cooperation 
increase with the increase in the network density.  
Better connections in cooperation structures are important for mobilization. For instance, 
Zmerli and Newton (2007) argue that in dense networks the chance of being mobilized for 
political action and the possibility of mobilizing others increases. The scholars also argue that 
interorganizational connectedness increases the impact on the political system. Hanneman and 
Riddle (2005) claim that networks with high density respond better to challenges from the 
environment than those with low density. 
Network densities can be measures in UCINET, which gives an index of the degree of 
interconnectivity in a network.  With valued data (our case), density is usually defined as the 
average strength of linkages across all possible linkages.  Table 8 reports network densities for 
the regional cooperation networks in percentages.  
Table 8: Network Density 
   NETWORK DENSITY (N = 100)a 
 Density  
Southern Cooperation Network 1999 7.03 % 
Southern Cooperation Network 2006 10.27 % 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 1999 13.32 % 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 2006 36.67 % 
a The closer the density is to 100%, the denser the network. 
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Network densities show that in 1999, the northwestern cooperation network was denser 
than the southern network implying that there were more connections between network actors in 
the northwestern system than in the southern one. Both systems developed more links between 
network actors and became denser in 2006 meaning that overall interconnectedness of actors 
involved in regional cooperation improved over time. However, the difference between the 1999 
and 2006 densities of the northwestern network is much bigger than the difference between the 
densities of the southern network, implying that the northwestern system has a better progress in 
developing interconnectedness among network actors. In 2006, the northwestern cooperation 
network became more than three times denser than the southern cooperation network (36.67% 
compared to 10.27%). This indicates much higher overall level and breadth of cooperative 
activity in the northwestern network.   
Transitivity  
 
Transitivity measures a tendency for a link from A to C to exist if a link from A to B and 
a link from B to C exist. With un-directed data (our case), there are four possible types of triadic 
relations (no ties, one tie, two ties, or all three ties). High transitivity is associated with the 
existence of all the possible connections in triads.  Interorganizational networks with high level 
of transitivity are considered to be more cohesive, stable, balanced, and harmonious as all the 
three organizations in the triad are connected with each other and therefore are in structurally 
equal positions in respect to each other, which facilitates the flow of information and equitable 
sharing of network resources (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005; Atouba, Yannick and Shumate, 
2008). Network transitivity was measured in UCINET.  
Table 9 reports transitivity for the regional cooperation networks. The results of the 
transitivity analysis demonstrate that in the 1999 southern cooperation network 14% of triads are 
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transitive. Transitivity increases to 21% in 2006. However, transitivity in the northwestern 
network both in 1999 and in 2006 is much higher than in the southern cooperation network (48% 
in 1999 and 81% in 2006 respectively). In 2006, transitivity of the northwestern network is 
almost 4 times higher than in the southern network, implying that the northwestern system is 
much more stable, balanced and harmonious.    
 
Table 9: Network Transitivity 
 
   NETWORK TRANSITIVITY (N = 100) 
 Transitivity  
Southern Cooperation Network 1999 14 % 
Southern Cooperation Network 2006 21 % 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 1999 48 % 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 2006 81 % 
 
 
Compactness 
 
The concept of compactness is based on the ‘distance’ between actors. More compact, or 
cohesive networks, have shorter distances between network actors. Most algorithms use one 
particular definition of the distance between actors in a network to define more complex 
properties of actors’ positions and the structure of the network as a whole (Hanneman and Riddle, 
2005). This quantity is the geodesic distance. The geodesic distance is the number of relations in 
the shortest possible walk from one actor to another. The geodesic distance is widely used in the 
network analysis. There may be many connections between two actors in a network and 
therefore, actors may be able to reach each other through different paths. “If we consider how the 
relation between two actors may provide each other with opportunity and constraint, it may well 
be the case that not all of these ties matter” (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). That is, the geodesic 
path (or paths, as there can be more than one) is the ‘optimal’ or most ‘efficient’ connection 
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between two actors. The lengths of the geodesic paths in the regional cooperation networks can 
be located in UCINET.  The algorithm defines the distance between two actors based on the 
strength of the weakest link between them and finds the number of edges in the strongest path 
between each pair of nodes. 
Table 10 reports compactness (or distance-based cohesion) indexes for the regional cooperation 
networks.  
Table 10: Network compactness 
   NETWORK COMPACTNESS (DISTANCE-BASED COHESION) INDEXES (N = 100)a 
 Compactness Indexes 
Southern Cooperation Network 1999 0.332 
Southern Cooperation Network 2006 0.344 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 1999 0.546 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 2006 0.620 
a range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness. 
 
 
Distance-based cohesion indexes indicate that the distance-based cohesiveness increases 
in both networks. However, the northwestern network is more cohesive than the southern one 
both in 1999 (0.546 compared to 0.332)  and in 2006 (0.620 compared to 0.344) implying that 
the most ‘efficient’ connection between two actors is shorter in the northwestern network, 
therefore, the actors in the network are able to reach each other through shorter distances. 
Distance-based cohesion is important in regional cooperation networks, as it shows how 
accessible the actors are in the regions and how informed they are of each other and the whole 
politics, dynamics, and outcomes of cooperation processes occurring in the regions. 
Compactness of the network indicates how quickly information flows from one end of the 
network to the other, which depends on the network path lengths. When the length of the shortest 
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path between a pair of actors is high, it will take a long time for information to flow from one 
actor to the other. In networks with high average path lengths the spread of information to all the 
network actors will be slower. Therefore, according to the results of the compactness analysis, 
the northwestern cooperation network is much more efficient in terms of information exchange. 
All the measures of network cohesion indicate that the degree of cohesiveness of both 
networks improves with time, however, in the northwestern network it improves with a wider 
range and the northwestern network is more cohesive than the southern one both in the 1999 and 
in 2006. Therefore, the northwestern system generates higher levels of trust and social capital.  
Network-level hypotheses:  
Hypotheses 4 and 5 / Power and core- periphery relations 
 
           Network analysis has contributed a number of important insights about power in 
interorganizational networks. “Perhaps most importantly, the network approach emphasizes that 
power is inherently relational” (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). According to network analysts, 
power is a consequence of patterns of relations and interactions among actors; therefore, the 
amount of power in social structures can vary. In networks with low density of linkages there is 
the potential for greater power, while in high density networks not much power can be exerted. 
Power is both a systemic (macro) and relational (micro) property. According to Hanneman and 
Riddle (2005), the amount of power in a system and its distribution across actors are related, but 
are not the same thing. The scholars argue that two systems can have the same amount of power, 
but it can be equally distributed in one and unequally distributed in the other.  
Power in networks may be interpreted either as a micro property referring to relations 
between two actors or as the property of a group of actors or of the whole network. Structural 
position of an actor or group of actors in a network on the one hand imposes constraints, and on 
the other hand, offers certain opportunities. Actors that have fewer constraints and more 
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opportunities than others, obtain better structural positions. Having a better position means that 
“an actor may extract better bargains in exchanges, have greater influence, and that the actor will 
be a focus for deference and attention from those in less favored positions” (Hanneman and 
Riddle, 2005). 
In the network analysis, power is connected to the position of centrality occupied by 
network actors. Each of the three approaches described and used above (degree, closeness, 
betweenness) describe the positions of organizations in terms of how close they are to the 
‘center’ of the action in a network.  
Bonacich (1972, 2007) questioned the idea that the more central actors are more likely to 
be more powerful actors. He argued that being connected to connected others makes an actor 
central, but not powerful. According to the scholar, power in the network is being linked to 
others that are not well connected, because these other actors are then dependent on the one 
through which they are connected, while well connected actors are not that dependent in network 
systems. Bonacich proposed that power and centrality is a function of the links of actors in a 
network. The more links the actors in a network obtain, the more central and powerful they are. 
Also, the fewer the links the actors in a network have, the more powerful certain actors are. 
Hanneman and Riddle (2005) extensively discuss Bonacich’s technical measure of power. 
Bonacich proposed to measure power by giving each actor an estimated centrality equal to their 
own degree, plus a weighted function of the degrees of the actors to whom they are connected. 
Then, repeat the algorithm, using the first estimates (i.e. give each actor an estimated centrality 
equal to their own first score plus the first scores of those to whom they are linked). As this 
procedure is repeated numerous times, the relative sizes of all actors’ scores will come to be the 
same. The scores are then re-expressed by scaling by constants. 
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The degree of power an actor has in the network can be measured in UCINET, which 
gives statistical indexes for the level of power obtained by network actors. UCINET Bonachic 
power procedure is used to examine the power scores of the regional cooperation network actors. 
Appendix of this chapter lists power scores of the 10 most powerful actors.  
The results show that in the southern cooperation networks, provincial governments are 
most powerful actors, while in the northwestern networks power is dispersed among network 
actors and becomes more equally distributed over time. Big difference in the southern network 
between most powerful and least powerful actors (2 for the least powerful actor and 64 for the 
most powerful actor in 1999 and 71 for the most powerful actor and 2 for the least powerful actor 
in 2006) indicates highly asymmetrical distribution of power in the system, while in the 
northwestern network there is a smaller variability in power scores indicating small difference 
between the most powerful and the lest powerful actor, which even decreases with time ( 27 for 
the most powerful actor and 2 for the least powerful actor in 1999, and 14 for the most powerful 
actor and 2 for the least powerful actor in 2006). Therefore, there are great inequalities in actors’ 
power and power becomes more asymmetrical over time in the southern regional cooperation 
network, while power in the northwestern network becomes more evenly distributed over time. 
It is also important to see how much power provincial governments have collectively 
over the whole system meaning how much control they have over the regional cooperation 
processes. For this purpose they were grouped together, their power scores were added and then 
divided by the sum of the power scores of the rest of the network actors. 
Collective power scores (Table 11) show that provincial administrations have much 
control over cooperation processes occurring in the southern region, while in the northwestern 
region  public sector actors have much less control.  
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Table 11: Collective power of administrations 
 
 
Networks Collective power 
Southern cooperation network 1999 49 % 
Southern cooperation network 2006 43 % 
Northwestern cooperation network 1999 11 % 
Northwestern cooperation network 2006 5 % 
 
Slight decrease in administrations’ collective power in the southern cooperation network 
in 2006 can be explained by the structural changes in the network: a few other actors moved to 
more powerful positions and the system developed a bigger number of interorganizational 
linkages making network actors slightly less dependent on the most powerful actors. However, 
collective power of provincial administrations remains very high in the southern system. 
An extension of the concept of centralization and power is a core/periphery dichotomy. In 
core/periphery networks weakly connected actors revolve around a set of central actors that are 
well-connected with each other, and also with the periphery. Peripheral actors, in contrast, are 
connected to the core, but not to each other.  
Core-periphery relations have been widely studied by different network analysts 
(Laumann and Pappi, 1976; Alba and Moore, 1978; Mintz and Schwartz, 1981; Boyd, Fitzgerald 
and Beck, 2006). “Core/periphery networks contrast with ‘clumpy’ networks, which consist of 
two or more subgroups that are well-connected within group but weakly connected across groups, 
like a collection of islands” (Borgatti, 2005). 45  In the networks with the same density, 
                                                 
45 Borgatti’s article “Facilitating Knowledge Flows” is available at 
http://www.socialnetworkanalysis.com/knowledge_sharing.htm 
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core/periphery structure will allow for much faster dissemination of information and spread of 
ideas, knowledge and resources than the clumpy structure, as in the core/periphery networks 
average path length is considerably shorter. However, because core/periphery structures have a 
dominant core, this core has significant control over the whole system and over the network 
communication and exchanges. Thus it is important to see what actors constitute the core and 
whether they are beneficial for the network exchange processes. In core/periphery networks it is 
desirable that the core is constituted by different types of actors to avoid the grip of power by 
only one class of actors. 
Another qualitatively distinct type of networks is multiscale networks. Unlike ‘clumpy’ 
networks that consist of weakly connected groups of actors, and core/periphery networks, where 
connectivity is dominated by a single scale, “these networks display connectivity at all scales 
simultaneously” (Dodds, Watts and Sabel, 2003). However, multiscale networks do not have 
uniform density of links at all scales as link density decreases gradually with depth in a way that 
the top level, or the core of the network, displays the highest density. Multiscale networks are 
similar to core-periphery networks; the critical difference, however, is that in multiscale 
networks there is no clear distinction between a well connected core and a weakly connected 
periphery as connectivity decreases slowly. Dodds, Watts and Sabel (2003) found evidence that  
in organizational environment by exhibiting connectivity across all network stages, multiscale 
networks yield better robustness properties. The scholars show that multiscale networks exhibit 
both connectivity and congestion robustness (unlike other types of networks) and perform much 
better in terms of information exchange. 
In cooperation networks the desirable structure is the one without distinct core-periphery 
separation and without ‘clumpy’ networks; it is argued that the best structure for successful 
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collaboration is a decentralized and dense or ‘integrated’ network (multiscale network) without 
distinct subgroups, and if there is a distinction between a core and periphery, it is desirable that 
the core is big and diverse (Rank C., Rank O. and Walda, 2006). 
Network core-periphery relations can be analyzed in UCINET. The program finds a 
core/periphery structure in two possible ways: either it computes the degree of ‘coreness’ for 
each actor (continuous model), or it bipartitions all the actors into the core and periphery 
subgroups (discrete model) (Boyd, Fitzgerald and Beck, 2006). As far as the discrete analysis is 
concerned, the output in UCINET includes an overall measure of ‘fitness’ of the model that 
shows how well the network approximates an ideal core/periphery structure. A high fitness index 
indicates that the network is a good approximation of the core/periphery model, while a lower 
fitness index suggests that the model should be rejected. 
For the purpose of this study, discrete model is chosen for the estimate of the core-
periphery relations in the regional cooperation networks, as it will show whether there is a clear 
distinction between a core and a periphery in the networks and provide within and inter group 
densities demonstrating the level of interconnectedness between and within the core and the 
periphery. 
The results of the application of the core-periphery model to the regional cooperation 
networks are displayed in Table 12. The table shows the density measures within the core (1-1), 
within the periphery (2-2), and between the core and the periphery (1-2 or 2-1) along with the 
corresponding model fit and the number of organizations constituting the core.  
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Table 12: Core-periphery model 
 
C/P  /south/ 1999 C/P  /south/ 2006 C/P northwest/1999 C/P  /northwest/2006 
   1            2                              
-----        ----- 
1  0.765    0.270               
2  0.270    0.021 
 
      1             2                            
-----         ----- 
1  0.636    0.196               
2  0.196    0.037 
       1          2                               
-----       ----- 
1  0.566    0.110                 
2  0.110    0.067    
 
     1        2                                 
-----      ----- 
1  0.768   0.352                  
2  0.352   0.236 
 
13 actors in the core 18 actors in the core 
 
31 actors in the core 50 actors in the core 
Final fitness: r =0.566 Final fitness: r=0.541 Final fitness: r=0.426 Final fitness: r=0.215 
 
The results indicate that the entire collaboration structure of the southern regional 
network both in 1999 and 2006 may be divided into a core and a periphery as in the network 
weakly connected actors revolve around a set of central nodes that are well-connected with each 
other, and also with the periphery. The final model fit of r = 0.566 (1999) and r=0.541(2006) 
indicate that the southern cooperation network approximates an ideal core-periphery structure 
well. The partial density of the relations among the members of the core of the southern 1999 
network amounts to 77%. Compared to the overall density of the entire network of 7.03 %, the 
level of information and resource exchange within the core has to be judged as significantly 
intense.  
Furthermore, organizations belonging to the periphery are very weakly connected with 
each other; the respective partial density in this segment is only 2%. Finally, the partial density 
of the intersections between the core and the periphery amounts to 27%, which indicates that the 
peripheral actors are well connected to the core. As far as the 2006 southern network is 
concerned, it can also be divided into a core and a periphery, however with a slightly worse final 
model fit (r=0.541). The model fit is still high and indicates that the 2006 southern cooperation 
network approximates an ideal core-periphery structure fairly well. The partial density of 
relations among the members of the core of the 2006 network amounts to 64 %, which indicates 
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high level of interconnectedness of the core actors. Peripheral actors become slightly more 
connected (increase in density from 2.1% to 3.7 %), and partial density of the intersections 
between the core and the periphery amounts to 20%, which shows that the periphery is fairly 
well connected to the core. It is also important to note that the core in 1999 network was 
constituted by 13 actors, 9 of which were provincial administrations.  In 2006, the core became 
slightly more diverse (increase in 5 actors) consisting of 18 organizations, 9 of which were 
provincial administrations. Still, compared to the total size of the network (100 actors), the core 
remains very distinct and small in the southern cooperation network.  
As far as the northwestern cooperation network is concerned, the results of the 
core/periphery analysis indicate that the structure of the 1999 network may be more or less 
described in terms of a core/periphery dichotomy: the final model fit of r = 0.426 is lower than 
that of the model applied to the southern network, however it is considered fairly good for 
accepting the core/periphery model. The partial density of relations among the members of the 
core of the 1999 northwestern network amounts to 57%, which indicates a considerably high 
level of information and resource exchange within the core. Organizations belonging to the 
periphery are more weakly connected with each other than the core actors as the respective 
partial density in this segment is 6.7%, however, it is still larger than the peripheral density of the 
southern network both in 1999 and 2006, implying that the actors that are not in the core of 
cooperative activity in the northwestern region are still fairly connected.  
Finally, the partial density of the intersections between the core and the periphery 
amounts to 11%, which indicates that the peripheral actors are fairly well connected to the core. 
In the southern network the density in this segment both in 1999 and 2006 is significantly higher, 
which indicates that the core actors of the southern network have more power and influence over 
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the network peripheral actors than the core actors in the northwestern network. Furthermore, the 
core of the northwestern 1999 network is bigger and more diverse than the core of the both 1999 
and 2006 southern network (one third of all network actors are in the core), indicating that in the 
northwestern network more actors have access to decision-making and are able to influence the 
flow of cooperative effort. 
The final model fit of the 2006 northwestern network of r=0.215 indicates that the 
network does not approximate an ideal core-periphery structure. Therefore, the results of the 
analysis have to be judged as insignificant. However, the results indicate that the 2006 network 
developed into a multiscale network, where there is no sharp distinction between the core and the 
periphery as the actors in all the segments (core, periphery, and core-periphery) are well –
connected and connectivity of network actors decreases slowly. Additionally, the results of the 
analysis indicate that the core (if one accepts the core-periphery model) of the 2006 network 
consists of half of all network actors and the composition of the core is very balanced as more or 
less equal number of actors from each network segment are in the core. 
The findings of the core-periphery analysis have important implications for the regional 
integration processes. The results of the analysis show that the integration processes in the 
northwestern region represent a cohesive, stable and balanced structure with equal opportunities 
for the regional actors and equitable sharing of power, influence and control among them. The 
northwestern cooperation network approximates a good network governance model based on 
self-organization, adaptability, mobility, and collective action. As a contrast, in the southern 
region, public sector actors dominate regional cooperation and control integration processes 
occurring in the regions. This may occur for a variety of reasons and they will be explored in the 
fifth chapter of this dissertation.  
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Network-level hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 6 / Network Structure 
 
Embedding of actors in dyads, triads, clusters, and groups are different ways in which the 
structure of social networks (individual or interorganizational) may be differentiated. However, 
this differentiation may be horizontal, or it may have vertical nature involving unequal rankings 
or, in other words, hierarchy. Network analysis scholars speak about different forms of vertical 
differentiation in networks. One form of vertical differentiation is referred to a structure where 
individuals or organizations are ranked into superiors and subordinates by the nature of their 
actual position, like hierarchy in the military or inter-firm network of the main firm and its 
branches. Another form of vertical differentiation in networks discussed by network analysts is 
structural hierarchy, were the actors are not subordinate or superior to other actors in terms of 
their actual position, but are structurally ranked being placed at different structural levels of the 
network indicating that they have different access to decision-making and different amount of 
power and influence in the network. For instance, Collins (2009) argues that when an 
organizational field is characterized by power inequality, interorganizational networks are 
subordinate to central dominant actors; however in interorganizational systems network 
characteristics like reciprocity and interdependence can temper vertical differentiation over time. 
Network analysis scholars developed several ways to assess the degree of vertical 
differentiation in networks. With directed data, the most popular method is Krackhardt’s (1994) 
method that includes a combination of several measures of network hierarchy. With undirected 
reciprocal data (our case), network analysts use approaches based on hierarchical clustering.  
“An inherent duality in networks is the tension between connectivity and clustering” 
(Levine and Kurzban, 2005). On the one hand, networks enable diffusion of information, 
162 
practice and knowledge and facilitate exchange of resources of various kinds. On the other hand, 
networks tend to be composed of internally more or less homogenous clusters that are loosely 
connected and situated at different network levels- some closer to the network center, some at a 
greater distance. The closer the clusters are to each other, the more efficient network exchanges 
are. Clustering with big distances between clusters is considered problematic in 
interorganizational networks, because it hinders network flows, increases isolation, and can lead 
to the abuse of power by dominant network actors (Levine and Kurzban, 2005). For instance, 
Prell (2003) analyzes community network in the city of Troy, New York, USA, and finds out 
that network exchanges are not very efficient as public sector actors are the most popular and 
powerful actors in the network: “ties are concentrated around these actors, indicating that the 
network is structured vertically rather than horizontally”. 
There are several tools in network analysis available for the analysis of clustering in 
networks with undirected data. A combination of Newman Girvan’s method and Burts’ (1992) 
hierarchy (one of the measures of structural holes) will be used for the analysis of hierarchical 
clustering of the regional cooperation networks. Newman Girvan’s method separates the network 
into clusters using the following technique: the link with the highest edge betweenness is 
removed and the procedure is repeated until the network breaks apart in two components, then 
this process starts all over again until the specified number of components has been reached.46 
The results also give the model fit estimate indicating the most suitable number of partitions for 
the network. Figure 16 and Figure 17 display the results of Newman Girvan’s analysis.  
                                                 
46 For more information, see Interpretation of UCINET 6 Output.  
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Newman Girvan /Southern network/ 
1999 (Q= 0.000) 
Newman Girvan /Southern network/ 
2006 (Q= 0.000) 
            
 
Figure 16: Newman Girvan analysis 
The nodes split into Newman Girvan’s partitions with a goodness of fit factor of Q=0.000 
and the colors in the figures correspond to the Newman Girvan’s clusters. Figure 16 depicts 1999 
southern cooperation network as having 9 clusters which are situated at different distances from 
the core of the network and some of them do not have a direct connection with the core of the 
network. The southern network is largely segmented.  
The northwestern cooperation network consists of 8 clusters. Only two of them constitute 
a particular group, however, both groups have direct connections with the core of the network. 
The majority of actors in the northwestern network belong to the main partition and those actors 
that are not placed at the very center of the network have direct links to the core of the network 
implying that the majority of the network nodes are placed at one level, therefore, the structure of 
the network is considerably horizontal.   
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Newman Girvan /Southern network / 
2006 (Q= 0.000) 
Newman Girvan /Northwest network 
/2006 (Q= 0.000) 
 
                
Figure 17: Newman Girvan Analysis 
According to Figure 17, the 2006 southern network remains largely segmented (8 
Newman Girvan’s partitions) with distinct clusters placed at different distances, implying that 
the structure remains vertically differentiated. At the same time, the 2006 northwestern network 
approximates an ideal horizontal system very well, as the absolute majority of the network actors 
belong to the main partition and those that do not belong to the main partition have more than 
one connection to the main group, therefore are placed at a close distance from the main partition. 
Figures 18 and 19 represent regional cooperation networks rotated vertically according to 
Burt’s hierarchy measures for better visualization of network levels. The color of the nodes 
reflects their belonging to the actual sector (economic, social, culture, public sector, etc. - see 
Figures 12, 13, 14, and 15). Clusters that are at the top of Burt’s hierarchy are depicted at the 
bottom of the figures. 
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Hierarchy/ Southern network/ 1999 Hierarchy/ Northwestern network/ 1999 
 
Figure 18: Network hierarchy analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hierarchy/ Southern network/ 2006 Hierarchy/ Northwestern network/ 2006 
 
Figure 19: Network hierarchy analysis 
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The figures indicate that in the southern networks there is a relatively big distance 
between network clusters, which hinders network exchanges. Big distances between clusters 
indicate vertical differentiation of the southern networks, while smooth continuous placement of 
nodes in the northwestern networks reflects their horizontal differentiation. Moreover, clusters 
that are at the top of Burt’s hierarchy are depicted at the bottom of the figures, and it is clearly 
seen that in the southern networks such clusters are composed of public sector actors.  
In the northwestern networks distances between the clusters are not significant (except 
for the two actors in the 1999 northwestern network); therefore, the structure of the network 
proves horizontal. Another important feature of the northwestern networks is that the network 
clusters are diverse as they are composed of actors coming from various sectors, therefore the 
decisions are made in diverse collaborative environments. It is possible to conclude that the 
northwestern governance network involves stable horizontal interactions between groups of 
actors that represent a plurality of organizations. 
Clusters in the southern networks are composed of predominantly same-sector actors 
(especially in 2006 network), which does not contribute to openness and dynamism of the 
southern system. Therefore, the southern networks are far from the Putnam’s (1993, 2001) ideal 
of a horizontally structured network with equitable sharing of resources and information, where 
actors are inter-connected and tied to one another. 
 
Network-level hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 7/ Strength of Cooperative effort: 
 
Based on the models used in information theory and electrical engineering, I developed a 
method to evaluate the strength of cooperative effort in the regional cooperation networks. For 
characterizing the strength of cooperative effort, I use the normalized entropy of the probability 
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mass function induced by the distribution of cooperation initiatives among organizations in the 
network, which is defined for a network as follows:  
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jiN ,  is the number of cooperation initiatives between organization i and organization j, S is the 
size of the network (total number of nodes in the network), τ  is a normalized measure of the 
strength of cooperative efforts ranging from 0 to 1. τ  is 0 when there is only one link in the 
whole network (assuming network always has at least 1 link). τ  is 1 when there are links of 
equal strength established between every pair of organizations in the network, implying that 
network forms a complete graph, or in other words, is fully connected. It is important to note that 
the distribution of link strengths plays extremely important role in determining the value of τ . In 
the extreme situation when all the pairs in the network are connected by weak ties and there is 
one very strong tie, τ  will still be very close to zero indicating low effectiveness of the 
cooperative efforts. In other words, uniformity of the distribution of link strengths in the system 
determines the strength of cooperative effort of the system. 
Table 13 reports the scores for the strength of cooperative activity in the regional cooperation 
networks. 
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Table 13: Strength of cooperative activity 
 
 
 
Southern99 
 
 
Southern06 
 
 
Northwestern99 
 
 
Northwestern06 
 
 
Strength of 
cooperation 
τ  
 
0.25 
 
0.34 
 
0.50 
 
0.69 
 
 
 
According to the results of the analysis, the strength of cooperative activity increases in 
both networks. However, in the northwestern network, the strength of cooperative activity is 
significantly higher and the difference between the 1999 value (0.50) and the 2006 value (0.69) 
is bigger than the difference between the southern network scores (0.25 in 1999 and 0.34 in 
2006). This implies that the strength of cooperative effort increases faster in the northwestern 
network and therefore, the northwestern system has better cooperative dynamics. 
To illustrate the development and evolution of cooperative processes in the system, I 
model Smooth Cooperative Effort Strength Field in MATLAB program. Smoothing is performed 
using Gaussian kernel to facilitate visual attractivity of the data. The values of pixels in the Field 
are described by the following formula: 
∑∑
= =
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−−=
S
k
S
l
lkN
jlik
C
jiI
1 1
,2
22
2
)()(exp1),( σ  
 
Where ),( lkN  is the number of cooperation initiatives between organization k and organization l, 
),( jiI  is the cooperative efforts strength between organization i and organization j, σ  is the 
smoothing parameter and C is the normalization constant: 
∑∑
= =
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−−
=
S
k
S
l
jlik
C
1 1
2
22
2
)()(exp
1
σ
 
 
S is the size of the network (total number of nodes in the network).  
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Figures 20, 21, 22, and 23 depict visualized representations of Smooth Cooperative Effort 
Strength Field of the regional cooperation networks modeled in MATLAB program.  
 
 
 
Figure 20: Southern Network 1999 
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Figure 21: Southern Network 2006 
 
Figure 20 shows that many parts of the field do not exhibit cooperative activity or show 
very little action, implying that in the 1999 regional cooperation network, cooperative activity in 
many pairs of actors did not exist or existed at a very low level. Network exchange processes 
occur predominantly in the center of the system and the strength of cooperative effort seems to 
be the highest at the center of the network. In the 2006 southern network (Figure 21), the 
distribution of link strengths becomes a little bit broader, implying that the strength of 
cooperative activity between actors becomes slightly more even across the network and more 
actors engage in cooperative processes with other network actors. However, the strength of 
cooperative effort among many actors is still very low and the highest level of the strength of 
cooperative activity is still at the center of the network, where exchange processes occur most 
intensely. 
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Figure 22: Northwestern Network 1999 
 
Figure 22 demonstrates that unlike in the southern networks, practically all the parts of 
the Smooth Cooperative Effort Strength Field of the northwestern network exhibit cooperative 
activity, indicating that cooperative effort exists in bigger number of pairs of actors. Moreover, 
the distribution of link strengths is much broader and more uniform in comparison with the 
southern network, which implies that the strength of cooperative activity between actors is much 
more even across the network. The peaks of the strength of cooperative effort are placed all 
around the field implying that the highest level of the strength of cooperative activity is not 
concentrated in just a few pairs. In addition, the peaks of the strength of cooperative effort are 
higher than in the southern networks, indicating that the overall strength of cooperative effort in 
the system is higher.  
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Figure 23: Northwestern Network 2006 
 
Figure 23 demonstrates that the overall strength of cooperative effort increased in the 
2006 northwestern network as the peaks of the strength of cooperative effort became higher, and 
the distribution of link strengths became highly uniform implying that the strength of cooperative 
effort became more even across the system. 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the strength of cooperative effort increases in 
both networks over time; however, in the northwestern network it increases faster and it is much 
more evenly distributed across the system. This indicates that more actors in the northwestern 
network are engaged in cooperative effort with many other actors and therefore, have access to 
information about processes occurring within different policy sectors and capability to influence 
regional events. Higher strength of cooperative effort indicates better awareness of regional 
processes, higher openness of the whole system, and better participation, mobilization, and 
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adaptation capabilities of the northwestern actors. Additionally, as discussed in the theoretical 
part of this section, decentralization and participation strengthen governance and build social 
capital in society. Therefore, it is possible to say that due to the structural peculiarities of the 
networks, the northwestern network generates social capital more intensely and has a stronger 
effect on democratic governance.    
Group–level hypotheses:  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 / Cohesion within and among groups and intersectoral linkages 
 
Scholars argue that cooperation between different actors (public, private, civil society, 
mass media, etc) is crucial in modern society as it helps to solve intractable development 
problems and builds social capital, which is critical to stability, democracy and economic 
development (Brown and Ashman, 1996). Joas, Kern, and Sandberg (2007) explored 
transregional cooperation among various actors in the Baltic Sea region and found out that 
participatory decision-making and mutual influence were essential for solving important regional 
problems. According to Narayan (1999), interorganizational collaboration networks that contain 
high number of intersectoral cross-cutting ties have better governance capabilities and higher 
adaptivity to evolving complex societal and economic problems.  
EU-Russia regional cooperation networks aim at solving complex environmental, 
economic, and social transregional problems in the Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Area 
and problems existing in the Russian northwestern and southern regions. It is important to see 
whether they are structurally equipped to tackling such problems. A high level of cross-cutting 
intersectoral ties would be an indicator of networks’ flexibility, effectiveness, and efficiency in 
turbulent regional environments. According to Sorensen and Torfing (2003, p. 614), if actors 
from different sectors are equally involved in decision-making processes, they will tend to 
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develop a sense of joint responsibility and ownership for the decisions, which will oblige them to 
support, rather than hamper, their implementation. 
Intersectoral density analysis was applied to the regional cooperation networks. Network 
actors were separated into segments according to the sectors (economic, public, social, education, 
etc.) and then the densities of connections within groups and across groups were estimated in the 
UCINET program. Figures 24 and 25 display within-sectoral and intersectoral densities.   
    
 
 
1      2      3      4      5      6       7    8 
----    ----   ----   ----  ----   ----   ---- ---- 
1  0.05 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
2  0.01 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 
3  0.00 0.01 0.08 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 
4  0.07 0.09 0.18 0.51 0.04 0.13 0.06 0.08 
5  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.03 
7  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 
8  0.01 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.13 
 
1      2      3      4      5      6     7    8 
----    ----   ----   ----  ----   ----  ----  ---- 
1  0.08 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.04 
2  0.03 0.17 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 
3  0.12 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.04 0.11 0.04 
4  0.05 0.14 0.12 0.39 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.00 
5  0.01 0.00 0.20 0.06 0.19 0.00 0.01 0.00 
6  0.07 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.01 
7  0.01 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.21 0.04 
    8  0.04 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.14 
 
         
Figure 24: Southern network 1999 (to the left) and 2006 (to the right) 
 
 
 
 
1       2     3      4      5      6      7      8      9     10 
----    ----   ----   ----   ----   ----  ----  ----   ----   ---- 
1  0.27 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.14 
2  0.02 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.12 
3  0.01 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 
4  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.14 
5  0.03 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.15 0.14 
6  0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 
7  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.03 0.15 
8  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.01 0.14 
9  0.04 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.29 0.20 
10 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.20 0.61 
 
 
1       2     3      4     5      6      7       8      9    10 
----   ----  ----   ----  ----   ----  ----   ----   ----  ---- 
1  0.29 0.20 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.02 
2  0.20 0.35 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.38 0.32 0.20 0.16 0.13 
3  0.04 0.16 0.50 0.07 0.07 0.17 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.08 
4  0.05 0.13 0.07 0.32 0.03 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.08 
5  0.07 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.40 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.06 
6  0.11 0.38 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.69 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.18 
7  0.10 0.32 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.37 0.60 0.10 0.09 0.16 
8  0.02 0.20 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.36 0.06 0.08 
9  0.06 0.16 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.28 0.09 
10 0.02 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.18 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.32 
 
 
         
Figure 25: Northwestern network 1999 (to the left) and 2006 (to the right) 
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As Figure 24 shows, in the 1999 southern network densities within and between sectors 
are quite low and in many cases non existent indicating the absence of connections between 
many actors. However, public sector actors (4) have ties to all the other sectors and dominate the 
system. This implies that the system lacks intersectoral linkages and is imbalanced and 
asymmetrical.  According to Figure 24, in the 2006 southern network intersectoral group 
densities increased implying that the system developed higher level of cross-cutting ties. 
However, some of the sectors remain disconnected and public sector actors still have higher level 
of connectedness with other sectors than any other sector in the system, indicating that decision-
making processes in various policy sectors are dominated by the public sector actors and actors 
from other sectors have low access to policymaking; therefore, opportunities for collective action 
and collective decision-making are restricted in the southern network. Sorensen and Torfing 
(2003, p. 617) argue that intersectoral interorganizational participation in decision-making 
processes is critical for democratic governance as members of various private and civil society 
groups and organizations “constitute a demos of directly affected people” that governance 
network must represent so that it is able to “obtain democratic legitimacy”. Thus it is possible to 
conclude that the southern network lacks democratic legitimacy as it lacks representation. 
According to Figure 25, the distribution of densities in the 1999 northwestern network is 
more even that in the 1999 southern  network, and ‘within’ and ‘between’ sector densities are 
much higher implying that the actors belonging to the same sector cooperate intensely with each 
other and cooperate with other sectors fairly well. However, some of the sectors in the system are 
quite disconnected. Economic actors (10) have the highest level of inter and intra group 
connectivity, which indicates that they have well established links with each other and with other 
sectors. This may indicate that in 1999, private actors were interested in building regional 
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alliances to develop business at the regional level, gain better investment opportunities and 
occupy prominent regional positions. Regional cooperation with the EU provided them with 
opportunities that relatively weak Russian economy lacked at that time. However, economic 
actors do not dominate and suppress actors from other sectors in the system, because actors from 
other sectors are considerably interconnected and have sufficient intersectoral linkages providing 
them with fairly good access to overall network exchanges and decision-making opportunities.  
Interestingly, Europe-related organizations (5) have low within-sector density, but are 
very well connected with other groups. Since each of the Europe-related organizations belongs to 
a particular regional structure existing apart from the regional cooperation framework, this may 
indicate that these structures do not overlap and each of the organizations targets local actors 
rather than seeks cooperation with like-minded organizations in the regional cooperation 
framework. The 2006 northwestern regional cooperation network developed into a very cohesive 
and balanced system with a high level of cross-cutting ties. All the sectors are well-connected 
and both inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral densities became higher indicating that the overall level 
of interconnectivity, and therefore cooperative activity and access to collective decision-making, 
increased both within and between sectors. 
Thus the hypothesis that “networks in the northwestern region have more or less equal 
densities within blocks and among blocks implying a high level of cross-cutting ties in the 
system, while in the southern networks, there is a lack of cross-cutting ties as there are big 
differences in the densities within and among groups” is only partially true. In the northwestern 
networks, densities within groups and between groups are indeed higher than in the southern 
networks, therefore, the level of cross-cutting ties is significantly higher in the northwestern 
system. However, in the northwestern network densities within sectors are higher than densities 
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between sectors, meaning that the inter-sectoral cooperation is higher than intra-sectoral 
cooperation.   
Figures 26 and 27 display visualized representations of intersectoral cooperation modeled 
in NETDRAW. Each network was rotated in a way to represent network actors grouped based on 
their belonging to the same sector and linkages existing between the sectors. Each sector is 
marked by a separate color (see Figures 12, 13, 14, and 15).  
 
            Southern network /1999                Northwestern network /1999 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Intersectoral interaction 
As Figure 26 demonstrates, in the 1999 southern network public sector actors have strong 
links to all the other sectors. The most disconnected sector is regional mass media (light blue). 
Except for the public sector-related linkages, other most connected sectors are education (black) 
and tourism, sport, and entertainment (dark blue); and education and economic sector (red). 
There are also strong linkages between cultural (light green) and social (grey) sectors, and 
environment (dark green) and tourism, sport, and entertainment (dark blue). Overall, education 
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appears to be the second most strongly connected sector in the network. This reflects an 
interesting phenomenon that there are big universities with strong research centers in the 
southern region (Kuban University, Rostov University, Stavropol University), which (compared 
to weak and underdeveloped non-profit organizations and associations existing in the southern 
region) are well established and respected in the society and have strong and multiple linkages 
with the local community and access to public authorities. There are many instances when 
educational institutions in the southern region took the function of civil society organizations and 
were initiators of collective action or engaged in a dialogue with public authorities over different 
regional policies and issues.  
As far as the 1999 northwestern network is concerned, as discussed previously, economic 
sector (red) is most strongly connected to other sectors, also Europe-related organizations (dark 
yellow) are well connected with the other sectors. The least connected sector is transport (light 
yellow); however, this may be explained by the peculiarity of this sector that it does not involve 
many social contacts and activities by its nature. It is also important to note that there are strong 
linkages between the economic (red), civil society (grey) and public sector (pink) actors, which 
indicates the existence of a regional governance structure with interactive policy processes that 
reflect, or at least take into account, the interests, preferences and opinions of the members of 
different regional groups and organizations. 
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            Southern network / 2006 
 
               Northwestern network /2006 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Intersectoral interaction 
 
Figure 27 demonstrates that there are still missing intersectoral linkages in the southern 
2006 network and public sector actors retain dominant positions by having strong links to all the 
other sectors thereby controlling the system. At the same time, the northwestern network 
developed into a very cohesive system with more or less evenly distributed strong intersectoral 
linkages. Economic sector (red) is still highly interconnected with all the other sectors. Social 
sector (grey) developed very strong linkages with other sectors and became highly connected to 
all the other sectors. Public (pink), social (grey), education (black), and economic (red) sectors 
are all well-connected, which is important for democratic governance, social capital, and 
sustainable development in the region. Therefore, it can be concluded that in the northwestern 
region, regional cooperation creates an important bridge between the public sector, civil society 
and the market, thereby making the northwestern regional governance structure more responsive 
to the needs of the regional community. Inteorganizational cooperation empowers regional 
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residents with information about economic, public, social, educational, and environmental 
activity in the region and provides them with access to public officials and regional economic 
actors, which facilitates higher levels of transparency and accountability of the economic and 
public sector in the region. High level of cross-cutting ties in the northwestern region is an 
important factor in explaining why it has higher level of democratic governance than the 
southern region. 
Additionally, According to Meyer (2008), civil society and other non-state actors play a 
crucial role in regional integration as they bring in new capacities and resources, and moderate 
the current predominance of public actors and their interests within the policymaking process. 
Therefore, effective intersectoral cooperation is key to the effective design and implementation 
of regional policies and is a fundamental basis for successful and efficient regional integration.  
Thus is possible to conclude that in the northwestern region, regional integration 
processes are effective and efficient, while in the southern region high level of centralization of 
political control over cooperation processes poses the principal obstacle to greater sub-national 
regionalism. 
Node-level hypotheses:  
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 (factors that explain agent’s degree of power and centrality in the 
networks) 
 
The analysis so far has been focused on the structural peculiarities of the southern and 
northwestern regional cooperation networks at the whole network and group levels of analysis. 
In the course of the analysis significant structural differences were found and their implications 
for the functioning of the networks, as well as the overall network effects on democratic 
governance and policy processes in the regions were extensively discussed. 
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It is important to understand the factors that explain structural positions in the regional 
cooperation networks. For instance, why certain actors are more central then others or why 
certain actors appear to take most advantageous and powerful positions in the networks. Network 
centrality is an important element in the study of regional cooperation, because it indicates what 
actors are in charge of the regional integration processes and therefore, control information 
exchange and access to resources and opportunities provided by the regional cooperation (for 
example, opportunity to use regional integration as a means to occupy influential and prestigious 
position in the region). 
It is hypothesized that an actor’s degree of centrality and power in the northwestern 
cooperation network is a function of its size, alliance proactiveness, level of activity in local 
environment, and international competence. ‘Size’ is referred to the total number of people 
working for the organization. Bigger organizations might have more contacts with other 
organizations (both formal and informal), and therefore may have better awareness of 
opportunities provided by the regional cooperation. It may also happen that European actors 
might be interested in involving bigger partners in projects and initiatives because of trust and 
reliability issues: they might have better knowledge about bigger regional actors than smaller 
ones. Alliance proactiveness is defined as the total number of partners. If an organization is 
already engaged in partnerships with other organizations, there might be a better chance that it 
will get engaged in collaboration with other actors in the regional cooperation framework. The 
level of activity in local environment is defined as the number of public events organized by an 
actor during the period of time of one year. And international competence is defined as the level 
of engagement in international activity of any kind: participating in international exchanges, 
conferences or other events, or having strategic international partners. International competence 
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was measured on a 3-point scale- ‘0’ for no competence, ‘1’ for moderate competence and ‘2’ 
for high competence. 
It is hypothesized that power and centrality of an actor in the southern cooperation 
network depends on its size, budget/income, and whether it comes from the public sector. Public 
sector variable was coded as ‘1’. All the other sectors were coded as ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘4’, etc. 
For the first dependent variable- centrality- degree centrality measure was chosen. Degree 
centrality concerns most advantageous positions in the network in terms of network resource 
exchanges and information flows. Degree centrality indicates how many other network actors are 
in direct contact with a particular actor. The more actors have connections to an actor, the higher 
is its degree, and therefore, the greater is its potential to be in the center of events and network 
exchange processes. Borgatti (2005) points out that degree centrality measure carries with it a set 
of assumptions with regard to how communication and information flow through a network. In 
particular, he argues that degree centrality focuses on immediate influence with regard to 
network flows. 
The second dependent variable- power- was defined as an eigenvector centrality measure. 
According to degree centrality, actors connected to more actors tend to be more central. But this 
measure does not account for differences in the centrality of one’s partners. Actors who are 
connected to many well connected actors are more powerful than those who are connected to an 
identical number of poorly connected actors. In other words, those who are in contact with well-
connected or ‘popular’ actors will tend to be more central than those who are connected to the 
unpopular. I use eigenvector centrality to capture this aspect. This measure assumes that the 
centrality of a given actor is an increasing function of the sum of all the centralities of all the 
actors with whom an actor is connected.  
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Therefore, the models for the analysis are described as follows: 
 
 
Power 1999 = ß0 + ß1Size + ß2Activity + ß3 Alliance+ ß4 Competence + ß5 Sector + ß6Budget/Income+  e  
 
Power 2006 = ß0 + ß1Size + ß2Activity + ß3 Alliance+ ß4 Competence + ß5 Sector + ß6Budget/Income +  e  
 
Centrality 1999 = ß0 + ß1Size + ß2Activity + ß3 Alliance+ ß4 Competence + ß5 Sector + ß6Budget/Income + e  
 
Centrality 2006 = ß0 + ß1Size + ß2Activity + ß3 Alliance+ ß4 Competence + ß5 Sector + ß6Budget/Income + e  
 
 
Multiple regression method was used to estimate the significance and effect of the 
parameters discussed above on the position of centrality and power in the networks. SPSS 
statistical package was used for conducting multiple regression analysis. Tables 14 and 15 
display the results of the analysis.  
 
Table 14: Southern Network 
 
 
 Size Level of  
Activity 
Alliance 
proactiveness 
Sector International 
Competence 
Budget/Income 
Centrality  
1999 
0.31* 0.12 0.36 ‘1’-0.74** 0. 27 0.19* 
Power 1999 0.28* 0.09 0.24 ‘1’-0.67* 0. 23 0.15* 
Centrality 
2006 
0.34* 0.13* 0.43 ‘1’-0.62* 0.29 0.14* 
Power 2006 0.30* 0.10* 0.37 ‘1’-0.44* 0.25 0.08* 
 
 
*   significant at the .05 alpha level 
** significant at the .01 alpha level 
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Table 15: Northwestern Network 
 
 
 Size Level of  
Activity 
Alliance 
proactiveness 
Sector International 
Competence 
Budget/Income 
Centrality  
1999 
0.12* 0.34 0.27** ‘2’-0.37** 0.42** 0.31 
Power 1999 0.07* 0.31 0.24* ‘2’-0.32** 0.40* 0.29 
Centrality 
2006 
0.13 0.26* 0.32* none 0.37* 0.25 
Power 2006 0.10 0.28* 0.30* none 0.35* 0.19 
 
 
*   significant at the .05 alpha level 
** significant at the .01 alpha level 
 
 
The results indicate that the size of an actor, its budget/income, and sector orientation 
(whether it belongs to the public sector) were statistically significant factors that had a positive 
effect on the position of centrality and power in the 1999 southern network. High coefficient for 
the sector orientation was expected from the previous analysis and goes in line with the previous 
findings. In 2006 southern network, size, budget/income and sector orientation are still 
statistically significant positive predictors of an actor’s centrality and power in the network. 
Interestingly, the level of an actor’s local activity became a significant positive predictor of 
centrality and power in 2006. This may indicate that when an actor is engaged in cooperative 
networking processes, it may acquire support from like-minded organizations and gain strength 
and popularity in the region by active participation in the life of the local community and 
organization of various events and activities. Therefore, over time, public sector actors will have 
to start taking such ‘popular’ regional actors into account, thereby creating conditions for 
increase in centrality and power of such actors in the region cooperation infrastructure. 
As far as the northwestern network is concerned, in 1999, statistically significant positive 
predictors of an actor’s centrality were the size of an actor, alliance proactiveness, international 
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competence, and sector orientation. Statistically significant positive coefficients for the sector 
orientation (2- economic sector, coefficients 0.37 for centrality and 0.32 for power) were 
expected from the previous analysis and go in line with the previous findings indicating that in 
the northwestern region, in 1999, the central aspect of regional cooperation was economic 
integration. Budget/income and the level of local activity turned out to be insignificant variables 
in predicting actor centrality and power in the 1999 northwestern network. In the 2006 network, 
power and centrality are affected by alliance proactiveness, international competence, and local 
activity variables. Size, sector orientation and budget/income proved insignificant. 
The findings show interesting tendencies in the regions. The probability that an 
organization becomes central in the regional cooperation with the EU in the northwestern region 
is highly dependent on its international competence and alliance proactiveness implying that the 
overall level of networking and outreach capabilities and mobility of an actor are important in 
determining whether an actor will occupy a central and powerful position in the regional 
cooperation processes. In the southern network, centrality and power are more a function of local 
factors indicating that Russian southern actors are more oriented towards internal regional life 
rather than external integrative processes.    
 
Regional cooperation-intervention hypothesis:  
 
To evaluate the EU-direct effect on the development of linkages among regional actors in 
the southern and northwest regions, two square matrixes of the same size (N=100) with the same 
organizations as in the previous analysis were constructed for each region: one for 1996 (pre-
regional cooperation) and one for the most recent period of time, 2008, where relationships 
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between two actors were measured by a 3 point-scale data – ‘0’ for the absence of a relationship, 
‘1’ for a weak relationship, ‘2’ for a strong relationship.  
An e-mail or fax (where appropriate) with the list of organizations and a request to check 
those with whom the actor worked to a great extent (2), little extent (1), and not at all (0) in 1996 
and then in 2008, was sent to all the actors. The survey was sent three times. Due the peculiarity 
of the Russian context (in general, people are not uses to surveys or questionnaires and in 
addition, contact information for some of the actors did not work and some e-mails returned), the 
overall response rate was 73% (73% out of 100 actors replied) in the northwestern region and 
61% in the southern region. Due to the undirected nature of the data, the missing data was filled 
in by assuming that the relationship was reciprocal with those of respondents and also non-
respondents.  
The missing data for the rest of the actors was taken from the regional and local 
newspapers, websites and archival documentation. The relationship was considered ‘strong’ if 
organizations were in a strategic alliance or interacted with each other on a weakly basis through 
joint partnerships or initiatives of any kind. ‘Weak relationship’ was assigned if two actors had a 
few contacts throughout the year or participated in some events or joint projects, but did not 
interact frequently. In general, a ‘weak relationship’ was assigned for two actors, if there was at 
least one mention of them interacting with each other or having a joint activity in the materials 
available. ‘No relationship’ was assigned if there was no mention of the two actors having a joint 
activity or contacting each other.  In the previous analysis, the measure of a relationship between 
two actors was based on their involvement in the specific Europe-related regional cooperative 
effort, in this analysis the measure of a relationship is based on the general frequency of 
interaction between the two actors. 
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Then two additional square matrixes were constructed for each region, where the 
relationships between the two actors were measured by the number of EU-related 
projects/partnerships/activities/deals/initiatives for the period of 1999-2006. 
The analysis was conducted in UCINET program.  
Network Regression  
Research Question: Has regional cooperation with the EU had a positive causal effect on the 
current network of regional actors? 
Hypothesis: Current network is caused, partly and positively, by the ‘cooperation with the EU’ 
intervention (positive regression coefficient) 
Model 
This is a quasi experimental design, and regional cooperation is treated as the 
‘intervention’ (project/partnership/activity/initiative intervention).  A standardized multiple 
regression model is used.   
 
Model:  2006 Network = 1997 NetworkX1 + Regional_CooperationX2 + e 
 
Factors 
1) Historical path-dependence 
 
History usually plays a significant role in determining the period that follows next in the 
linear sequence. Network scholars investigate the influence of history on the current state of 
interorganizational networks and argue that history is an important factor in explaining the 
current structure of interorganizational networks (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988; Ghezzi and 
Mingione, 2007). This phenomenon is usually called path-dependency in networks or the legacy 
of old networks. Therefore, the network path-dependency concept can be extrapolated to this 
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analysis and it is logical to expect that the current state of relations between organizations is 
somewhat dependent on their previous interactions.  
 
Time Period 1 → Time Period 2 
1996 Network → 2008 Network 
 
 
2) Regional Cooperation 
 
Regional cooperation intervention is expected to play a significant role in determining the 
network structures in 2008.  
 
Regional cooperation → 2008 Network 
 
 
Results 
 
Southern Region 
 
Table 16: Causal effects of the current network 
 
 
R-square = .39 
 
Independent                   Stand. Coeff. Significance 
 
1996 Network                          .19    0.000 
Regional Cooperation  .23    0.048 
 
 
Northwestern Region 
 
Table 17: Causal effects of the current network 
 
 
R-square = .44 
 
Independent                  Stand. Coeff.         Significance 
 
1996 Network                          .28                  0.000 
Regional Cooperation  .34  0.032 
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*   significant at the .05 alpha level 
** significant at the .01 alpha level 
 
Figure 28: Causal Scheme for the Southern Network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*   significant at the .05 alpha level 
** significant at the .01 alpha level 
 
 
Figure 29: Causal Scheme for the Northwestern Network 
 
The results of the analysis indicate that both the 1996 network and the regional 
cooperation intervention have a statistically significant positive causal effect on the current 
network of regional actors.  Interestingly, 1996 pre-regional cooperation network has a bigger 
causal effect on the northwestern network, implying that northwestern actors had a higher level 
   1996 
Network 
   2008 
Network 
.28** .34*
    Regional  
  Cooperation 
   1996 
Network 
   2008 
Network 
.19**
    Regional  
  Cooperation .23*
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of interaction and interconnectedness than the southern ones before the intense regional 
cooperation processes started. In both cases regional cooperation turns out a positive significant 
factor in developing links and increasing the intensity of interaction among all kinds of regional 
actors. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the regional cooperation is an effective tool to 
facilitate communication and collaboration among actors residing in the Russian northwestern 
and southern regions. However, regional cooperation has a significantly stronger effect in the 
northwestern region (0.34 compared to 0.23), and this could be explained by the structural 
peculiarities of the networks that were discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, and also 
by different regional historical, ethno-cultural, geopolitical and economic factors, which will be 
addressed in the next chapter of this dissertation.  
5. Energy Networks: Analysis 
 
Network-level hypotheses:  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 /Network Centralization 
 
Network centralization has particular relevance for the study of relationships between the  
Russian energy companies operating in the northwestern and southern regions and provincial 
governments, as high degree of network centralization will imply concentration of power in the 
hands of a few. As previously discussed, Russia’s economy is heavily dependent on oil and 
natural gas exports, which generate huge percentage of Russia’s export revenues. Various 
scholars claim that the tendency of the Russian central government to re-assert control over 
energy resources is also reflected at the regional level, as provincial administrations also tend to 
establish control over energy-related exploration and production activities occurring in their 
provinces (Daidov, 2009). In many cases significant stakes in the companies operating in the 
regions officially belong to regional authorities and it often happens that regional officials 
establish other formal and informal links with the energy companies. Therefore, network 
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centralization will indicate to what extent regional decision –making processes in the energy 
sector are dominated by the alliance between certain public and energy actors. 
As discussed previously, network centralization means having one center of control in the 
network. Alternatively, decentralized systems have broad distribution of control. For the purpose 
of this study, Freeman’s closeness centrality (or access centrality) and betweenness centrality (or 
control centrality) were identified as the most useful centrality measures for indicating the levels 
of network centralization. Closeness centrality (Freeman, 1979) examines how close an actor is 
to all other actors in the system, in other words, how much access an actor has to other actors. 
Betweeness centrality (Freeman, 1979) estimates the extent to which an actor is between all 
other actors in the network. If an actor is between two other actors, it means that there is no 
direct connection between those actors. From Burt’s (1992, 2000) perspective, a separation 
between non-redundant contacts (a ‘structural hole’) creates control and power advantages for 
the actor who bridges the gap.  
Therefore, a combination of network centralization measures based on how much certain 
actors control the system being brokers of relationships between other actors and how much 
access certain actors have to all other actors would better correspond to the nature of the energy 
network than the degree of centralization simply based on the number of links incident upon a 
node (the number of ties that a node has), known as Freeman degree, or eigenvector centrality 
which estimates the overall importance of an actor in the network. 
Energy networks were modeled in UNINET and NETDRAW programs. Figures 30, 31, 
32, and 33 display the visualized representations of the networks and Tables 18 and 19 report 
network centralization scores. Network centralization scores were calculated in UCINET.  
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Disconnected actors (northwestern network, Pskov and Vologda provincial governments) were 
removed from the analysis.  
 
 
Figure 30: Southern energy network 1999 
 
 
 
 
193 
 
 
Figure 31: Northwestern energy network 1999 
 
 
 
Gazprom
Stavropol gov
Rostov gov
Rosneft
Astrakhan gov
Lukoil
Tatneft
Stavropolneftegaz
Krasnodar gov
Kaspiiskaya neft ko
Cherkessk gov
Elista gov
Vladikavkaz gov
Nalchik gov
Kalmneft
Maikop gov
Donskie nefteprodukti
Transneft
Ugneft
Krasnodarnedtegaz
Volgodonsknefteprod
Kabbalkneftetoprom
Provincial administrations
Energy companies
Dongazdobicha
 
 
 
Figure 32: Southern Energy network 2006 
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Gazprom
Rosneft
Petrozavodsk gov
Lukoil
Russneft
Kaliningrad gov
Murmansk gov
St petersburg gov
Arkhangelsk gov
Novgorod gov
Tatneft
Provincial administrations
Energy companies
 
Figure 33: Northwestern Energy Network 2006 
 
 
 
 
Table 18: Network centralization 
     NETWORK CENTRALIZATION/CLOSENESS (N= 23; N=11)a 
 Centralization  
Southern energy network 1999 51.62% 
Southern energy network 2006 71.18% 
Northwestern energy network 1999 36.02% 
Northwestern energy network 2006 30.80% 
a The closer the centralization is to 100%, the more centralized the network. 
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Table 19: Network centralization 
     NETWORK CENTRALIZATION/BETWEENNESS (N= 23; N=11)a 
 Centralization  
Southern energy network 1999 46.01% 
Southern energy network 2006 44.92% 
Northwestern energy network 1999 32.22% 
Northwestern energy network 2006 20.89% 
a The closer the centralization is to 100%, the more centralized the network. 
 
 
As Figures 30, 31, 32, and 33 demonstrate and the results of the analysis show, southern 
energy network is a highly centralized system both in 1999 and in 2006. Northwestern network is 
on the contrary, a considerably decentralized system. Closeness centrality (or access centrality) 
significantly increased in the 2006 southern network (71.18% compared to previous 51.62%). 
Such an increase implies that the central group controlling the network acquired much more 
access to all the other network actors, as closeness centralization is based on the measure of how 
close an actor is to all other actors in the system. Betweenness centralization slightly decreases in 
the 2006 southern energy network (44.92% compared to previous 46.01%) implying that the 
overall interconnectivity of the system increased, as betweeness centrality is based on the extent 
to which an actor is between the two unconnected actors and, therefore, is able to control the 
flow of information and resources from one actor to the other.  
As far as the northwestern energy network is concerned, it is more decentralized than the 
southern network in 1999; and in 2006, it becomes more than 2 times more decentralized in 
terms of closeness centrality and betweenness centrality than the southern energy network. This 
indicates that in the northwestern network there is no particular group of actors that controls 
network exchanges and has influence over other network actors.  
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It is important to note that some actors that were disconnected from all other actors were 
removed from the network analysis, otherwise, the northwestern network would be considered 
completely decentralized from the perspective of closeness centrality, as no matter how certain 
actors are central in the main network structure, they would still be unable to reach and influence 
the disconnected actors. Betweenness centrality would be extremely low in this case. It is also 
important to note that the size of the southern energy network is two times bigger than that of the 
northwestern one implying that the southern network has more influence and prominence in the 
southern region than the northwestern network in the northwestern region due to a bigger number 
of energy actors involved in the network, which gives them an opportunity to act collectively in 
the regional decision-making processes. The fact that the southern network is much more 
centralized than the northwestern one significantly adds to its weight and influence in the region. 
The results of the centralization analysis show important tendencies in the evolution and 
development of energy networks. While the northwestern network becomes more decentralized 
over time both in terms of closeness centrality (access) and betweeness (control) centrality 
implying equitable sharing of information, resources, and influence among the network actors, 
the southern network becomes much more centralized around a particular group of actors that 
have access to all other actors and therefore, dominate the system. The fact that non central 
actors develop connections among each other slightly mitigates control of the central group over 
the whole system; however, control exercised by the central group (betweenness centralization) 
remains very high (45%). 
It is important to see what the most central network actors are in both systems. For this 
purpose, centrality scores for each network actor both in 1999 and 2006 were calculated in 
UCINET. Appendix of this chapter reports centrality scores for the 10 most central energy actors. 
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According to the centrality scores, the same actors dominate the southern energy network both in 
terms of closeness and betweeness centrality. Centrality scores show that in the 1999 southern 
network, both by closeness centrality and degree centrality, Lukoil Company was the most 
influential actor implying that it had the highest degree of access to all the network actors and the 
highest degree of control over them.  Other central actors with fairly equal centralities were 
Gazprom and Rostov government in terms of closeness centrality and Krasnodar government and 
Gazprom in terms of betweeness centrality.  
In 2006, Gazprom becomes most influential regional actor with absolute closeness 
centrality (100), implying that it has access to all the energy network actors, and with a very high 
betweenness centrality (59.1) indicating that it controls network communication and resources 
due to its position as intermediary and broker in network exchanges. In other words, it is possible 
to say that Gazprom has a rather monopolistic position in the network. Other central actors in the 
2006 southern energy network are Krasnodar government, Rosneft, Astrakhan government, 
Lukoil, Stavropol government and Rostov government. Centrality scores indicate that after 
Gazprom’s leading position, centralities of this group of actors are more or less close, while the 
rest of the actors have much lower centralities. This implies that Gazprom and these 6 actors 
form a strategic alliance, which has high influence and control over the rest of the network actors. 
It is also possible to say that these actors control most of the regional oil and gas assets and 
occupy strategic positions in respect to energy exports and transits. 
As far as the northwestern network is concerned, most central network actors in 1999 
were Russneft Energy Company, Gazprom and Rosneft. However, the difference between 
centrality scores of the most central actors and the least central actors is fairly small, indicating 
that  control and influence are more or less equally distributed in the network.  
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In the 2006 northwestern network, the most central actors are Gazprom and Lukoil; 
however, all the other actors have very close centrality scores implying that the system remains 
open, participatory, balanced and equitable. In other words, all the network actors have more or 
less equal access to network resources and decision-making processes as there are no actors 
dominating the network. Saint Petersburg administration is most central in the energy system out 
of all the provincial administrations, indicating that it is more involved in regional energy issues 
than the other provincial administrations. This may be explained by the fact that St Petersburg 
government is becoming very active in respect to the new projects concerning the development 
of new channels for Russian oil and gas exports, like the Nord Stream project (which is supposed 
to bring Russian gas directly to Germany) and other. However, centrality scores of provincial 
administrations indicate that there is no significant variation in the level of control over the 
network resources among provincial administrations implying that there is no highly dominant 
actor in the system. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that the northwestern energy network is more decentralized 
than the southern energy network proves true.  
Network-level hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 3 /Network Cohesion 
              
As discussed previously, network cohesion is associated with the degree of 
interconnectedness of network actors. High network cohesion in energy networks would indicate 
that the energy companies operating in the regions have tight relationships with provincial 
governments; therefore they would have direct access to energy politics at the regional level and 
provincial governments would have direct involvement in the regional energy sector. . 
This study employs the combination of the same measures of cohesion as in the case with 
the regional cooperation networks.  
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Network density  
 
Density is a measure of overall network interconnectivity. Network analysts claim that in 
networks with positive externalities, high density is important for maintaining collective action 
and ensuring enforcement of collective norms (Coleman, 1988, 1990), while in networks with 
negative externalities (e.g. extremist groups) high level of density is perceived as a negative 
phenomenon indicating high capability of the network to exert its negative externalities (Memon, 
Larsen, 2006). Density degree of the energy networks will be important indicator of their 
strength and influential capability.  
Network densities for the northwestern and southern energy networks were measured in 
UCINET and Table 20 reports network density scores:  
 
Table 20: Network density 
     NETWORK DENSITY (N= 23; N=11)a 
 Density  
Southern Energy Network 1999 10.27 % 
Southern Energy Network 2006 46.22 % 
Northwestern Energy Network 1999 11.00 % 
Northwestern Energy Network 2006 19.62 % 
a The closer the density is to 100%, the denser the network. 
 
 
Network density analysis results indicate that the densities of the southern and 
northwestern energy networks were more or less the same in 1999. However, in 2006 the 
southern network became much denser. In 2006, the density of the southern energy network is 
two times higher than that of the northwestern one implying that the southern energy actors have 
much tighter and more developed connections than the northwestern ones. High density indicates 
that there is high frequency of communication flows in the southern energy network and the 
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network is faster mobilized for collective action. The results of the density analysis also indicate 
that provincial administrations in the southern region are much more involved in the energy 
issues than their colleagues in the northwestern region. These findings go in line with the fact 
that in the northwestern region due to the lack of production and exploration activities, energy 
companies and provincial administrations communicate with each other mainly about export 
routes and transit pipelines, which does not presuppose intense communication, negotiation, 
bargaining, and power struggle, while in the southern region, due to the existence of rich oil and 
gas resources and significant exploration and production activity, there are many energy actors 
who are interested in influencing regional energy policy issues, and at the same time, provincial 
governments are motivated to develop connections with the energy actors as the revenues from 
the energy sector are important for their budgets.  
Transitivity 
 
As discussed previously, transitivity measures triadic closeness meaning the level of 
connectedness of all the actors in triads. High transitivity is associated with the big percentage of 
interconnected triads in the system. High level of transitivity in energy networks would be an 
indicator of deep embeddedness of network actors in the network structure implying good 
awareness of each other and overall network processes. Table 21 reports the results of the 
transitivity analysis.  
Table 21: Network transitivity 
     NETWORK TRANSITIVITY (N= 23; N=11) 
 Transitivity  
Southern Energy Network 1999 3.13% 
Southern Energy Network 2006 9.09% 
Northwestern Energy Network 1999 4.24% 
Northwestern Energy Network 2006 4.85% 
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Transitivity results indicate that in general energy networks do not have high transitivity. 
In the southern network it can be explained by the issues of control, when one actor exploits 
disconnectedness between the two other actors in a triad for its own benefit ( as the network has 
a high betweenness centralization degree), while in the northwestern network the lack of 
transitivity is more due to the general lack of connectedness among network actors. However, in 
2006, transitivity increased in the southern network (9.09 compared to 3.13) implying that the 
actors became more embedded in the network structure and interdependent.  
Compactness 
 
Compactness is a measure of the ‘distance’ between actors. A compact network would 
have short paths between its actors. Table 22 reports compactness (or distance-based cohesion) 
indexes for the southern and northwestern energy networks.  
 
Table 22: Network compactness 
 
   NETWORK COMPACTNESS (DISTANCE-BASED COHESION) INDEXES  
   (N= 23; N=11)a 
 Compactness Indexes 
Southern  Energy Network 1999 0.430 
Southern Energy Network 2006 0.626 
Northwestern Energy Network 1999 0.440 
Northwestern Energy Network 2006 0.612 
a range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness. 
 
Distance-based cohesion indexes indicate that both networks became more cohesive over 
time, however distance-based cohesion is dependent on the size of the network as in smaller 
networks actors are situated closer to each other (the smaller the size of the network, the shorter 
the paths between network actors are). Therefore, if we estimate compactness with respect to the 
size of the networks, southern energy network will be significantly more compact than the 
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northwestern one. High degree of distance-based cohesion shows that in both energy systems 
actors are well informed of each other and the whole politics, dynamics, and outcomes of 
regional processes in the field of energy. 
All the measures of network cohesion indicate that in 1999, the southern energy network 
and the northwestern energy network had similar level of cohesion, however over time southern 
energy network developed into a much more cohesive system. Therefore, the hypothesis that 
“energy network is more cohesive in the southern region and the degree of cohesion of the 
southern network increases significantly over time, while the level of cohesion of the 
northwestern energy network does not increase significantly over time” is only partially true as 
the level of cohesion of the northwestern network also increases over time, however, at a much 
lower pace than that of the southern network.  
It is important to note that there is a big difference in the way both networks develop 
linkages among network actors. Northwestern network becomes more cohesive with a low level 
of centralization, which indicates that the network actors increase interaction and communication, 
but at the same time all the actors have more or less equal access to the network flows and 
decision-making processes. This characterizes the system as open and balanced in terms of the 
distribution of control and influence. Additionally, if we take a look at the configuration of the 
northwestern network both in 1999 and 2006, it becomes clear that provincial governments are 
not extensively involved in the regional energy issues. In the southern network increase in 
cohesion is accompanied by a significant increase in centralization with a particular group of 
actors occupying most prestigious positions in the system. Also, from the configuration of the 
network it is clear that in the southern region provincial administrations are highly involved in 
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the regional energy issues. Therefore, based on the results of the analysis it is possible to 
conclude that the southern energy network generates ‘unsocial capital’ more intensely.  
Network-level hypotheses:  
Hypotheses 4 and 5 / Power and core- periphery relations 
       
Power is a very relevant measure in the analysis of the energy networks as struggle for 
power is an indispensable feature of the Russian energy sector due to its big profits and also 
political issues connected with the energy field. The degree of power would indicate the level of 
assertiveness of actors in the energy sector and a big difference between actors’ power scores 
would indicate power asymmetry and concentration of power in the hands of a few. 
For the analysis of power in the energy network, I use Bonacich’s power measure based 
on an actor’s connectedness to others that are not well connected. Appendix of this chapter 
reports power scores for the network actors. The range of power scores indicates that in the 
northwestern system power is evenly distributed among network actors, while in the southern 
network there is a big asymmetry of power, as there is a very big difference between the power 
scores of the most powerful and the least powerful actors.  
Power scores also indicate the existence of a strategic alliance in the 2006 southern 
energy network constituted by Gazprom (most powerful actor), Rosneft, Lukoil, and the 
following provincial governments: Krasnodar government, Stavropol government, Rostov 
government, and Astrakhan government. 
To be able to estimate how much power over the whole system provincial governments 
have in the energy field, power scores of provincial governments were summed up and divided 
by the sum of the power scores of energy companies. Table 23 shows the percentage of 
collective power obtained by provincial administration in the energy sector.  
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Table 23: Collective power of administrations 
 
        
Networks Collective power 
Southern energy network 1999 30% 
Southern energy network 2006 44 % 
Northwestern energy network 1999 9 % 
Northwestern energy network 2006 6 % 
 
 
The results of collective power analysis indicate that the power of provincial 
administrations in the southern system significantly increased (44% compared to previous 30%). 
This implies that provincial administrations expand their power over the energy sector. These 
findings support the general tendency of the Russian state to become increasingly involved in the 
energy sector and control energy politics. The power of provincial administrations over the 
energy sector in the southern region is much higher than that of the provincial administrations in 
the northwestern region (44% compared to 6% in 2006). This can be explained by the fact that in 
the northwestern region the main energy issues are related to energy transit pipelines and exports, 
which is more the sphere of influence of the national government. In the southern region, where 
energy companies are involved in exploration, production and transportation activities on the 
territory of the provinces, provincial administrations have more opportunity to be involved in the 
energy sector and, as the analysis shows, they take good advantage of this opportunity. 
Core-periphery analysis is an extension of the collective power analysis. However, it does 
not separate actors according to their actual sectors, but identifies the powerful core on the basis 
of the most connected actors who control poorly connected ones. In the energy networks, the 
existence of a distinct core-periphery structure would indicate unequal distribution of control and 
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the grip of power by a few actors (as in an ideal core-periphery model, core is significantly 
smaller than periphery). 
The results of the application of the core-periphery model to the energy networks are 
displayed in Table 24. The table demonstrates density measures within the core (1-1), within the 
periphery (2-2), and between the core and the periphery (1-2 or 2-1) along with the 
corresponding model fit and the number of organizations constituting the core. 
 
Table 24: Core-periphery model 
 
 
C/P  /south/ 1999 C/P  /south/ 2006 C/P northwest/1999 C/P /northwest/2006 
    1         2                           
-----       ----- 
1  0.794   0.417              
2  0.417   0.104 
 
    1         2                             
-----       ----- 
1  0.889   0.659                 
2  0.659   0.103 
 
    1         2                               
-----        ----- 
1  0.571    0.130                  
2  0.130    0.093    
 
    1         2                              
-----       ----- 
1  0.564    0.213               
2  0.213    0.110 
 
3 actors in the core 
 
7 actors in the core 
 
5 actors in the core 5 actors in the core 
Final fitness: r=0.512 Final fitness: r=0.643 Final fitness: r=0.326 Final fitness: r=0.315 
 
 
The results indicate that the southern energy network both in 1999 and 2006 may be 
divided into a core and a periphery as there is a core of well-connected actors who are also well 
connected to peripheral actors, while peripheral actors are poorly interconnected. The final 
model fit of r = 0.512 (1999) and r =0.643(2006) indicates that the southern energy network 
approximates an ideal core-periphery structure well. The partial density of relations among the 
members of the core of the 1999 southern network amounts to 79%. Compared to the overall 
density of the entire network of 10.27 %, the level of information and resource exchange within 
the core has to be judged as highly intense. Moreover, actors belonging to the periphery are 
weakly connected with each other; the respective partial density in this segment is 10%. Finally, 
206 
the partial density of the intersections between the core and the periphery amounts to 42%, which 
indicates that the core has significant control over the periphery. The core of the 1999 southern 
network is constituted by 3 organizations: Lukoil, Gazprom and Rostov government.  
As far as the 2006 southern network is concerned, it yields even better approximation of 
the core/periphery model (final model fit r=0.541 compared to r=0.512). The partial density of 
relations among the members of the core of the 2006 network amounts to 89%, which indicates 
an increase in interconnectivity of the core members. Peripheral actors become slightly less 
connected and partial density of the intersections between the core and the periphery amounts to 
66%, which shows that the periphery is highly controlled by the core. The core of the 2006 
southern network is constituted by 7 actors: Gazprom, Rosneft, Lukoil, Krasnodar government, 
Rostov government, Astrakhan government, and Stavropol government. These findings go in 
line with the previous analysis, therefore, it is possible to conclude that these actors are the most 
powerful and influential actors in the system and they have great control over all the other 
network actors. 
As far as the northwestern energy network is concerned, the results of the core/periphery 
analysis indicate that the structure of the 1999 network does not approximate an ideal core-
periphery model. Model fits of r=0.326 and r=315 are considered low for accepting the model. 
However, if one accepts the model, then the core actors will be 5 energy companies operating in 
the region and the peripheral actors will be provincial governments. 
The findings of the core-periphery analysis have important implications for the 
development of the energy sector in the regions. The results of the analysis indicate that in the 
southern region, provincial administrations have much control over the energy sector. 
Furthermore, power and control are distributed unequally in the southern energy sector, in a way 
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that 3 major companies and 4 provincial administrations are controlling the rest of the actors. In 
the northwestern region, provincial governments are not assertive in the energy sector. Moreover, 
exchange processes that exist among energy companies in the northwestern region are much 
more equally distributed than in the southern region and even one of the most influential actors, 
Gazprom, does not monopolize network exchanges to the extent it does in the southern region. 
This may be occurring for a variety of reasons, some of which have been already discussed (lack 
of production and exploration opportunities in the region), and some other reasons (e.g. cultural 
and historical) will be addressed in the next chapter of this dissertation.  
Network-level hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 6 / Network Structure 
 
As discussed previously, differentiation of network actors in a network structure has 
important implications for network information and communication flows and for the 
distribution of power and opportunities in the system. In networks based on undirected data (like 
energy networks) this differentiation may have horizontal or vertical nature depending on the 
number of network structural levels and the differences in distances between network clusters. 
Burts’ hierarchy analysis was applied to the energy networks for the analysis of their 
structural differentiation. Figures 34 and 35 display the results of the analysis. The networks are 
rotated in NETDRAW vertically according to Burt’s hierarchy measures for better visualization 
of network levels. Energy companies are marked by blue color and provincial administrations are 
marked by red color.  Actors that are at the top of Burt’s hierarchy are placed at the bottom of the 
figures.    
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Hierarchy/ Southern network/ 1999 Hierarchy/ Northwestern network/ 1999 
 
 
Figure 34: Network hierarchy analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hierarchy/ Southern network/ 2006 Hierarchy/ Northwestern network/ 2006 
 
 
Figure 35: Network hierarchy analysis 
209 
The figures indicate that in the southern networks, there are significant distances between 
well-differentiated network clusters that consist of both provincial administrations and energy 
companies. Several key network actors are the most popular and powerful actors in the system. 
Ties are concentrated around these actors, indicating that the network is structured vertically 
rather than horizontally. Such a structural differentiation hinders network exchanges and affects 
network communication and information flows.  
As far as the northwestern network is concerned, it mainly consists of two clusters- 
energy actors and provincial administrations adjacent to them. Due to the small size of the 
network, it is difficult to judge about the distances between the clusters as there are short paths in 
the network and even the furthest actor can reach actors who are at the top of Burt’s hierarchy 
considerably fast.  
 
Node-level hypothesis (based on node structural and resource attribute data):  
It is hypothesized that an actor’s degree of centrality and power in the energy networks is 
a function of its size and income. The peculiarity of the modern Russian energy sector at the 
national level is that big companies that are well supported by the government dominate smaller 
companies, and as a consequence gain more power over energy politics over time. In many 
instances, significant shares of energy companies officially belong to the government. The same 
tendency seems to occur at the regional level; therefore, it would be logical to expect that there is 
a positive relationship between an actor’s size and income and its degree of centrality and power 
in the energy network. Thus the independent variables are the size of a network actor, meaning 
the number of people employed by the actor in a particular region, and its income (if it is an 
energy company) or budget (if it is a provincial administration). The peculiarity of the Russian 
regional context is that some regions have significantly bigger budgets depending on the 
210 
territorial size of a region, its population, revenues and other factors. Therefore, the size of the 
regional budget might be an important variable in predicting the level of an administration’s 
power and centrality in the energy network. 
For the first dependent variable- centrality- betweeness centrality measure was chosen. 
As discussed above, betweenness is a measure based on the actor’s occurrence on many shortest 
paths between other actors. Betweenness centrality reflects how much control over other actors 
and over network exchange processes an actor has. 
The second dependent variable- power- was defined as an eigenvector centrality, a 
measure based on the connectedness of an actor to other actors that are well-connected. 
Therefore, an actor with high eigenvector centrality has access to and power over the most active 
network members.    
The models for the analysis are described as follows: 
 
 
Power 1999 = ß0 + ß1Size + ß2Budget/Income+  e  
 
Power 2006 = ß0 + ß1Size + ß2Budget/Income+  e  
 
Centrality 1999 = ß0 + ß1Size + ß2Budget/Income+  e    
 
Centrality 2006 = ß0 + ß1Size + ß2Budget/Income+  e    
 
 
Multiple regression method was used to estimate the significance and effects of the 
parameters discussed above on the positions of centrality and power in the energy networks. 
SPSS statistical package was used for conducting multiple regression analysis. Tables 25 and 26 
display the results of the analysis.  
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Table 25: Southern Network 
 
 
 Size Budget/Income 
Centrality  1999 0.28** 0.35* 
Power 1999 0.30** 0.42* 
Centrality 2006 0.32* 0.39* 
Power 2006 0.43* 0.46* 
 
 
*   significant at the .05 alpha level 
** significant at the .01 alpha level 
 
 
 
Table 26: Northwestern Network 
 
 
 Size Budget/Income 
Centrality  1999 0.15   0.09* 
Power 1999 0.19   0.11* 
Centrality 2006  0.29  0.24* 
Power 2006  0.22*  0.31** 
 
 
*   significant at the .05 alpha level 
** significant at the .01 alpha level 
 
 
The results of the analysis indicate that both the size of an actor (the number of people 
working for an actor in the region) and its income/budget are statistically significant positive 
predictors of its centrality and power in the southern energy network. The results also show that 
over time, the positions of power and control in the southern network are becoming more 
dependent on the size and income/budget of an actor, as coefficients increase. Therefore, it is 
possible to conclude that in the southern region, the most influential energy actors are big actors 
with strong financial capabilities.  
As far as the 1999 northwestern network is concerned, the size of an actor appeared to be 
insignificant, indicating that it is not a good predictor of an actor’s centrality and power in the 
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network. This may be explained by the fact that due to the lack of exploration and production 
opportunities in the northwestern region, fewer people are employed by companies. Interestingly, 
in 2006, size turns out a statistically significant positive predictor of an actor’s power in the 
northwestern network. This may be explained by the fact that several companies increased their 
presence in the northwestern region to be able to participate in the new export transit projects 
(like Nord Stream). However, power coefficient is considerably low compared to the southern 
network (0.22 compared to 0.43) indicating that the size of an actor has smaller influence on the 
position of power in the northwestern network than in the southern network.   
The income/budget of an actor turned out to be a statistically significant positive 
predictor of an actor’s centrality and power both in the 1999 and 2006 northwestern network. 
However in 1999, coefficients are considerably low indicating that the variable had small effects 
on the positions of centrality and power in the network. In 2006, coefficients become 
significantly higher indicating that the income/budget of an actor has a bigger impact on the 
positions of centrality and power, which implies that the most influential network actors are 
those with bigger financial capabilities. 
The variable ‘size’ was coded as the number of people working for the company in the 
region; however, due to the lack of production and exploration activities in the northwestern 
region, companies are represented by fewer employees than in the southern region, which is rich 
in energy resources and extraction and production activities associated with the existence of 
energy deposits. It would be important to see whether the total size of an energy company 
influences its position in the energy network in respect to power and centrality. By total size I 
mean total number of people employed by the company in all the regions of the Russian 
Federation. Therefore, energy actors were separated from provincial administrations and their 
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network power and centrality scores were used as a dependent variable. Simple regression in 
SPSS was conducted to estimate whether there is a relationship between the total size of the 
company and company’s position in the energy network. 
 
The model for the analysis is represented as follows: 
 
Power 1999 = ß0 + ß1Size_total + e 
 
Power 2006 = ß0 + ß1Size_total + e 
 
Centrality 1999 = ß0 + ß1Size_total + e 
 
Centrality 2006 = ß0 + ß1Size_total + e 
 
 
Tables 27 and 28 report the results of the analysis. 
 
 
Table 27: Southern Network 
 
 
 Size 
Centrality  1999 0.38* 
Power 1999 0.41* 
Centrality 2006 0.45* 
Power 2006 0.49* 
 
 
*   significant at the .05 alpha level 
** significant at the .01 alpha level 
 
 
Table 28: Northwestern Network 
 
 
 Size 
Centrality  1999 0.09* 
Power 1999 0.15* 
Centrality 2006 0.18* 
Power 2006 0.22* 
 
 
*   significant at the .05 alpha level 
** significant at the .01 alpha level 
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The results of the analysis indicate that the total size of an actor is a statistically 
significant positive factor in predicting actors’ power and centrality in the energy networks. 
Coefficients are higher in the southern energy system implying that the size of an actor has a 
bigger impact on the positions of centrality and power in the southern energy network.  
The results of the analysis go in line with the general tendency of big energy companies 
in Russia to increase their presence and influence in decision-making processes in the energy 
sector. This is also reflected in the way energy companies behave at the regional level. However, 
based on the results of the analysis, it is possible to conclude that in the regions with a low level 
of oil and gas exploration and production, energy companies have smaller effect on regional 
decision-making processes and there is a lower chance that a particular group of energy actors 
will dominate the energy sector due to the smaller size of the energy network (fewer energy 
companies operate in the regions) and network structural differences, as energy networks in such 
regions are more decentralized, and power and control are more equally distributed in the energy 
systems. 
Network-level hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 8/ Consensus and effect on decision-making 
 
The structure of interorganizational relationships has been recognized as having 
significant influence on the character and level of an organization’s performance and collective 
performance of organizations embedded in it (Evan, 1972; Pennings, 1981). According to 
interorganizational network analysts, collective effectiveness and efficiency is dependent on the 
formation of consensus in networks. 
Sørensen and Torfing (2005) claim that effective governance networks establish a 
framework for consensus building, which facilitates resolution of conflicts among stakeholders 
and problem solving. Other organizational theorists and scholars similarly argue that effective 
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governance networks tend to develop their own logic of appropriateness that regulates the 
process of communication, negotiation and information exchange, and the formation of 
consensus and attempts to resolve conflicts (March and Olsen 1995, p. 27; Mayntz 1991, p. 17). 
Appelman, Rouwette, and Qureshi (2002) claim that consensus has important impact on the 
effectiveness of decision-making processes and the diffusion of norms and values among 
network members that helps to achieve mutual benefits. 
Therefore, the level of consensus in the regional cooperation and energy networks would 
be an important indicator of their influence on decision-making processes in the regions. High 
level of consensus in the regional cooperation networks would indicate the existence of 
interactive and effective governance structures in the regions, participants of which share 
common interests, norms and values, as regional cooperation networks involve multitude of 
actors from different sectors and aim at solving important regional and transregional social, 
economic, health, and environmental problems. High level of consensus in energy networks 
would imply an overlap between energy sector actors’ interests and the interests of the regional 
public sector actors and would indicate that energy structures have a strong effect on the regional 
decision-making processes. 
Fabio and Howe (2009) found out that network structural properties have a big impact on 
the in-group agreement, even when controlling for other parameters in the model. So far 
interorganizational network analysts have been mainly concerned with the analysis of network 
structural elements that facilitate or impede consensus, but few studies were concerned with 
measuring consensus in interorganizational networks. Based on consensus models used in the 
information theory, I propose a method to evaluate consensus in interorganizational networks. 
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Distributed consensus is a canonical problem in control, distributed decision making and 
sensor network signal processing (Tsitsiklis, 1984). The prototypical example of a distributed 
consensus is the so called average consensus. In this scenario each node i in the network 
consisting of N nodes initially has a value (typically measurement) iy . The goal is to calculate 
the average, ∑== Ni iyNy 11  at every node in a distributed fashion, so that only pairwise 
information exchanges between connected nodes are used to calculate the average. One of the 
most extensively studied iterative algorithms achieving this goal is the distributed averaging 
algorithm (Xiao and S. Boyd, 2004). Within the framework of this algorithm connected nodes in 
the network exchange information at time instances ,...2,1=k and perform updates of their 
values )(kyi . This can be briefly described as follows. At iteration k each node first broadcasts 
its own value and then receives values of his neighbors. After that each node replaces its current 
value with the weighted sum of the received values and its own values. This iteration can be 
written in matrix form 
)1()( −= kk Wyy  
Where TNyyyk ],...,,[)( 21=y is the vector containing values of all nodes comprising the network 
and W  is a weight matrix constructed to comply with network topology constraint, i.e. 
jiwji ,],[ =W  if nodes i and j are connected and 0],[ =jiW otherwise. Here jiw ,  is a weight 
chosen according to a certain rule (Xiao and S. Boyd, 2004), which is used by node i when it 
incorporates the information at node j during the update. Without loss of generality we suppose 
that information exchanges in the network are undirected and thus W  is symmetric. Under mild 
assumptions on the structure of W distributed averaging algorithm is shown to converge to the 
average (consensus) at every node asymptotically, i.e. when ∞→k . 
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It is assumed that by studying the convergence properties of the distributed averaging 
algorithm on the network topologies induced by the interactions in the energy sector and the EU-
Russian regional cooperation in the northwestern and southern regions, we can infer how these 
networks behave when other distributed inference and decision making processes take place in 
these networks. In the case of symmetric W , the convergence of the distributed averaging 
algorithm is described by the following equation  (Xiao and S. Boyd, 2004):  
yyk k −−≤− )0()]([)( yJWy ρ            (1) 
Where ⋅  is a distance metric, y−)0(y  is the initial distance of the network state from the 
consensus state, yk −)(y  is the distance of network state at iteration k from the consensus state, 
0)( ≥− JWρ  is the spectral radius of matrix JW − , and J  is the ideal averaging operator such 
that 
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And we see that )0(Jy=y , i.e. network converges to the average after one information 
exchange (note that this is only possible when the network is fully connected – each node is 
connected to every other node in the network). We see that according to (1), )( JW −ρ  is the 
measure of how fast the distance between the current network state and the consensus state 
contracts. Since we have a k-th power of )( JW −ρ  in (1), the distance between current state of 
the network and consensus state becomes less at every iteration if 1)( <− JWρ . There are two 
extreme situations defined by the structure of network topology. First, 0)( =− JWρ  (in which 
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case the network is fully connected and JW = ). Second, 1)( =− JWρ  (in which case 
associated network has isolated non-connected clusters and convergence to consensus is not 
guaranteed). All other cases are in between those two and particular value of )( JW −ρ  is 
defined by the weight matrix construction mechanism and network topology. For a fixed weight 
matrix construction mechanism the value of )( JW −ρ  is defined only by the network topology. 
As a rule, for more densely connected networks )( JW −ρ  has smaller value and consensus 
algorithm converges faster (network has better information diffusion properties) whereas for 
sparse networks )( JW −ρ  is large and information diffuses slowly.  
In the following figures I show the bounds (identified by the log of equation (1)) on the 
convergence curves of the consensus algorithm. It is important to note that these bounds are tight 
in the sense that there exists a configuration of the initial vector )0(y  such that the convergence 
of consensus algorithm is described by (1) with equality. Thus Figures 36 and 37 given below 
show worst case performance of the consensus algorithm. The experiment conditions are as 
follows. To construct weight matrix W  I have used Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (Xiao and S. 
Boyd, 2004) and )( JW −ρ  was calculated using singular value decomposition of W . The plots 
are in log scale and they depict the following version of (1): 
ykyk −+−≤− )0(log)](log[)(log yJWy ρ , 
 
which is the equation of a straight line with the slope defined by )](log[ JW −ρ . The x axis 
corresponds to iteration number, k, and the y axis corresponds to the log-error yk −)(log y .  It is 
important to note that the less is )( JW −ρ  the better is the network suitable for information 
fusion and agreement among network actors and the faster the corresponding line in the plot goes 
to ∞−  (the state of corresponding network converges to the state of consensus faster). Figures 
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36 and 37 display bounds on the convergence to consensus algorithm run over the network 
topology induced by the relationships in the regional cooperation and energy networks. The 
closer the line is to ‘0’, the faster is convergence to consensus. ‘BS’ stands for the Black Sea 
Area, and ‘ND’ stands for the Northern Dimension. 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Convergence to consensus in the energy sector 
 
The blue line in Figure 36 converges faster than the green one. The blue line corresponds 
to the energy network in the southern region in 1999 and the green line corresponds to the energy 
network in southern region in 2006. This indicates that in the southern energy network developed 
from 1999 to 2006 to facilitate better information diffusion and agreement among its members. It 
is important to note that in general, the southern energy network both in 1999 and 2006 has high 
rate of convergence to consensus. On the contrary, we see that the northwestern network is 
underdeveloped and contains non-connected clusters ( 1)( =− JWρ  ); therefore, there is no 
convergence to consensus.  
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It is possible to conclude that the consensus analysis indicates the existence of a strong 
and consolidated energy structure in the southern region which has a strong effect on the regional 
policy-making processes. At the same time, the energy structure in the northwestern network is 
fragmented, therefore, does not have a significant direct effect on decision-making in the 
northwestern region.   
 
 
 
Figure 37: Convergence to consensus in the regional cooperation sector 
As Figure 37 displays, the northwestern regional cooperation network has a higher rate of 
convergence to consensus than the southern one both in 1999 and in 2006. Furthermore, the 
northwestern network’s consensus convergence rate has significantly increased from 1999 to 
2006, while in the southern network the increase is comparatively low. However, the southern 
cooperation network also shows a tendency to develop better consensus convergence properties 
over time. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that regional cooperation processes foster better 
information exchange and agreement among various regional actors thereby facilitating effective 
governance in the regions. Although, due to the differences in the network structure properties, 
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the northwestern cooperation network has a much stronger impact on the regional decision-
making processes than the southern one.  
          
G. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The results of the network analysis of the regional cooperation and energy structures in 
the northwestern and southern regions indicate significant regional differences that have 
important implications for democratic governance in the regions. The analysis showed that 
regional cooperation with the EU plays a significant positive role in creating connections among 
Russian local organizations, NGOs, companies, firms, educational institutions, and provincial 
governments in both northwestern and southern regions; however, due to the peculiarities of the 
regional structures, regional cooperation with the EU has a stronger effect on the development of 
an interconnected regional infrastructure in the northwestern region.  
According to the analysis, the northwest region, which has higher level of democratic 
governance, is embedded in a dense and decentralized network governance structure. On the 
contrary, southern region happened to have sparsely connected, largely fragmented, and highly 
centralized regional cooperation structure. Northwestern regional cooperation network showed 
the prevalence of horizontal modes of decision-making, while southern network happened to be 
vertically differentiated. The results of the analysis indicate that in the northwestern network, 
there is a fairly equal distribution of power, influence and control among network participants; 
therefore, the northwestern network approximates a good network governance model based on 
self-organization, adaptability, mobility, and collective action. This indicates efficiency in the 
regional integration processes in the northwestern area.  
222 
In the southern cooperation network, public sector actors dominate decision-making and 
control integration processes occurring in the regions, which significantly impedes information 
diffusion and resource exchanges in the southern region. High level of centralization of political 
control over cooperation processes in the southern cooperation structure poses the principal 
obstacle to greater sub-national regionalism. 
Another important difference between the northwestern and the southern regions is that in 
the northwestern region, regional cooperation network has a much higher level of intersectoral 
cross-cutting ties, which indicates that the northwestern regional structure is richer in social 
capital and is also more participatory, open, and democratically legitimate than the southern one. 
High level of cross-cutting ties in the system also indicates its effectiveness, mobility and 
adaptivity to evolving complex regional social, economic, and environmental problems.  
Additionally, the northwestern network showed higher rate of convergence to consensus 
than the southern network, indicating that interests, norms and values of different regional actors 
in the northwestern region coincide better than those of actors in the southern region. Another 
important finding is that the level of centrality and power in the northwestern network (among 
other factors) depends on an actor’s alliance proactiveness and international competence, which 
implies that networking capabilities and knowledge of transregional and international 
environment are important factors determining whether a northwestern actor will get engaged in 
the regional cooperation infrastructure and become central in it. Therefore, actors in the 
northwestern region are more motivated and inclined to cooperate with international actors than 
the southern actors, and most important, already have significant international experience. In the 
southern region, power and centrality are functions of local factors. This indicates that actors in 
the southern region are more oriented towards local action arena.  
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As far as the energy structures are concerned, in the northwestern region, energy network 
turned out to be underdeveloped, fragmented and decentralized, with no immediate direct effect 
on the regional policy-making processes. As a contrast, in the southern region, energy network 
appeared to be denser, much more centralized, and vertically differentiated with a strong (and 
significantly increasing over time) effect on the regional decision-making processes. The results 
of the analysis indicate that the tendencies of the Russian energy sector to become more 
monopolistic and the Russian state to reassert control over energy resources and energy actors 
are also reflected at the regional level. Big companies (in terms of both size and income) form 
strategic alliances to dominate energy-related decision-making processes in the regions, and 
provincial administrations increase their grip of the regional energy sector over time. However, a 
necessary condition for this is the existence of energy resources and exploration and production 
opportunities in the region; otherwise, regional energy infrastructure (meaning public sector-
energy alliance) will be fragmented and decentralized, like in the northwestern region. 
The dimension that was neglected in this analysis is the micro-level of individuals.  This 
aspect was ignored not because it is considered to be of less importance, but because this study 
has been specifically focused on a comparative assessment of the systemic features of the 
regional cooperation and energy domains in the northwestern and southern regions of the 
Russian Federation.  
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V. DIFFERENCES IN THE REGIONAL COOPERATION AND ENERGY 
STRUCTURES IN THE NORTHWESTERN AND SOUTHERN REGIONS: REGIONAL 
SPECIFICS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
 
 
                                                       
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
Interorganizational networks are not by definition ‘democratic’ or ‘undemocratic’, as 
everything depends on their actual form and functioning, which again depends on the historical 
and political context in which they emerge and operate (Sorensen and Torfing, 2005). This 
chapter investigates ethno-cultural, historical, geopolitical, and economic specifics of the 
northwestern and southern regions that account for the structural and functional differences in 
the regional cooperation and energy networks. In this effort, it considers internal and external 
factors shaping regional structures and discusses implications for further development of 
democratic and effective governance at the sub-national level in the northwestern and southern 
regions. 
This chapter is based on the 34 (17 for each region) in-depth interviews with regional 
energy sector representatives, public officials, NGO representatives, journalists, economists and 
political scientists.47 The interviews were conducted between June and October 2008 in a semi-
structured format, consisting of a set of core questions supplemented by an in-depth discussion 
about different subjects the respondent was willing to provide further detail about. Each 
interview focused on the questions related to the particular experience of a respondent’s 
organization in dealing with the regional cooperation/energy issues, yet went beyond these 
questions to address broader questions about governance patterns and decision-making processes 
                                                 
47 The list of the interviewees and the core questions are attached in the Appendix of this chapter  
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in the region. All the interviews were taken in the Russian language and were translated into 
English. Open/axial/core coding method developed by Anselm Strauss was applied to process 
and codify information contained in the interviews (Strauss, 1997). 
The purpose of the interviews was to provide in-depth understanding of the regional 
peculiarities that explain the differences in the regional cooperation and energy structures and 
also the mechanisms through which these structures influence democratic governance in the 
regions. The interviews gave access to greater levels of information and a more complete picture 
of the regional contexts based on detailed observation about the regional processes and the 
mechanisms of decision-making at the sub-national level, which quantitative data alone could 
not provide. 
The interviews resulted in a rich set of qualitative data providing general information on 
the regions and case-specific insights. It is important to note, however, that the interviews go 
beyond mere description as they were conducted with the aim of contributing to testing the 
hypothesis about the impact of regional cooperation and energy structures on democratic 
governance in the regions and they provide the basis for exploring deductively predictions about 
the relationship between the way the regional cooperation and energy networks are structured 
and the level of democratic governance in the region. Therefore, the qualitative analysis seeks to 
evaluate the overall consistency of the interview data with the previous econometric analysis of 
the longitudinal data and the network analysis. 
Threats to validity and reliability of the interview data were addressed through several 
means. First, I sought to construct a representative sample of respondents: the interviews 
involved key actors from various sectors of society—including civil society, mass media, 
business, energy sector, government, and academia— therefore, representing a ‘micro cosmos’ 
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of the regions. Diverse range of respondents enhanced the credibility of the answers. Second, the 
interviews related to the regional cooperation were conducted with actors who have considerable 
experience in cooperating with the EU actors at the regional level and energy-related interviews 
involved prominent regional energy experts; therefore, the respondents were very knowledgeable 
of the interview subjects. And third, an in-depth interview format allowed for follow-up 
questions and ensured consistency across the answers provided. 
The factors that shape and influence governance patterns in the regions and condition 
structural composition of the regional cooperation and energy structures can be divided into the 
four broad interconnected categories:  
 
B. ETHNO-CULTURAL COMPOSITION AND THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY 
According to respondents, ethnic composition and sub-ethnic elements have a significant 
direct impact on the regional governance processes and shape regional governance structures. 
Unlike ethno-culturally homogenous, socially cohesive, and modernized northwestern region, 
southern region remains a traditional clan-based society. Social transformation and deformation 
of a traditional society through which Russia passed in pre-medieval and early medieval period, 
and then under the tsarist regime and the Soviet authority, affected the southern region to an 
incomparably smaller degree than the other regions. The southern region has exhibited powerful 
forces of resistance against the abandonment of clan ties and loyalties for the sake of realignment 
toward a larger state-wide identity and even the processes of industrialization, urbanization, 
restratification, and forced relocation (under Stalin) have not had a significant impact on the 
social structure in the Russian south. 
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Clans in the Russian south are sub-ethnic and their identities are rooted in kinship. The 
southern clans are hierarchical structures based on common ancestry, territorial unity, social 
integration (e.g. through inter-marriage) and have their own social practices, traditions, and 
customs. A specific feature of the southern society is strong inter-clan solidarity within 
ethnicities, but very weak solidarity among ethnicities, which can be explained by historical 
socio-cultural and geographical factors such as the existence of long-term ethnic rivalries and 
differences in regional landscape (e.g. mountains versus steppe) that led to segmented identities. 
Although formal national identities have been imposed on the southerners, informal ethnic and 
clan-based identities persist and are well sustained through knowledge of the family’s genealogy, 
a strong sense of responsibilities and duties related to kingship and links of territorial loyalty. 
These powerful ties are often disregarded by scholars because of their informal character; 
however, according to the interviewed regional experts, they provide the basis for political and 
economic groupings and formation of regional elites in the Russian south. 
Clans are the main actors in the regional economy and politics in the southern region. 
They pervade regional bureaucracy and economics informally, but due to the regional specifics, 
the formal level matters very little, whereas the informal level matters enormously. Informal 
relations within a clan are more important than formal rules and regulations. Powerful clans 
protect their members who violate the formal law from the official prosecution, but severely 
punish (including assassination) those members who ignore internal informal norms and 
traditions. There is a well –developed system of incentives and sanctions that maintains the order 
within a clan. The most important incentive is the promotion to a higher economic or 
bureaucratic position in the clan hierarchy and, therefore, gaining higher income and prestige in 
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the region. Clan members that have access to prominent regional positions patronize their kin by 
giving jobs and promoting people based on the kin ties, but not merit.  
According to respondents, southern provinces are stable recipients of the federal 
donations, and 5 from them are among the 7 poorest subjects of the country, receiving up to 
80 % of their budget from the federal center, while the revenues from the regional energy sector 
and regional businesses end up in the pockets of provincial bureaucrats and regional economic 
actors tied by informal clan bonds. Basically what happens is that clan elites steal regional assets 
and divert them to their clan members. In the southern provinces the level of shadow economy is 
very high. For example, in Dagestan, by different estimates, from 50 up to 70 % of the working 
population are functioning in the shadow sector. By furthering their interests clans have largely 
neutralized the effect of individual elites, leadership based on merit, and formal institutions. In 
the south, provincial bureaucracy parasitizes on grants from the federal center for sustaining 
regional development, does not have incentives for the necessary deep transformations and 
resists sensible reforms. Unofficial clan politics and patriarchal linkages hinder social 
development; complicate the development of democratic institutions in the region and make 
liberalizing political and economic reforms very difficult as they create informal political and 
economic rules that are not pluralist, accountable, and equally and fully participatory and 
representative. 
The southern traditions of strong family-patrimonial ties should be respected, supported 
and encouraged, but when they get transferred to the regional policy-making, they create 
informal economy, encourage practices of clientelism, nepotism, and bribery, and give rise to 
corrupt power groups, oligarchs and even maphia-groups in the region. Regional maphia groups 
are most prominent in the regional oil and gas sector, as it is the most profitable branch of the 
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regional economy allowing for gaining fast riches. According to various experts, the regional 
energy sector is largely controlled by the regional bureaucrats, and vise versa, oil and gas 
magnates linked to public officials by clan ties, are most influential actors in the regional politics. 
In the southern region it is common that people from oil and gas elites become important public 
officials and even provincial governors. Energy elites want one of their representatives as 
governor or major public official to establish close interaction with the regional political elite. 
And common people who vote for such businessmen generally hope that the oligarch’s wealth 
will help the entire region. 
Several experts mentioned that over the recent years, power and control over the regional 
energy assets became centralized in the hands of a few. Therefore, high level of centralization 
and vertical differentiation of the regional energy structure can be explained by the clan nature of 
the southern society, where clan leaders occupy the leading political and economic positions in 
the region and have access to regional resources; more powerful clans have control over bigger 
companies and have a chance to dominate the energy sector. For instance, in Kalmykia Republic 
almost 85 % of the townspeople and more than 90 % of inhabitants of villages identify 
themselves with this or that clan; three most powerful clans compete for political and economic 
power in the republic: Torgut, Dervud and a younger Buzav clan constituted by Don Kalmyks. 
The biggest business in Kalmykia, Kalmneft Oil Company, is controlled by the president of 
Kalmlykia, Kirsan Illumzhinov, from Buzav clan and his people. 
Along with inter-clan competition over energy resources, there is an inter-regional 
competition, when several clans unite to get more access to energy assets; for instance, Elista, 
Rostov, Krasnodar, and Astrakhan elites managed to obtain control over the biggest energy 
companies operating in the southern region and also seized control over important southern gas 
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fields (like Chumakovskoe, Sladkovsko-Morozovskoe, and Temruksko-Ahtarskoe) both by 
official means- by officially obtaining a stake in a company- and unofficial means, like informal 
clan ties with the energy actors. The biggest companies operating in the region, Gazprom, Lukoil, 
and Rosneft, have on their regional boards the members of provincial governments; or directors 
and senior managers of the regional branches of these companies are tied to provincial public 
officials by informal clan ties. Therefore, by effectively using administrative leverage, these 
companies managed to buy shares of many smaller southern energy companies and acquired 
official access to their internal decision-making processes, or established informal links with the 
smaller companies through informal clan connections. These companies now have a big say in 
the regional and even national-level energy policy decision-making, as in many cases national-
level decisions regarding southern energy politics and geopolitics of new routes in the south are 
made in a close consultation with the regional energy sector representatives and officials ties 
together by formal or informal linkages. 
To avoid open confrontation and conflict, powerful southern clans share some of their 
profits with the rival clans; however, from time to time there are clan clashes or even wars that 
result in re-division of power and resources. For instance, in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, recent clan 
rivalry over the ownership of the chemical factory that involved several killings resulted in 
political crisis, when people blocked the building of provincial administration for several days 
demanding prosecution and punishment of those in power that were behind the killings. 
The clan structure of public and economic authority leads to phenomenal, even by the 
Russian standards, level of corruption. However, in the southern region corruption is generally 
not perceived as a negative phenomenon, as in many instances it is commonly viewed as a 
derivative of clan-based relations. The federal center basically allows southern regional elites to 
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do whatever they want in exchange for security of the southern borders and suppression of any 
secessionist tendencies. In general, southern clans do not oppose the boundaries of a state; they 
seek political and economic resources for the particularistic ends of the group. Regional experts 
claim that even the appointment of the regional governor by the center under Putin’s vertical of 
power has not and will not change the regional clan-based dynamics, which has not changed for 
centuries. Putin’s vertical of power actually goes back to the Russian tradition of voevodoship, 
when for several centuries governance in Russia was based on voevodas, or feudal lords, who 
had certain amount of land under their control and provided the state with soldiers and taxes. At 
present, the power between the federal center and the provinces is, of course, distributed in a 
more modern and complicated manner, but in many instances it retains features of the old system. 
In the southern region, regional governor nominated by the center is a rather nominal 
figure, as regional elites are in charge of the social, political and economic processes in the 
region. The formal institutional mechanisms linking public sector and society have been much 
less significant in the southern region as regional clan elites have full control over the process of 
distributing resources, jobs, and social benefits. For instance, the Republic of Chechnya (which 
is in the southern region and is technically under the southern regional governor’s authority) is 
significantly more independent now under the ‘pro-Moscow’ president Kadyrov than it used to 
be under the separatist Dudayev. Kadyrov and people from his clan have full control over 
administering the Republic.  In addition, the federal center supplies Chechnya with over a billion 
dollars in aid annually. Central authorities have stopped to control how this money is spent and 
are no longer interfering in the process of the allocation and distribution of this money. Therefore, 
Kadyrov and his team distribute the money in accordance with the traditional patriarchal rules of 
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the Chechen society and its complex clan structure and tribal hierarchy. Similar situation is 
occurring in the other southern provinces.  
It is crucial to take into account an important peculiarity of power in a traditional society. 
Separation of powers is the institute that has passed through a long-term evolution and developed 
naturally in Europe in the course of various rebellions and revolutions. This phenomenon is 
completely alien to archaic and traditional societies.  In a traditional society, the clan leader and 
his team are perceived as having almost a sacred status and all the other independent branches of 
authority are automatically perceived as undesirable not only by the ruling elite, but also by the 
majority of the population. Therefore in ‘posttraditional’ societies (many experts call the 
southern region a posttraditional society) supervising bodies constituted by clan elites frequently 
continue having almost unlimited powers. Another important feature of the southern region is 
that unlike the majority of European peoples that lost tribal ties in the process of social 
transformation and economic development (including northwestern and central Russia), the 
majority of the ethnicities in the Russian south retained clan linkages, which penetrated their 
societies.  
There is an interesting phenomenon in the southern region- Don Cossacks- whose 
democratic potential has not been taken into account by reformers, but under certain conditions 
could have a positive impact on the development of democratic governance in the region.  
The necessity to defend their free lifestyle and protect their settlements from the attacks 
of Tatars, Mongols and other nomadic tribes that lived in the steppes of southern Russia, forced 
Cossacks to get organized into a military society with the Common Assembly (‘Kazachiy Krug’) 
that elected temporary military authorities – ‘atamans’. Different experts describe Cossack 
society in the early medieval times as a loose federation of independent but interconnected 
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communities with their own local armies, separate from the neighboring states (e.g Poland, 
Grand Duchy of Moscow or the Khanate of Crimea) and pursuing independent foreign policy. In 
the Russian Empire, when in the course of expansion southern lands became part of it, Don 
Cossacks were given certain privileges in exchange for the protection of the southern borders. 
Throughout the whole history of Russia, Cossack’s main goal was to protect Russian southern 
frontiers.  
Cossack population significantly decreased after the First and the Second World Wars 
and Stalin’s oppressions. Modern Cossacks live in small communities called ‘stanitsy’ mainly in 
Rostov, Stavropol, and Krasnodar provinces. Cossacks still have their assembly and a vibrant 
network of associations, which are predominantly cultural and historical, aimed at preserving 
Cossack traditions and customs. However, some Cossack communities and their organizations 
also seek political power. For instance, in the late 1990s, Cossacks became a considerable force 
in the government of Rostov province. 
According to respondents, Cossack society has vibrant democratic nature; however, the 
main problem is that Cossack culture is very different from that of the other ethnic groups 
residing in the southern region and Cossacks do not integrate well with other groups. Cossacks 
are predominantly Slavic and Christian, like the majority of Russians; while other ethnic groups 
in the southern region are either Turkik or Caucasus, and predominantly Muslim, representing 
different branches of Islam from mystical Sufi Islam to Wahhabi Islam with the strictest puritan 
rules and severely enforced standard of conduct. Caucasus and steppe societies are hierarchical 
and autocratic (except for the Chechen and Ingush, where there are several elderly clan or ‘teip’ 
leaders), with the long history of social differentiation into clan princes, clan aristocracy, 
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freemen and slaves, and chronic struggle for prestige and rank. Cossacks, on the contrary, have 
historically been a free horizontally structured decentralized society.  
Cossack history, customs, traditions, norms and values are part of the common Indo-
European heritage and are very different from that of the other ethnic Caucasus or Asian groups 
in the region. Therefore, Cossacks are mainly concerned with their own prosperity and cultural 
heritage and preservation of their lifestyle. 48 Thus in many instances, instead of serving as a 
connecting link among various ethnic groups, Cossacks add to the segmentation and 
fragmentation of the southern society and despite their historical freedom and innate democratic 
nature, often act as another clan in provincial governmental bodies.  
Nevertheless, according to different regional experts, municipalities with bigger number 
of Cossack settlements are more democratic than other municipalities in the southern region. A 
possible explanation to this phenomenon is that in the areas where Cossack population is 
significant, Cossack networks help to increase administrative efficiency and responsiveness to 
local needs. Additionally, for a number of historical and cultural reasons, Cossacks (unlike other 
ethnic groups in the region) have a holistic vision of the southern region and are more concerned 
with its cultural and socioeconomic development and geopolitical importance for the Russian 
Federation. However, according to many respondents, Cossacks alone, no matter how 
democratic their society is, can not improve governance in the whole region, which is home to a 
multitude of other groups with their specific culture and their own customs and traditions. 
Various experts claim that Cossack democratic potential has not been fully realized and 
provincial politics is still based on ethnic rivalry and clan struggle. 
The main problem of the clan-based politics in the southern region nowadays is that it 
undermines key dimensions of democracy—separation of powers, transparency, accountability, 
                                                 
48 According to Maria Chufistova, director of Cossack cultural heritage association 
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representation, participation, responsiveness and solidarity. Clan connections define the 
allocation of public resources, and elections in representative bodies of authority, as a rule, are 
based not on political programs that would be beneficial for every member of society, but on 
clan principles. This is why southern provinces have the greatest income inequality in the 
country: provincial clan elites are interested in their own self-preservation and prosperity and, 
therefore, get rich for the sake of the rest of the population. So, the opportunity structure in the 
southern region is very hierarchical and highly unequal. This is reflected in the way regional 
cooperation with the EU is structured. Opportunity to participate in regional cooperation 
partnerships is restricted in the southern region as regional elites perceive regional cooperation as 
another financial opportunity and try to direct the resources offered by it to their clan members. 
Provincial bureaucracies constituted by powerful clan elites control cooperation processes and 
tend to use regional cooperation as a means to further their interests rather than to solve complex 
regional problems.  
For instance, in Adygea republic, UTK telecom company, which had stronger ties with 
provincial bureaucrats in the communication and information department, ousted ATC Company 
from the EU project aimed at strengthening accessibility and connectivity of intra- regional 
information and communication links in the framework of the Black Sea Basin Joint Operational 
Program, although the ATC Company had better knowledge of the region and was better 
equipped to take part in the project.49 
As another example, Cherkessk environmental NGO was supposed to participate in the 
project aimed at building Trans Caucasus transportation system connecting Cherkessk with 
Adler. However, Cherkessk administration and Karachaevo-Cherkessian Society for the 
Promotion of Motoring and Road Improvement and UPRDOR ‘Karachaevo-Cherkessk’ linked to 
                                                 
49 According to Oxana Svetlitsina, representative of ACT telecommunications company 
236 
Cherkessk administration by clan ties blocked the environmental NGO from full participation in 
the project and distributed among themselves resources meant for ecological expertise and 
environmental analysis. 
There is evidence that southern administrations interfere a lot in the university exchange 
programs with the European Union and favor those educational institutions that have direct ties 
with them. Due to corruption rooted in clan-based structure of the southern region, the joint 
project between the Russian southern region and European Black Sea countries supported by the 
Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) aimed at the development of sea port 
terminals and facilitation and enhancement of sea trade routes did not bring expected results on 
time and work planned for two years extended for four years with extra financial support from 
the federal center and the Russian development bank. 
Clan-based structure of society in the southern region leads to the lack of 
interorganizational networking, as different clans occupy different industries and areas of 
economy, and public and social sector and are not interested in collaboration. Because of their 
noncollaborative nature, clan-based elements neutralize attempts to develop regional synergy 
designed by the authors of the Black Sea Synergy initiative. 
Clans effectively eliminate nonclan forms of association and participation by the 
mechanism of inclusion of members and exclusion of non-members. In the southern region, the 
lack of solidarity and collaboration among clans and existing regional cleavages prevent the 
achievement of consensus in the society and undermine a sense of citizenship. The potency of 
sub-ethnic loyalties hinders region-wide and state-wide consensus building and political 
compromise that are necessary for liberal democracy to work. Regional clan elites use their clans 
to mobilize social support for their agenda and are not interested in effective functioning of 
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organizations that would have broader regional constituencies. This is why civil society is much 
more underdeveloped in the southern region compared to the other regions of Russia. 
Additionally, the EU assistance programs and opportunities provided by the regional cooperation 
have somewhat paradoxical effects on the development of civil society in the southern region as 
despite their networking character they produce distinct civic elites in the region well connected 
with the provincial bureaucracies, but without a visible constituency and dense horizontal 
linkages among themselves. 
Another problem of the regional cooperation programs is that those initiatives that are 
designed by the European actors (either EU bodies or EU member states, regions of member 
states, or individual actors) usually do not take into account complex southern ethno-cultural 
specifics and clan-based governance; therefore, exactly the same program has very different 
results in the southern region than in the northwestern one. For instance, an EU-funded TACIS 
project aimed at promoting health education in Russian schools in Pskov province (northwestern 
region) had a lot of follow-up projects and schools in the region even established inter-school 
health consultation clinic, while in Rostov province (southern region) the project had problems 
due to administrative barriers (the recipients had difficulty in receiving financial support on time 
because of the interference of public officials) and did not have significant follow up initiatives. 
Reciprocating any cooperative measure is important for generating further trust in the regional 
cooperation system.  
Additionally, there is also a problem of the regional cooperation in the southern region, 
which cooperation experts call a ‘selection problem’. By selection problem they mean a 
phenomenon that due to the lack of experience in dealing with the southern actors, European 
partners often choose the actors that they have some knowledge of from previous projects. 
238 
Therefore, in many cases, same actors participate in new initiatives, while new actors do not get 
involved, and regional networks do not develop as fast as they should.  
A good way to strengthen and consolidate southern regional networks would be to link 
the weaker vulnerable regional actors (especially from different ethnic and clan groups) by 
involving them in various partnerships and initiatives and creating connections among them. 
This would develop cohesion, increase social capital and build consensus in the region as when 
individuals belonging to different groups with diverse goals and members have a chance to 
communicate and engage in cooperative activities, their attitudes will tend to moderate as a result 
of group interaction and cross-pressures. However, without thorough knowledge of the regional 
specifics and extensive experience in dealing with different actors coming from different ethnic 
and clan constituents, it will not be possible for the European actors interested in the 
development of regional cooperation to create a cohesive developed regional network structure.  
Several regional cooperation experts believe that due to the collaborative nature of the 
regional cooperation processes, various regional actors are bound to develop interorganizational 
linkages, although this might take much more time and effort than in the northwestern region. 
Regional cooperation with the EU played an important role in establishing connections between 
human rights NGOs in the southern region and even led to political changes in Rostov province 
where public officials had to engage in intense dialogue with Ekologika, Youth Human Rights 
Movement and other NGOs empowered by the regional cooperation partnerships and simplify 
NGO registration procedures and allow several new NGOs to register despite the recent law that 
created an overly complicated registration procedure for NGOs and permitted government 
officials to deny registration arbitrarily.  
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At the same time, other experts argue that for consistent change and strong effect on the 
regional decision-making processes, regional cooperation influence should be systematic. 
According to them, due to the regional ethnic and clan specifics, southern regional cooperation 
system will most likely remain centralized around regional elites (as it is their innate feature to 
control any activity occurring in the region), even if different regional actors engage in a higher 
level of cooperation. Because of the rigid clan-based structure and high segmentation of society, 
and historically non-European, autocratic, hierarchical and highly centralized forms of 
governance, the southern region is much less prone to European influences; therefore, the effect 
of the regional cooperation with the EU on internal governance processes will anyways be much 
smaller than in the northwestern region.  
As far as the northwestern region is concerned, the society of Novgorod-the-Great, which 
later became Novgorod Republic and then the northwestern region of Russia, developed along 
the lines of other Northern European nations. According to regional experts, the northwestern 
region represents a cohesive entity held together horizontally by shared history, culture, and 
language. It progressed away from traditional ties toward rational and secular relations and civil 
ties of the modern society. In the northwestern provinces common regional interest is placed 
above sectional pressures and segmented identities. 
At present, the northwestern region has much bigger number of nongovernmental 
organizations and associations of various kinds than any other region of Russia. The most 
comprehensive employers’ associations of Russia, the Russian Union of Industrial Employers 
and Entrepreneurs (RSPP, Rossiskii soyuz promyshlennikov i predprinimatelei) and the 
Federation of Producers of Goods (Federatsiya tovaroproizvoditelei) have the biggest number of 
members and are most active in the northwestern region.   
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According to the anonymous senior manager of Sintal Corporation that has branches both 
in the northwestern and southern regions, while in the southern region certain amount of 
company’s resources goes to the bribery of public officials due to excessive official and 
unofficial administrative barriers, in the northwestern region public officials do not interfere in 
the company’s business and on the contrary, cooperate with the company’s social department by 
providing information about regional nongovernmental organizations and associations and 
helping to link the company with organizations representing most deprived sectors of the 
northwestern society in the framework of the company’s corporate social responsibility project.  
According to Charities Aid Foundation Russia representatives, there is the biggest 
number of corporate social responsibility programs in the northwestern region. The northwestern 
region has the most dense and developed network of partnerships between civil society and 
private sector. Despite 2005 unfriendly NGO legislation which gave bureaucrats the authority to 
use several administrative measures against civil society organizations, nongovernmental 
organizations in the northwestern region do not have registration problems and other 
administrative hurdles like in the other regions of Russia and foreign NGOs are not pressed by 
provincial registration authorities though the new law gave the authorities the possibility to make 
arbitrary decisions in respect to foreign civil society organizations.  
The northwestern region is an entity with powerful foreign presence, as many foreign 
NGOs, especially European, are located in the region and many choose to register in the 
northwestern region to avoid possible administrative difficulties. The region does not share 
common problems of the modern civil society in the other regions: selective implementation of 
new NGO law (treatment of some NGOs as ‘good’ and some as ‘bad’), restriction of activities 
that cause disruption to the functioning of many small NGOs, lack of access to different sources 
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of funding, uncertainty in financial resources, lack of interaction inside the civil society sector, 
and lack of effective interaction between the civil society and the public sector. 
For instance, Murmansk administration has been very accessible and cooperative with 
civil society organizations in respect to regional environmental issues. It has been engaged in an 
environmental policy dialogue with the neighboring Petrozavodsk administration, Norwegian 
and Finnish authorities and local and regional NGOs (such as Russian-Norwegian Cleaner 
Production Centre), and as an outcome, important regional waste management program was 
established and regulations concerning cleaner production were adopted. Additionally, several 
important regional public events concerning regional environmental problems were held in the 
region.  
According to different experts, in the northwestern region, public authorities often gather 
information about complex regional issues from inter-regional, regional and local civil society 
organizations and involve them in decision-making processes. Such decentralization and 
participation build social capital and strengthen governance in the region by fostering civic 
participation in decision making, providing feedback from the northwestern residents to public 
officials, and mediating dialogue between the public sector and various groups of the 
northwestern society.  
Intense interaction with European actors in the northwestern region is very important, as 
it creates a common geopolitical space with shared norms and values and serves as a mechanism 
of the infusion of European norms and standards in the Russian northwestern social, political, 
and economic space. Close cooperation with European partners in the northwestern region 
sometimes has important consequences for the whole country; for instance, regional 
environmental processes in the northwestern region have had a major impact on the development 
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of environmental legislation at the national level and the adoption of the EU environmental 
standards. 
A recent in-depth survey project of the Social Institute and several nongovernmental 
organizations shows that more than 70% of NGO leaders interviewed in the northwestern region 
expressed their trust in provincial officials compared to only about 30% in the southern region. 
Due to historical peculiarities that led to the ethno-cultural cohesiveness of the northwestern 
society and close cooperation and networking with European actors, civil society sector is much 
more developed in the northwestern region than in the other regions of Russia and it has grown 
significantly over the past decade. 
 According to different experts and political scientists, nongovernmental sector in Russia 
is neither ‘perestroika’ phenomenon, nor one imported from the European democracies, though 
common European past is considered to be an important factor conditioning high level of civic 
activism and social cohesion in the region. Charity, philanthropy, mutual help, group activity and 
voluntarism have been long a part of the northwestern (and in general Russian) history and now 
are revived. Novgorod-the-Great, then the Republic of Novgorod, and then Novgorod Gubernia 
and the northwestern region of Russia had a well developed network of civic organizations: 
numerous ‘gildii’ (guilds), voluntary associations of tradesmen or craftsmen formed to protect 
mutual interests and maintain standards of workmanship and ethical conduct, and also different 
boyar charities, unions of rural people, and other associative networks.  
In the tsarist Russia, even given more autocratic forms of governance, there was a system 
of municipal self-government and thousands of charity organizations and voluntary associations 
functioned in different regions, and in the 19th century more than seven million people received 
aid and services through such organizations every year. Though in the framework of the Soviet 
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Union it is not possible to treat civil society as an independent phenomenon, a determinate 
structure or a network of organizations with certain membership, civic interaction in the Russian 
society continued although through restricted forms such as unions of workers, artificially 
constructed forms such as pioneer unions, or informal gatherings and meetings. But most 
important, social capital was preserved in the form of community norms, customs, and traditions. 
In the early post-Soviet times and throughout the 1990s there was a boom in number of 
new NGOs, associations, and unions. The northwestern region had the most rapid growth in the 
number of civil society organizations and at present, according to different experts, it has more 
advanced and vibrant civil society than any other region with almost every third northwesterner 
being a member of an association. This can be explained by the legacy of old networks and 
societal peculiarities of the northwestern region such as ethno-cultural homogeneity, high degree 
of social cohesion and shared culture and history that determine the structure of current and new 
connections among northwestern regional actors.  
Dense connections between the northwestern actors and the European actors are also 
explained by the fact that the northwestern region has common ethno-cultural past with the 
Northern European countries in terms common identity shared by Scandinavian, Baltic, Slavic, 
and Finnic people. Even though Finnic people have a Uralic ethnic origin and language, they 
migrated to the European part of the continent from the East long time ago; therefore, they share 
common history with the Balto-Slavs and the Nordic peoples. The northwestern republic of 
Karelia, where some part of the population is of Karelian (Finnic sub-ethnicity), Baltic, Finnic, 
Norwegian and Swedish origin, is an important cultural bridge between the northwestern Russia 
and Northern Europe. 
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Karelian society is very integrated and clavicized; however, there is a multitude of 
historical and cultural associations and organizations aimed at the preservation and development 
of Finno-Ugric cultural heritage and languages. Unlike in the southern region, where ethno-
cultural organizations are concerned with a particular ethnic group and do not collaborate with 
other organizations, in Karelia, ethno-cultural organizations effectively cooperate with other civil 
society actors in the Republic and in general in the northwestern region. For instance, Trias 
youth organization conducts active work in the field of implementation of ethno-cultural and 
ethno-social rights of the Karelian people. Lyydiläine organization issues specialized newspaper 
in Lyddik dialect of Karelian language. Both organizations closely cooperate with private-sector 
organizations, Petrozadodsk state university, St Petersburg Times Agency, North-West 
Association, human rights NGOs, and provincial authorities. One of the important outcomes of 
this collaboration has been the restoration of the public center and the creation of a local museum 
and a cultural forum in the village of Tunguda of Byelomorsk. 
The Northwestern’s civil society sector receives much bigger number of donations from 
commercial organizations, municipal and regional budgets and from foreign organizations than 
civil society sector in any other region. Additionally, various events with participation of 
regional business actors, NGOs, and public officials such as open public forums, regional 
conferences and public events are quite common in the northwestern region. Different experts 
speak about the existence of a developed public-private-civic partnership in the region. 
One of the main problems of the Russian modern social sector is the lack of public trust 
in civil society institutions. However, this is not the case in the northwestern region, as in the 
northwestern region civil society organizations seem to be recognized as important actors of 
social life and mediating mechanisms between society, business and public officials. Different 
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respondents speak about high degree of trust, reciprocity and cooperation in the northwestern 
region. Norms of trust are generated by developed social networks and organizations and 
improve the efficiency of governance in the region by coordinated actions. Additionally, 
according to various regional experts, interorganizational networking in the northwestern region 
provides a check on public and private actors through several mechanisms, including legal 
protection, monitoring, anti-corruption and accountability programs and programs increasing 
responsiveness of regional officials to regional and local needs, mobilizing support for collective 
action and advocacy campaigns, and promoting civic education and responsible citizenry.  
At the same time, the northwestern region remains one of the most economically 
developed regions (despite the lack of oil and gas activity that forms the basis of modern Russian 
economy) with the highest standards of living and the most equal income distribution. It is 
argued that the success of the northwestern region is rooted in its history as a democratic polity 
and a flourishing center of trade and culture, with high level of social cohesiveness and active 
civic infrastructure. Various experts claim that the northwestern region has the highest level of 
social capital in the country, which facilitates economic and social relationships in the region and 
plays major role in the economic performance of the region and efficiency of the northwestern 
political institutions. 
According to different experts, northweterners are well aware of the fact that Russia 
started from the northwestern region, Novgorod-the-Great, economically and culturally 
flourishing democratic entity with advanced literacy and developed social infrastructure. And 
this awareness has a very symbolic meaning for the northwestern people that holds the region 
together and conditions its civic vibrancy and cohesiveness, and is also reflected in the patterns 
of governance.    
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Therefore, the form and the functioning of the regional cooperation and energy networks 
may be explained by the ethno-cultural context in which they emerge and operate. Thus in the 
multiethnic, multireligious and highly segmented southern region with its patriarchal culture, 
clan-based politics, ethnic tensions, underdeveloped civil society and rampant corruption, 
democratic concerns hardly play any role in the regional decision-making processes and regional 
cooperation with the EU is controlled by regional bureaucrats, and therefore, is very segmented 
and vertically differentiated, while networks between energy actors and public officials are dense 
and centralized.  
At the same time in a stable, socially cohesive, more ethno-culturally homogeneous, yet 
pluralistic northwestern region, democratic concerns play much bigger role in governance 
processes and governance networks are promoted as a means of enhancing efficient and 
participatory governance. Therefore, the northwestern regional cooperation network is horizontal, 
dense, cohesive, and decentralized offering the prospect for the development of democratic 
network governance, while the network between public officials and energy actors is sparse, 
decentralized and ineffective in terms of its influence on the regional decision-making processes.  
 
C. HISTORICAL PATH-DEPENDENCE 
Different regional experts argue that historical path-dependence is an important factor 
that predetermines, shapes and influences regional cooperation and energy structures. According 
to regional historians and culturologists, due to the fact that Russia is not a homogeneous state as 
it incorporated different lands and peoples in the south and in the east all the way to the Pacific 
Ocean in the course of the expansion of the Russian Empire, the subconscious identity of the 
modern Russian culture balances among these vast differences and a collapse of the system or a 
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crisis usually activates historically preceding structures. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
activated such structures. Southern region became turbulent with former ethnic tensions and 
governance problems (Chechnya as the most vivid example), while the northwestern region 
quickly turned back to its European past. Central region governed by Moscow followed its 
historical centralization patterns, and Siberia and the Far East remained karmically neutral and 
contemplating in their Buddhist and Shamanist tradition. Regional experts claim that historical 
legacy is extremely important in explaining regional differences and the differences in the form 
and functioning of the regional governance structures. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, despite the lack of oil and gas resources that were 
the major attraction for foreign investment, the northwestern region attracted a large amount of 
foreign investment and had a dramatic economic and political success. According to different 
regional experts, northwestern provincial governments have been reliable in delivering public 
services, cooperated extensively with private and civil society actors and responded quickly to 
northwestern residents’ needs and demands.  
One of the main reasons why the northwestern regional elites have been successful is 
because they managed to formulate reform as a revival of the norms and values of democratic 
and prosperous Novgorod Republic, which created an important bridge and an orienteer in the 
post-Soviet vacuum, appealed to the norms and identity of the northwestern community, helped 
to gain public support for reforms, and generated trust and confidence in public authorities. For 
instance, in the northwestern region, official rhetoric has been centered on the fact that in the 
medieval times the Republic gained its prosperity because of trade, democratic governance, and 
cooperation with European partners, and the idea that the same is very relevant for the present-
day northwestern region. Therefore, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union the region 
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engaged in expanding trade, attracting foreign investment, strengthening local self-government 
and public-private-civic cooperation, and concluding multiple cooperation projects, initiatives, 
and partnerships with European actors.  
Regional experts claim that according to the federal local self-government act of 1995, all 
subjects of the Russian Federation are divided into ‘raioni’, smaller units, equivalent to districts. 
Due to historical reasons there is a broad spectrum of different local administrations or councils, 
such as village councils, below the town and district administration level. Among all the Russian 
regions, the northwestern republic of Karelia is considered to be a forerunner in developing local 
self-government, and then follow the other northwestern provinces. According to different 
regional experts, effective local self-government increased administrative efficiency and raised 
the level of democracy in the northwestern region. 
Northwestern public officials have been using the cultural image of the democratic 
Novgorod Republic extensively. For instance, the governor of Novgorod province (which used to 
occupy all the lands of the northwestern region and now is only part of it), Mikhail Prusak’s 
strategy was to stimulate the use of cultural symbols that were important during Novgorod’s 
medieval history. For instance, a popular progressive newspaper Veche, named after the 
medieval Republic’s assembly, was launched in the province. Regional media have also been 
involved in supporting Novgorodian cultural continuity by fostering public awareness of the 
region’s prosperous and democratic past and historical conflict with Moscow. Ironically, by 
using its symbolic opposition to Moscow, the northwestern region was quickly united both in 
terms of regional elites and broader public and was quite successful in the early post-Soviet 
period, when the rest of the country was in economic shock and political chaos. 
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Respondents mention that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some regions acquired 
special treatment in respect to having an opportunity to engage in international trade, attract 
foreign investment, make contacts with foreign actors and engage in international and regional 
cooperation, which was laid down in bilateral agreements between the government and regional 
administrations. All the provinces at the Nordic border have such agreements in force. The 
Kaliningrad agreement, signed in 1996, forms the basis for an economic free zone with the 
European Union. The majority of the southern provinces, especially the southern republics (e.g. 
Kalmylia, Adygeya) also have such arrangements that allow them to engage in cooperation 
projects, programs, and initiatives with foreign partners as the southern region has a status of the 
‘border region’.  
While after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the northwestern region rushed to 
implement economic and administrative reforms and engage in intense cooperation with 
different European actors, the southern region was more preoccupied with internal ethnic 
rivalries and struggle for power and in a few years control and power over the regional political 
and economic affairs was divided between the elites of a few most powerful clans. 
In the northwestern region, right after the fall of the Soviet system, big North-West 
Association was founded by the representatives of executive and legislative authorities of the 
northwestern provinces. The main goal of the Association is to promote effective interaction 
among the northwestern provinces and create conditions for interregional integration and social 
and economic development. The objectives defined by the Association concern such areas as 
industry, agriculture, transport, energy, social sector and other. The Association’s representatives 
specify them as follows: development and implementation of regional programs and projects 
with foreign and domestic capital participation (especially regional cooperation with the EU and 
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Nordic countries), coordination of activities in the northwestern region; creation of the necessary 
conditions for foreign investors with regard to the interests of the Association’s members; labor 
market research; personnel training, accommodation of the population coming from other 
regions of the country, and the establishment of mutually beneficial economic relations with 
other regions, republics and districts.50 The Association includes representatives from the regions 
and countries neighboring the northwestern region. It has been extremely active in connecting 
Russian northwestern social, economic, public, education and mass media actors with European 
actors and helped to establish all sorts of cooperation projects and partnerships. The Association 
also played an important role in the major interregional cooperation partnerships, such as Euro-
Russia development program aimed at improving the investment conditions and networking of 
companies across the border between Russia, Finland and Sweden as private-public cooperation 
through investment projects. 
Many other large-scale initiatives were launched by the northwestern authorities and 
social and private actors. For instance, PRIOR North-West is a northwestern regional initiative 
aimed at the facilitation and development of an Information Society in northwestern Russia 
through building a partnership between the participants of the e-development process: 
government, business, civil society, research and education community, donors and investors. 
The initiative is a network of professional contacts and a venue for the exchange of professional 
experience and expertise, and dissemination of information in ICT sphere.51  
                                                 
50 For more information on the association, see report on the northwestern Russia, available at 
http://www.stockholmregion.org/website1/1.0.1.0/479/Northwest%20Russia%20Facts%20and%20Events%20w%2
06%202008.pdf 
51 For more information on the PRIOR North-West initiative, see 
 http://www.isca-speech.org/archive/specom_04/spc4_603.pdf 
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PRIOR North-West is closely linked to the EU Programs of e-Development targeted at 
northwestern Russia: ‘E-Karelia’, ‘E-Skills for Russian SMEs’, ‘New Information Society 
Indicators for Russia’, ‘Development of Internet Based Interactive Government-to-Business 
Services in the North-West of Russia’. PRIOR North-West also took active part in the formation 
of an international consortium of St. Petersburg and Finnish companies and organizations 
interested in cooperation. The consortium was formed in the framework of the Northern 
Dimension ICT Development Network.  
Therefore, when the EU came up with the Northern Dimension policy in 1998, there had 
already existed a developed network of numerous partnerships, projects, and initiatives between 
the Russian northwestern and European actors. Thus, according to respondents, the Northern 
Dimension was not an innovative policy initiative; it rather aimed at strengthening already 
existing processes and providing more resources for already established cooperation.  
Intense integration of the northwestern region with European regions and countries can 
be explained by historical path-dependence. According to various regional experts, common 
history and geographic closeness to Nordic and other European states predetermined the 
openness of the northwestern region to European influences and made it seek partnerships and 
cooperation initiatives with European actors. Both European and northwestern actors have been 
very proactive in concluding alliances and carrying out different projects with each other.   
 According to Andrey Bogdanov, the leader of the Democratic Party of Russia (that 
proposed a Russian referendum for joining the EU), and candidate for the 2008 presidential 
elections, the northwestern region did not have any other option, but to choose its historical 
European trajectory. He calls it “historical Nordic democratic gravity of the region”.  
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As far as the southern region is concerned, the networks between southern and European 
actors have always been very sparse, segmented and underdeveloped. Historically, the southern 
region did not have a lot of interconnections with European states for a number of reasons 
extensively discussed in the third chapter of this dissertation. In comparison with the 
northwestern region that originated from the democratic Novgorod Republic, was influenced by 
its Nordic neighbors and for a long period of time was well integrated in European inter-regional 
and international structures, the southern region was initially shaped by a multitude of different 
ethnic constituents and has been influenced by different civilizations, cultures and administrative 
systems. Thus this historical legacy factor is important in interpreting the current regional 
cooperation and energy structures.  
With the EU’s expansion to the east and to the south, to the Black Sea, the southern 
region became more engaged in EU-related initiatives, however, the level of networking and 
collaboration still leaves much to be desired. The EU’s Black Sea Synergy initiative is an 
important resource that brought new opportunities to both the EU and southern actors; however, 
according to the regional experts, sub-national integration is more a bottom-up process than a 
top-down policy and there should be motivation and interest on both sides for it to function 
properly and to be used effectively. So far, the EU actors have been quite cautious and modest in 
establishing partnerships with southern actors. At the same time, southern actors (in general) 
have not been very active in pursuing closer relations with the EU actors either.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe-oriented northwestern region took its 
historical past as an orienteer for economic and administrative reforms, developed 
interorganizational networking, and established close connections and partnerships with its 
European neighbors, which resulted in vibrant regional cooperation networks, and the southern 
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region with its complex ethnic and social structure was preoccupied with its internal problems 
and instead of conducting the needed reforms and engaging in the regional cooperation with 
European actors, relied on its vast energy resources and engaged in power struggle over control 
over the regional energy sector, which resulted in dense and developed energy networks, but 
segmented and underdeveloped regional cooperation networks.  It is also important to note that 
because of the common history, European actors have been more eager to engage in intense 
cooperation with the Russian northwestern actors than with the southern ones.  
 
D. GEOPOLITICAL FACTOR 
According to different respondents, geopolitical location of the region has important 
implications for its development and is a significant factor in explaining differences in the shape 
and functioning of regional governance structures. The northwestern region is located in the 
northwestern Russia and shares common neighborhood with Finland, Sweden, Norway, and 
Baltic Countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) to the north and Poland, Byelorussia, Germany 
and Denmark to the west. Therefore, the region’s foreign policy is oriented towards Europe, and 
European actors are the main foreign actors involved in the internal affairs of the region.  
At the same time, the southern region’s neighborhood is represented by a variety of 
different actors: South Caucasus Georgia and Azerbaijan, Central Asian Kazakhstan, European 
Ukraine, Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria, and Turkey and Iran. The main Eurasian transportation 
lines go through the southern region to Turkey and Iran. All actors enumerated above are 
interested in the southern region, as it is the center of the major inter-regional and international 
transportation systems, is very rich in resources, and at the same time occupies a strategic 
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position in respect to the transfer of the Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas to Europe. Figure 
38 displays geopolitical location of the region in respect to Caspian and Central Asian energy. 
 
 
 
 Figure 38: Russian southern region: geopolitics of energy routes  
It is also important to mention that due to the region’s geostrategic location, besides 
countries that share common neighborhood with it, other important international actors have 
their vested interests in the southern region: all the European countries that receive oil and gas 
through the Russian southern routes, and also the US that is heavily involved in the geopolitics 
of Caspian and Central Asian energy. Therefore, the southern region is being influenced by a 
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very heterogeneous group of actors and is at the very center of all sorts of geopolitical games and 
rivalries based on the energy issue. For instance, according to southern respondents, recent war 
between Russia and Georgia is well connected with the geopolitics of energy routes in the region 
as the EU and US are pursuing alternative transportation lines that would go through Georgia, 
which (according to respondents) was used by Georgia as a leverage to solve its territorial 
problems. Representatives of the Transneft Energy Company operating in the southern region 
believe that the EU and the US were partially involved in the conflict as they are extremely 
interested in the restoration of the Georgian territorial integrity as Abkhazia, one of the Georgian 
break-away provinces, is a convenient location for the possible energy transportation lines. 
According to different respondents, Southern and Eastern European states are becoming 
more interested in the southern region because of the new energy routes such as South Stream, 
which will bring energy from the southern region to Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and also Austria 
and other EU countries. By 2015 the southern region is supposed to be involved in exporting 
about 130 million tons of oil via the new Black Sea-Caspian infrastructure (compared to 70 
million tons via Nord Stream that will bring Russian energy directly to Germany). 
According to different regional experts, an important factor in explaining the differences 
in the regional cooperation structures is the EU’s motivation. They argue that while in the 
northwestern region the main driving force of the regional cooperation with the EU is genuine 
interest of European countries, institutions, and actors in the regional integration with the 
northwestern region and economic, democratic and social development of the region due to 
common history and culture, in the southern region the main force that drives the EU institutions 
and countries closer to the southern region and the main motivation behind the Black Sea 
Synergy regional cooperation is energy (both resources of the region and its transportation 
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capacity and facilities), though on paper regional cooperation in the Black Sea area is all about 
democracy building. Respondents mention that despite the fact that the main declared goals of 
both the EU Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy are fostering democratization and 
improving governance in the Russian northwestern and the Black Sea regions, in the 
northwestern region there are much more cooperation initiatives and programs between different 
regional actors that result in vibrant interorganizational networking, promote and support 
democratization and strengthen good governance. This can be explained by the fact that in the 
northwestern region, regional cooperation is based on the natural regional processes rooted in the 
common past and every initiative involves a multitude of different regional actors at different 
levels, while in the southern region, it is a more recent and more an EU sponsored and designed 
initiative, access to which is quite restricted due to the regional specifics. Regional experts argue 
that in the northwestern region, the majority of cooperation projects are between the 
northwestern region and the neighboring countries and the regions of the neighboring countries, 
and the EU- assistance programs are a complementary resource, but not the main one; at the 
same time, in the southern region the majority of cooperation projects are sponsored by the EU. 
To check if this has any connection to reality, I conducted an analysis aimed at 
calculating the percentage of initiatives/programs/projects in the northwestern and the southern 
regions that originated from non-Russian actors (Russian actors and authorities co-sponsor 
regional cooperation programs, especially in the northwestern region) from 1999 to 2006. Table 
29 displays the results of the analysis.  
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Table 29: Non-Russian initiators of cooperation projects 
 
Actors/ Northern Dimension Projects 1999-2006 
EU Commission 10% 
Regional organizations 13% 
Finland 23% 
Sweden 10% 
Baltic Countries 17% 
Germany 15% 
Denmark 5% 
Other  7% 
Actors/ Black Sea Synergy Projects 1999-2006 
EU Commission 69% 
Regional organizations 3% 
Greece 9% 
Bulgaria 7% 
Romania 4% 
Other 8% 
 
As the results of the analysis indicate, the majority of non-Russian initiators of 
cooperation projects in the northwestern region have been actors coming from the neighboring 
countries. Actors from Finland, Sweden, Germany and Baltic countries have been the most 
important actors in the northwestern regional cooperation processes. EU assistance programs 
account for only 10% of all the projects indicating that besides programs designed and sponsored 
by the EU, there is a very active collaboration among the regional actors in the northwestern 
region. 
At the same time, in the southern region, the EU programs account for the majority of 
cooperation initiatives. Besides the EU institutions, the main actors in the regional cooperation in 
the southern region are actors coming from Greece, Bulgaria and Romania; however, compared 
to the shares of projects launched by actors coming from the EU member-states in the 
northwestern region, it is clear that Greek, Bulgarian and Romanian actors are not as proactive as 
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they could be. However, given the fact that Greece is further away from the southern region than 
Bulgaria and Romania, its involvement is rather significant. Respondents explain it by the fact 
that Greece conducts many archeological and cultural projects in Krasnodar and Rostov 
provinces, where its northern ancient cities were located during classical times, and where 
significant Greek Diaspora is currently located. As far as Bulgaria and Romania are concerned, 
regional experts believe that being new countries in the EU, they are currently more concerned 
with their internal developments and cooperate with Russia more at the national level rather than 
at the regional level. 
Additionally, several regional experts mentioned the fact that in the Northern Dimension, 
all the countries involved in the regional cooperation with the northwestern region are either 
democratic and most developed EU northern countries or also democratic and developed non-EU 
Norway and Island. At the same time, regional cooperation in the Black Sea area (besides 
Russian southern region and the EU’s Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria) involves a variety of 
countries that are still countries-in-transition and are not very advanced in terms of democracy – 
Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. According to respondents, this also 
explains the differences in the regional integration patterns and the differences in the effects of 
regional cooperation on democratic governance between the northwestern and the southern 
regions.  By interacting with the northern European countries that are more advanced both in 
terms of democracy and economy, the northwestern region follows a certain policy-learning 
model. At the same time, the southern region is interacting with diverse actors and the effects of 
the interaction with the EU are not as strong as in the northwestern region, as they are mitigated 
by influences coming from other actors that are not much more democratic and economically 
developed than the Russian southern actors.  
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It is also important to note that the share of cooperation projects launched by the regional 
organizations in the northwestern region is higher than in the southern region. Even if we take a 
look at the number and the variety of various regional organizations in the northwestern region 
and compare them to the southern region, it becomes clear that the northwestern region has much 
more developed regional collaboration structures. Table 30 reports regional organizations in the 
North-West and the Black Sea area.  
 
Table 30: Regional organizations 
 
Regional organizations/northwest Regional organizations/south 
Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS)  Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) 
Barents Euro Arctic Council (BEAC) Black Sea Forum for Partnership and 
Dialogue (BSF) (Russia is not a member ) 
Arctic Council (AC)  Community for Democratic Choice (Russia 
is not a member) 
Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM)  
Nordic Environment Finance Corporation 
(NEFCO)  
 
Nordic Investment Bank   
Nordic Project Fund (NOPEF)   
 
It is important to note that Russia is not a member of the Black Sea Forum for Partnership 
and Dialogue and Community for Democratic Choice. Although Russia is an indispensable actor 
in the Black Sea area, these organizations are mainly focused on the Caucasus countries (Georgia 
in particular) and Ukraine. Russia is frequently not included/invited in EU’s initiatives in the 
Black Sea area. In some intergovernmental partnerships it is Russia’s choice not to participate– 
like in the Environmental Collaboration for the Black Sea, initially designed for Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine. Southern respondents claim that cooperation in the Black Sea area is very 
politicized and in many cases the EU’s approach is ‘divide and conquer’, which does not help to 
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improve relations between the Black Sea states and hinders the development of democratic 
governance in the Black Sea region. 
It is also important to mention that the active members of both the Northern Dimension 
and the Black Sea Synergy are different international financial institutions such as the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB).  
The Northern Dimension, besides its advanced networking and developed regional 
structures has also developed a very interesting phenomenon- Euroregions -areas of enhanced 
political, administrative, and economic cooperation between certain regions of neighboring 
countries. According to respondents, the Euroregions in the Northern Dimension also play an 
important role in enhancing the flow of information and connectedness among stakeholders in 
different regions. At present, there are nine such Euroregions between North-West Russia and 
the regions of the neighboring European countries, which often overlap (the figure displaying all 
the existing EU-Russia Euroregions can be found in Chapter II of this dissertation).  
According to regional experts, Russian regions involved in the Euroregions benefit 
immensely in terms of fast development of trade and attraction of foreign investment, 
development of common transportation systems that foster economic development, and 
facilitated social cross-border exchanges.   
Besides pure material rewards, regional experts mentioned socialization factor as Russian 
actors get socialized into the liberal democratic norms of the EU in the process of their 
interactions with European actors. Such interorganizational networking in many instances leads 
to the acquisition of European administrative and business culture by the Russian northwestern 
actors.  
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As far as the EU side is concerned, it benefits from a more effective use of funds, because 
the EU programs are better coordinated at the regional and local level through Euroregions. 
Additionally, the EU benefits from obtaining desired outcomes from the regional projects and 
programs, as effective coordination of programs increases their efficiency. According to 
respondents, the main goals of the EU in respect to regional cooperation in the northwestern 
region are creating stability and democratic, economic and social development along its borders. 
Several respondents mentioned that the administrative organization of the Euroregions, 
that is usually represented by an Executive Committee that includes a variety of representatives 
both from the Russian side (regional and local) and the neighboring region of the EU member 
state, has been very efficient in distributing the EU INTERREG and TACIS funds among the 
regional actors and linking various European and Russian local actors by cross-border initiatives. 
In addition, according to respondents, the Euroregion’s Committees have been extremely 
successful in attracting private sector investment to various regional development projects. 
Among the concrete results of such intense cross-border cooperation, regional 
cooperation specialists mentioned a facilitated visa regime, a developed network of Tourism 
Information Centers and increased people-to-people contacts and exchanges across the borders, a 
dense network of modern border-crossing points, common transportation systems, dense and 
developed network of NGOs, developed local self-government, organization of special councils 
where local and regional residents can discuss important local and regional issues with the 
representatives of the Euroregions’ Executive Committees, an established calendar of common 
regional cultural, social, sport, and economic events, and increased flows of trade and investment 
across the borders. According to respondents, only within the framework of the Euroregion 
‘Baltic’, more than 1000 Polish-Swedish-Dutch-Lithuanian-Russian programs, projects, and 
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initiatives have been implemented for the last five years, in which at least 70 thousand people 
from both sides of the border have taken part. 
Euroregions also help to attract innovative production facilities to the Russian 
northwestern region and develop a variety of businesses in the service sector thereby developing 
and diversifying economy of the northwestern region. Hundreds of joint ventures with the 
Finnish, Baltic, Swedish, Polish (and other neighboring European countries’) capital are created 
and effectively work in the Russian northwestern region providing work for a great number of 
northwestern residents and generating considerable revenues, and the volume of capital 
investments in separate projects increases every year.  
Of course, it is not that everything is perfect along the northwestern border, all the 
problems are solved and there are no predicaments for further cooperation, but Euroregions’ 
Committees constituted by both Russian and European regional and local representatives who 
are well aware of the regional context, create an important administrative venue for discussing 
and addressing emerging regional problems and serve as an effective problem-solving 
mechanism. For instance, Euroregion Karelia has been very effective in solving environmental 
problems of the timber sector in the northwestern region by improving utilization of forest 
management and developing a set of regulations concerning protection of forest resources. 
Additionally, for quite a while Karelia was supplying neighboring Finland with raw timber and 
Karelians often complained of being some sort of raw-material appendix to Finland in the timber 
industry. The establishment of Euroregion Karelia in 2000 helped to address this problem and 
attract investment to setting up reprocessing and production enterprises in the Republic of 
Karelia thereby maximizing cost-effectiveness of Karelian exports. 
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The northwestern territories of the Russian Federation have always been part of Northern 
Europe and the processes of the EU enlargement and European integration have quickly made 
them come into immediate contact with the EU. According to respondents, Euroregions have 
been very effective mechanisms in preventing the creation of new dividing lines in Northern 
Europe by establishing intense cross border cooperation between the enlarged EU and the 
northwestern region of Russia. Euroregions have been extremely helpful for both Russian and 
European actors in developing networking, facilitating contacts and promoting trust and common 
identity across the borders.  
The analysis shows that it is important to take into account the geopolitical factor when 
interpreting differences in the regional cooperation structures. It also indicates that regional 
cooperation is not a one-sided process and it is critical that all the parties involved are highly and 
genuinely motivated to develop regional cooperation so that it becomes successful.  
According to respondents, the geographic location factor conditioned the European 
actors’ genuine interest in the development of the northwestern region, which contributed to a 
great extent to the democratic and economic success of the region. For instance, Karelian case is 
a good example of such interest. Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Karelia and other 
northwestern provinces became the most open and democratic sub-national entities of Russia. 
While leaders in many other republics were monopolizing power and struggling with capturing 
full control over resources, Karelia quickly developed a local party system, implemented local 
self-government reforms, and put much effort in the development of civil society.  
According to different experts, such fast advancement of democracy in Karelia can be 
explained by extensive help with the design, financial support and implementation of the 
necessary political, social and economic reforms that the Republic received from Finland, its 
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neighbor.  In addition, it is argued that extensive exposure to the EU and intensified interaction 
among the EU and Karelian actors account for the peculiarity of Karelia’s democratic and 
economic development. European actors, Finland and other Nordic states in particular, sponsored 
many reform initiatives in the republic. 
The northwestern region has become a constant beneficiary of hundreds of projects and 
initiatives designed by the Baltic Countries, Finland and other Northern European countries and 
sponsored by the EU (under various instruments such as TACIS and INTERREG or EU’s 
instruments for cross-border cooperation), or Nordic countries themselves. Hundreds of 
initiatives are designed and sponsored by the Northern European regional organizations, Russian 
northwestern regional and local organizations, Russian regional and provincial authorities, and 
Russian and European private sector actors; national, regional, and municipal governments and 
NGOs of different European states; and various European intergovernmental organizations. 
According to different regional experts, the rapprochement of the northwestern region and 
Northern Europe was inevitable due to the geopolitical factor.  
Several regional experts argue that the strategies of the northwestern local and regional 
authorities (discussed in the historical path-dependence section), the region’s openness to 
cooperation, and the developmental commitments of the Nordic countries conditioned by the 
region’s geopolitical location were key to the success of the northwestern region in obtaining 
external funding and all kinds of support from European actors (consultations, information, etc.).  
The geopolitical factor also conditioned the existence of the openness of the broader 
society. For instance, even during the Soviet times there were social interactions between 
Karelian residents and the residents of Finland, and Finnish was taught at Karelian and other 
northwestern schools and universities. Interaction between the northwestern region and Finland 
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and other Nordic neighbors has increased dramatically after the collapse of the Soviet system. At 
present, almost every northwesterner has some interaction with the Nordic neighbors through 
tourism, business initiatives, educational or social exchanges, or civil society projects.  Finnish, 
Swedish, Norwegian and Baltic languages and culture, language, history, and economic courses 
focused on Northern Europe are now widely taught at schools and universities in the 
northwestern region. The northwestern region was also the first one in Russia to open European 
Studies Centers (usually with a special focus on the Nordic states) in universities. 
According to the northwestern public officials, Nordic countries have been very active at 
the EU level in respect to the Russian northwestern region. It seems like at present, the southern 
region lacks actors (countries or regions of countries) particularly interested in the development 
of regional cooperation, and this can be explained by the factors discussed above.  
Therefore, the difference between the developed regional cooperation and 
underdeveloped energy structures in the northwestern region and the underdeveloped regional 
cooperation and developed energy structures in the southern region can be explained by the 
geopolitical factor: due to the geopolitical location of the regions, the importance of the southern 
region for Europe is mainly constituted by its energy capabilities both in terms of resources and 
energy transits, while the northwestern region is largely perceived as an area of historical, 
political, cultural, and economic integration.          
 
 
E. ECONOMIC FACTOR 
The Northwestern region is generally regarded as one of the most dynamic parts of 
Russia. It is ranked first among the seven federal districts in terms of real gross regional product 
growth and (as mentioned previously) has the most equal income distribution. Unemployment 
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rate in the northwestern region is much lower than the Russia’s average. The Expert Magazine 
has been rating the investment attractiveness of the Russian regions over several years by 
developing a set of regional investment components, including legislative, political, economic, 
financial, social, criminal and ecological risks. The northwestern provinces stand out for their 
low investment risk. During the last decade, the northwestern region has attracted more foreign 
investment than any other region of Russia despite the absence of oil and gas resources, while in 
Russia, energy sector is generally most attractive for foreign investors.  
According to different respondents, the level of civic activism and private 
entrepreneurship in the northwestern region is even higher than that of some regions of Western 
Europe. When looking at the industrial production growth, which grew twice as fast in the 
northwestern region (13.4 percent) compared to Russia as a whole (6.1 percent) in 2004 
(Denisova and Svedberg, 2005), a similar picture of the advancement of the northwestern region, 
compared to other Russian regions, is seen. This success is surprising as Russian economy is to a 
large extent dependent on the export of primary commodities, oil and gas in particular. Regions 
rich in oil and gas together with Moscow, the main economic, financial, and commercial center 
of Russia, make up a significant share of the Russian nominal gross domestic product (Denisova 
and Svedberg, 2005). 
According to different regional experts, the success of the northwestern region was 
largely dependent on the progressive mentality of political and economic leaders at local, 
provincial and regional levels who pursued effective economic diversification and made the 
attraction of investment a regional economic strategy. Northwestern favorable foreign 
investment legislation attracts EU companies to different industries. The region’s industrial 
development fostered by foreign multinational companies has generated significant infrastructure 
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growth. Interestingly, Novgorod province was the first one in Russia to adopt a foreign 
investment law. According to respondents, later on, other provinces copied the law after 
Novgorod. Novgorodian investment law has attracted a significant number of large and small 
companies from several countries to the northwestern region. Representatives of foreign firms 
operating in the northwestern region often speak about it as ‘investment heaven’.  
Respondents claim that the northwestern provinces are more supportive of foreign 
business than other provinces of Russia. For instance, Novgorod administration is claimed to be 
particularly investor- friendly as it has cooperated extensively with investors to remove 
administrative obstacles. Novgorod province (an in general, northwestern region) has also the 
lowest level of state capture. As a result, Novgorod province best known for its history, folklore 
and museums, quickly became a developed economic center together with St. Petersburg and 
other northwestern provinces. 
There is a significant variation in industrial structure across the northwestern provinces: 
for instance, Archangelsk and Karelia are typical forest, timber and paper regions whereas St. 
Petersburg and Pskov have strong food and beverage production; Vologda and Murmansk have 
ferrous metal industry (Denisova and Svedberg, 2005). By attracting foreign investment, the 
northwestern region has developed telecommunications, information technologies, and 
machinery industries. Major international companies open their branches and Research and 
Development labs in the northwestern region. Tourism companies flourish in the region; 
according to UNESCO, St. Petersburg and Novgorod, major historical cities of the northwestern 
region, rank among the top 10 cities in the world for ‘tourism appeal’.52 The service sector is 
                                                 
52 For more information, see Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States (BISNIS) report, 
available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps1733/9903nort.htm 
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increasing in the region both in terms of value added and employment. Small and medium-sized 
businesses are also most developed in the northwestern region according to different estimates.  
Therefore, the northwestern region is quickly evolving into a highly developed economic 
and business entity eager to provide favorable conditions for investors and develop science 
intensive fields of economy and production. Of course, it does not mean that all the economic 
problems and predicaments are solved in the northwestern region, but in comparison with the 
other regions of Russia, it is really a success story despite the absence of oil and gas resources. 
According to respondents, in addition to progressive leadership and effective use of cultural and 
historical symbols, the absence of oil and gas recourses was a critical factor in the region’s 
economic success as it enabled regional elites to look for diverse economic mechanisms to 
enhance regional economic development. 
Unlike poor in terms of energy northwestern region, southern region is on the contrary, 
very rich in oil and natural gas resources including Caspian, Azov and the Black Sea coastal 
series of fields. All the southern provinces are endowed with abundant resources. Therefore, the 
major industry in the southern region is oil and gas exploration, production, transportation, and 
trade. Southern oil is easily accessible and of high quality; for instance, Adygeya’s ‘white’ oil is 
known all over the world. Southern oil is delivered to many other regions and countries (mainly 
EU countries). It is not only that the region has vast resources of its own, it is also a major transit 
territory for Azerbaijani and Central Asian oil and natural gas, therefore, it has a powerful 
geostrategic position and has an important role in the geopolitics of energy in Eurasia.  
At the same time, the southern region is one of the poorest in Russia. Additionally, the 
southern region has the highest income distribution inequality and the lowest standards of living. 
In addition to various factors explaining this phenomenon, southern experts also claim that the 
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existence of resources is a curse for economic and democratic development of the southern 
region.  With the rise of oil and gas prices at the end of 1990s, southern provincial elites engaged 
in intense power struggle over the vast regional resources and control over major energy 
companies operating in the region and energy transportation routes and facilities such as sea 
terminals and railways.  
Present-day southern elites earn fortunes on energy trade and control of transit routes and 
do not have any incentives for economic diversification and developing alternative investment 
strategies. For instance, Kirsan Illumzhinov, a multi-millionaire and the president of the southern 
Republic of Kalmykia, and people from his clan officially control major provincial oil company, 
Kalmneft, and have millions on their banking accounts, while the majority of the Kalmyk 
population lives in poverty. Ilyumzhinov was elected President of Kalmykia in 1993, and 
immediately eliminated the Kalmyk parliament and changed the Kalmyk Republic’s Constitution 
in order to lengthen his term of office. The new parliament was constituted by people loyal to 
Illumzhinov, mainly from his clan. Therefore, he and his people have been in power for 16 years 
(!). According to respondents, unemployment rate in Kalmykia was over 30% in 2008.  
The situation with economic development and democracy in other southern provinces is 
not much different. For instance, Astrakhan elites are preoccupied with control over vast natural 
resources and exploration and production activities, as big part of the Caspian field is located in 
Astrakhan province and a multitude of energy companies operate there. 
According to various regional experts, present political system in the southern region is 
dominated by the close alliance between regional bureaucrats and energy people.  Regional 
bureaucrats and oligarchs cooperate closely to accumulate wealth, take control over natural 
resources of the region, and exert political authority as a result of the collapse of the formal 
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administrative capacities or intentional restriction of democracy (like in Kalmykia). Communist-
era regional clan elites have used the collapse of the Soviet system to create a new class of 
wealthy businessmen and entrepreneurs closely linked to administrative power and criminal 
groupings. According to respondents, nowadays regional bureaucrats have direct or indirect 
interest in all the energy companies operating in the region and their involvement in the energy 
sector has increased dramatically. Three years ago southern provincial governments altogether 
owned or controlled 20% of the total value of the listed energy stocks in the region. Today, they 
control over 70% of the regional oil and gas sector. A very negative consequence of these 
processes is increasing corruption. The region’s political system is inherently weak, not 
representative and is pursuing its own corrupt interests. Ironically, according to some 
respondents, regional bureaucracy that during the Soviet times was at least somehow controlled 
by the party apparatus has become a self sufficient force in its own right.   
The contrast between the southern and the northwestern region is striking, as if these two 
regions are completely different countries, with different administrative and economic systems, 
culture, social composition, and norms and values. Many respondents attribute it to the existence 
of abundant energy resources in the southern region that gave regional elites an opportunity to 
prosper and completely ignore socio-economic needs of the southern society. Therefore, the 
differences in the composition and the functioning of the regional cooperation and energy 
networks can be explained by the fact that due to the absence of resources, northwestern 
authorities had to look for different economic sources and, therefore, encouraged northwestern 
actors to engage in various economic, investment, and other partnerships with European actors, 
thereby creating dense and decentralized interorganizational networks in the northwestern region, 
while southern bureaucrats were quite self-sufficient with the region’s vast resources which they 
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controlled either directly or through close alliance with the energy elites, and did not have 
incentives to develop diversified regional economic and social infrastructure and encourage 
southern actors to cooperate with foreign actors.       
 
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 The results of the analysis demonstrate that regional cooperation is an effective 
mechanism for the enhancement of democratic governance in the northwestern region and the 
transfer of the EU’s norms into the regions’ internal policies. In the northwestern region, regional 
cooperation contributes to the development of civic connection, which creates reciprocity and 
trust in the society, and encourages community engagement by disseminating information, 
connecting citizens, and enabling direct participation of people and their organizations in 
provincial and regional decision-making processes. Due to the specifics of the region, sub-
national regionalism in the southern region is much less effective than in the northwestern 
region; however, regional cooperation with the EU still proved very important in creating links 
among different regional and local actors. Strong alliance between public sector actors and 
energy sector actors in the southern region proved to have a negative effect on the regional 
integration and the development of democratic governance by encouraging corruption, nepotism, 
clientelism, complacency in policy-making and creating incentives for rent-seeking. 
The analysis indicates that it is critical to consider social structures, culture and traditions 
to understand the differences in the functioning and the structure of interorganizaitonal links 
among the actors engaged in the EU-Russia regional cooperation, and between energy 
companies and provincial governments. The analysis demonstrates that to a large extent, 
substantial regional discrepancies, which widened after the collapse of the Soviet Union, account 
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for the differences in the regional cooperation and energy structures; therefore, these differences 
can be traced back to a very distant past. 
Historically, the northwestern region of Russia has been a much more ethno-culturally 
cohesive and democratic entity than the southern region. Additionally, it served as an important 
link to Europe and the West. Likewise, Europe (especially Northern Europe) has always played a 
significant role in the political, administrative and economic development of the northwestern 
Russia due to the common historical and cultural past. Many centuries have passed, but the 
tradition is still alive due to historical path-dependence. At the same time, the southern region, 
which was incorporated into Russia in the course of the expansion of the Russian Empire, has 
historically been populated by a multitude of peoples with different ethnic, cultural, linguistic, 
and religious backgrounds and has been significantly influenced by several non-European 
administrative, cultural and economic systems. Additionally, the southern region has preserved 
to a large extent the traditional clan societal structure and evolved more autocratic governance 
patterns based on the leadership of clan elites. 
Four main factors contributed to the socio- economic and political success of the 
northwestern region and the failure of the southern region to develop democratic governance 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These factors also explain the differences in the 
interorganizational regional cooperation and energy structures discussed in Chapter IV. First, 
cohesiveness of the northwestern region and, respectively, high segmentation and clan-based 
politics of the southern region. Second, historical path-dependency in terms of the northwestern 
region being a consolidated democratic entity in the past,  while the southern region being a 
conglomerate of different peoples with predominantly autocratic forms of governance based on 
clan hierarchy and clan leadership. Third, geopolitical location of the regions in respect to the 
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outside influences and interested actors, with the northwestern region located in a European 
environment with European actors genuinely interested in its development, while the southern 
region located in a very culturally and economically diverse area with the neighbors mainly 
interested in its natural resources and its geostrategic location of being a key point for the 
transfer of Caspian and (increasingly) Central Asian energy. And fourth, the existence of oil and 
gas resources, which stifled democracy in the southern region by creating opportunities for rent-
seeking and encouraging complacency in policy-making, while in the northern region the 
absence of resources created incentives for economic diversification and establishing intense 
networking with European actors and enabled the necessary democratic administrative reforms.       
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VI. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU-
RUSSIA SUB-NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN 
THE RUSSIAN REGIONS 
 
 In exploring the puzzle of variation in democratic governance among the subjects of the 
Russian Federation and the relationship between the level of democratic governance in the 
region and the region’s cooperation with the EU, this dissertation sought to address important 
gaps in the literature on European integration and democratization in respect to non-candidate 
countries in Wider Europe, EU external governance, and regionalism. The dissertation also 
assessed the effects of EU-Russia regional cooperation on the regional development in the 
Russian regions involved in cooperation and investigated internal and external factors that 
account for the resistance to or acceptance of democratic norms induced by the regional 
cooperation with the EU.  
The first chapters of the dissertation gave a comprehensive overview of the EU-Russia 
relations and discussed the peculiarities of the intense regional dynamics in the Northern 
Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy in comparison with the strained relations between 
Moscow and Brussels.  
The third chapter outlined existing differences between the subjects of the Russian 
Federation and issues related to the international activity of the Russian regions, and presented 
longitudinal analysis of democratic governance in the Russian provinces. The results indicate 
that the level of democratic governance in the provinces, among other factors, is significantly 
influenced by the intensity of the provinces’ cooperation with the EU (as measured by the 
number of social, economic, cultural, etc. cooperation initiatives between the actors residing in 
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the province and European actors and the number of EU assistance programs in the province). 
Important internal factor negatively affecting democratic governance turned out to be energy (as 
measured by the number of energy companies in the region and region’s dependence on oil and 
gas revenues). The longitudinal analysis outlined important overall tendencies concerning 
democratic governance in the Russian provinces and helped to find statistically significant 
factors that explain variation in democratic governance; however, due to the specifics of the 
method, it was unable to give an in-depth analysis of these factors, for instance, provide 
explanations through which mechanisms cooperation with the EU and energy activity in the 
province affect democratic governance, what structural properties of these variables are and what 
factors condition the properties of these variables.  
Therefore, the fourth chapter was devoted to the in-depth analysis of the factors affecting 
the level of democratic governance in the Russian regions. The fourth chapter presented a 
longitudinal comparative analysis of the two case studies – EU-related regional cooperation and 
energy structures in the Russian northwestern and southern regions that are included in the 
regional dimensions of the EU foreign policy. The northwestern region is considered to be the 
most advanced region of Russia in terms of democratic governance, while the southern region 
shows much lower levels of democratic governance. In order to explain this difference, an in-
depth interorganizational network analysis of the regional cooperation and energy structures was 
conducted in both regions. The network analysis examined structural properties of the regional 
cooperation and energy variables, identified the key actors of the networks, and assessed their 
propensity to influence decision-making processes in the regions. 
The results of the analysis indicate that regional cooperation with the EU plays an 
important role in linking Russian local organizations, NGOs, companies, educational institutions, 
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and provincial governments in both the northwestern and the southern regions. However, due to 
the peculiarities of the regional structures, regional cooperation with the EU has a much stronger 
effect on the development of an interconnected regional infrastructure in the northwestern region. 
The northwestern region, which has higher level of democratic governance, appeared to have 
cohesive, dense and decentralized regional cooperation structures indicating that the regional 
cooperation processes are participatory, open, democratically legitimate and generate high levels 
of social capital in the region. The southern regional cooperation structures, on the contrary, 
happened to be largely fragmented and centralized around public sector actors, implying lower 
levels of cross-cutting ties, therefore, lower levels of social capital, restriction to decision-
making processes for the majority of the actors, and barriers to information diffusion and 
exchange of resources. Northwestern structure showed the prevalence of horizontal modes of 
policy-making, while southern network happened to be vertically differentiated. 
At the same time, due to abundant oil and gas resources and a multitude of energy 
companies operating in the region, the network of energy companies and provincial governments 
turned out to be much denser, more centralized, and vertically differentiated in the southern 
region, with stronger effects on regional decision-making processes indicating higher importance 
of energy issues in the regional affairs in the southern region than in the northwestern one. The 
results of the sub-national level analysis confirmed the overall tendency of the Russian energy 
sector to become more monopolistic and centralized around big energy companies and public 
sector actors. 
The network approach was extremely helpful in the analysis of the regional cooperation 
and energy structures and their effects on governance; however, it was important to understand 
the local factors that shaped these structures and that account for the structural changes over time, 
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as regional cooperation and energy networks emerge and develop in a certain historical, ethno-
cultural, economic, and political context, which conditions their development and to a great 
extent explains the way they function. Regional context also predetermines existing patterns of 
governance. 
Therefore, the fifth chapter explored the regional specifics of the northwestern and the 
southern regions and their effects on the regional patterns of governance, based on the in-depth 
interviews with the Russian NGO representatives, public officials, businessmen, professors, 
social leaders, and energy sector representatives. The analysis indicated that the regional 
cooperation and the energy structures and the patterns of governance in the northwestern and the 
southern regions are to a great extent shaped and influenced by the regional cultural, historical, 
geopolitical, and economic contexts.  
The northwestern region appeared to be historically much more ethno-culturally 
homogeneous and socially cohesive entity than the southern region, with a long-standing 
tradition of more democratic patterns of governance. The southern region, constituted by a 
multitude of different peoples with their distinct culture, traditions, and languages, evolved more 
autocratic forms of governance based on clan hierarchy and clan leadership. The northwestern 
region has always been culturally, historically, politically and economically part of common 
European heritage, which conditions European actors’ interest in its socio-cultural and economic 
development. At the same time, the southern region has experienced a variety of external non-
European influences from Arabic and Turkic to Central Asian. The main factor explaining 
increasing EU’s interest in the region is its resources and the geopolitics of oil and gas in Eurasia.  
The absence of energy resources has been a significant factor in enabling the northwestern 
leaders conduct the necessary administrative and economic reforms, while the southern leaders 
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have been mainly relying on the vast southern resources, which increased corruption and 
encouraged complacency in the regional and local policy-making.  
Therefore, regional historical, ethno-cultural, political, and economic context is 
extremely important in explaining European integration in Wider Europe and regionalism along 
the borders of the European Union. The regional context is also important in explaining the 
strength and intensity of democratization processes. The results of the analysis showed that in 
many ways, the regional cooperation and the energy structures in the northwestern and the 
southern regions reflect broader regional governance and societal structures.  Therefore, it is 
possible to conclude that in the regions where democratic concerns hardly play any role and 
where democratic culture has never been part of historical development, EU-induced 
democratization processes will be slower and less efficient. On the contrary, in regions where 
even sometime in history democratic concerns were part of society’s values and norms and 
where democratic concerns play at least some role in existing governance patterns, EU-induced 
democratization processes will be effective and regional cooperation networks will contribute to 
the efficient and participatory governance. At the same time, it is important to note that European 
integration in Wider Europe will occur most efficiently in the areas that share common 
geopolitical, ethno-cultural, and historical European heritage.  
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VII. CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
 
 
A. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EU STUDIES 
 
This research demonstrates that cooperation networks between the EU and the regions of 
the neighboring countries under certain conditions can serve as effective instruments for 
democratization and actor-based mechanisms for the indirect transfer of EU norms into regions’ 
internal policies, build support for democracy among local and regional actors, and improve 
governance in the neighboring countries at the sub-national level, even when national-level 
conditions are not favorable for the EU influences. This dissertation emphasized the need to 
integrate the transnational and sub-national levels of analysis when theorizing the effectiveness 
of EU external influences. It also suggested that the analysis should take into account local 
factors that affect the EU-related regional processes and predetermine the outcomes of 
democratization efforts.  
Theoretically, it responded to a weakness in the literature on EU external relations which 
has mainly been focused on EU’s capacity to export its norms and standards beyond its borders 
at the national level within different legal frameworks, such as Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements, Stabilization and Association Agreements, or European Neighborhood Policy and 
has given very little attention to the actual integration processes occurring at the sub-national 
level induced by increased interaction between local and regional actors operating in the EU 
member-states and regional and local actors of the neighboring countries. 
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This dissertation suggested specific structural model that links EU regional policies and 
actual influences in the Wider Europe to the regional processes- interorganizational network 
model. In doing so, it empirically addressed the question of the EU’s impact on the regional 
governance patterns at the sub-national level, which has not been rigorously analyzed by the 
studies of EU external governance. The research indicates that the structure of the interactions 
among the public, civil society, and private-sector local and regional actors involved in 
cooperation with the respective actors from the EU member-states and the EU institutions in the 
regional cooperation domain to a great extent reflects broader patterns of governance existing in 
the region. 
The dissertation also took into consideration sub-national-level variables explaining 
regional integration and broader regional governance patterns which have not received much 
attention in works on EU external governance and European integration – ethno-cultural, 
historical, geopolitical, and economic regional contexts. In addition, this research demonstrated 
that for successful integration, not only the EU institutions, but also the EU member-states and 
local and regional actors coming from the EU member-states, as well as the regions of the 
neighboring countries and the actors residing in those regions should be genuinely motivated and 
interested in integration. In this respect, applying the insights gained from the cases of the 
Russian northwestern and southern regions to future case studies of regional cooperation 
between the EU and the neighboring countries would help predict integration patterns in other 
areas (e.g. Armenia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia). 
In sum, this dissertation adds to our knowledge of the processes occurring in the regional 
domains of the EU foreign policy and the international activity of the EU member-states and 
advances our understanding of regional integration processes and local factors that explain 
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existing patterns of governance, shape and influence regional cooperation structures, and account 
for the resistance to or acceptance of EU-related norms. As such, it contributes to the recent and 
increasingly growing literature on the EU external governance and democratization in the Wider 
Europe, as well as to more general studies that focus on the EU relations with the neighboring 
countries and the regions of the neighboring countries.   
 
 
B. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDIES OF REGIONALISM 
 
The dynamics and geopolitical importance of European integration, as well as other 
processes of regional development and integration (e.g. ASEAN, MERCOSUR) have become of 
major importance for international politics, economics and social development. The complexity 
of these processes induced by increased interaction among public, private, and civil society 
actors in advancing a plurality of regional political, economic and socio-cultural objectives have 
spurred a myriad of studies focusing on the phenomenon of regionalism in contemporary 
international affairs. 
However, the studies of regionalism have been mainly focused on explaining the 
rationale behind regional integration, the sources of regional cooperation and the design of 
regional institutions. Less attention has been paid to the actual impact of the regional integration 
on internal domestic transformations and the relationship between domestic patterns of 
governance and supranational, trans-regional, or inter-regional integration processes.  
Moreover, the studies of regionalism have been mainly concerned with regionalism at the 
supranational, international, and national levels of analysis, and there have been very few studies 
of the sub-national regionalism- integration between certain regions and areas of nation-states, or 
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between regions of nation-states and nation-states, or between regions of nation-states and 
supranational constituents. 
This dissertation contributes to the studies of sub-national regionalism and assesses the 
effects of the sub-regional integration on democratization and governance in the regions of the 
Russian Federation involved in the regional cooperation with the EU. In this respect, it might be 
useful to apply the regional integration network model to other areas of regional cooperation for 
the assessment of the strength, the intensity, and the efficiency of the regional integration 
processes.  
The dissertation also explores local factors that impede or facilitate regional integration 
and demonstrates that the consideration of social structures, cultures, traditions, history, and 
geopolitics is necessary to understand and explain existing regional governance patterns and the 
emergency, the development, and the strength and intensity of sub-national regionalism.  
Therefore, a similar combination of structure-based and culture-based approaches could 
be applied to the studies of other cases of sub-national regionalism, for instance regionalism 
along the Polish-Ukrainian or Russian Far Eastern and Chinese borders. Another interesting area 
of future research on the regional sub-nationalism could be the study of interaction between the 
processes occurring in regional domains and the national-level variables.  
 
 
C. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK STUDIES 
 
In the recent years, there has been a steady increase in the number of studies focusing on 
interorganizational networks due to increased interorganizational networking in the production 
and delivery of social services and cooperation among various private-sector actors. However, 
these studies usually focus on one particular type of interorganizational networks, for example, 
283 
networks of human rights NGOs, networks of health associations, or corporate networks. There 
have been no comprehensive studies of interorganizational linkages between public, civil society, 
and private-sector actors despite the fact that interaction between all the three sectors is growing 
in different domains of social, economic, and policy-making activity. This study significantly 
contributes to the intersectoral network research by looking at how actors from different sectors 
interact and behave in the regional cooperation and energy domains in the Russian northwestern 
and southern regions.    
While the traditional interorganizational network literature is rich in information about 
why networks emerge, it is less rich in information about the particular configurations of those 
networks. In addition, interorganizational network-level research has primarily been theoretical 
or based on descriptive case studies (Provan, Fish and Sydow, 2007). This study contributes 
significantly to the interorganizational network research, as it offers comparative longitudinal 
assessment of regional network structures and their impact on democracy and regional 
development.  
This research sought to explore the structural properties of the energy and the EU-Russia 
regional cooperation networks in the Russian northwestern and southern regions in order to 
explain regional governance patterns and sub-national regionalism patterns and assess their 
effects on democracy and regional social and economic development. The results of the analysis 
demonstrate that that the structural endogenous network parameters, such as centralization and 
cohesion, and several exogenous attributes explain the patterns of cooperation among actors 
involved in the regional cooperation and interaction patterns in the energy domain. The results 
indicate that the structure of the regional cooperation and energy networks affects the exchange 
of information and resources among the network actors, determines the level of social capital 
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generated by the network, and explains opportunities and constraints emerging for regional and 
local actors in the systems.  
At the same time, the analysis indicates that the current structure of the 
interorganizational linkages is largely influenced by the previous patterns of interaction among 
the network actors. The research demonstrates that the legacy of old linkages and the 
configuration of new ties are important for interpreting the effects of the processes occurring in 
the regional cooperation and energy domains on the regional development and democratic 
governance in the Russian northwestern and southern regions.  
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APPENDIXES 
 
APPENDIX A. 
CHAPTER III 
 
Tests of the efficiency of the fixed effects and random effects models 
 
The first test is the test for the statistical significance of U. From the previous discussion 
it is clear that unit-level error is important and it is necessary to know the statistical significance 
of the effects. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test of random effect shows that there is 
a high chi square (124.78), which suggests that the null hypothesis should be rejected.  
 
Estimated results: 
---------------------------- 
e        1.067053       1.032982 
u         2.512591       1.585116 
 
Test:   Var(u) = 0 
chi2(1) =   124.78 
Prob > chi2 =     0.0000 
 
 
Then Hausman test is conducted, which suggests that the if the assumptions of the 
random effect model hold, then fixed effects and random effects produce correct estimates using 
different techniques. In this case random effect is a more efficient model. If the assumptions are 
not correct, then the fixed effects model is a better model. So, there should be the same estimates 
between the models if the assumptions of random effects are true. According to the Hausman test 
(chi2 = 71), there is a significant difference in the estimates: 
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 ---- Coefficients ---- 
                   (b)             (B)              (b-B)         sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
                 fixed        random              Difference S.E. 
     
nres -.1244513    -.0949089  -.0295424 .0401925 
proj .3239824      .29001112           .03397128 .1012435 
 
  
Another way to assess the preference of models is by testing the assumption about the 
error term structure in the random effects model.  The assumptions state that total error variations 
are constant/Assumption 2 and that random error correlation are equal to 0/Assumption 3. These 
assumptions are tested by predicting randtotres, ue and predicting randerror, e. After this the 
randtotres and randerror are correlated. The correlation matrices suggest that the assumption do 
not hold. 
 
randto~1 randto~9 randto~4 
   
randtot~1991    1.0000 
randtot~1999    0.7111 1.0000 
randtot~2004    0.6774 0.8746 1.0000 
 
 
rander~1 rander~9 rander~4 
   
randerr~1991    1.0000 
randerr~1999   -0.6688 1.0000 
randerr~2004   -0.6639 0.2184 1.0000 
 
 
The assumptions about error term structure in the random effects model were tested and 
the results indicate that the total error correlations are not constant and random error correlations 
are not 0, so this assumption of the random effects model is violated. 
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APPENDIX B. 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 
LIST OF PROVINCES 
 
 
The Northwestern Region 
 
St. Petersburg (Leningrad) oblast 
Novgorod oblast 
Vologda oblast 
Arhangelsk oblast (excluding Nenets Autonomous District) 
Pskov oblast 
Republic of Karelia 
Murmansk oblast 
Kaliningrad oblast 
 
 
The Southern Region 
 
Rostov oblast 
Astrakhan oblast 
Krasnodar Krai 
Stavropol Krai 
Republic of Adygeya 
Kabardino-Balkar Republic 
Karachaevo-Cherkessk Republic 
Republic of Kalmykiya 
Republic of North Osetia 
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LIST OF SOURCES FOR THE NETWORK DATA 
 
EU Tacis programs:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/tacis/ 
 
Northern Dimension initiatives 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/doc/index.htm 
 
Black Sea cross-border programs 
http://www.blacksea-cbc.net/index.php?page=MAP;  
 
Neighborhood initiatives 
http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_647.htm; 
 
Cooperation partnerships 
http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_258.htm 
 
ENPI programs 
http://www.together50years.eu/EN/mn3_hr/enpi.htm 
 
External cooperation programs 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/enpi-cross-
border/index_en.htm 
 
Euroregions 
http://www.siauliai.aps.lt/saule/about.html,  
http://www.euroregionbaltic.eu/members.php,  
http://euregio.karelia.ru/site/?lang=eng 
 
Baltic Euroregion Network 
http://www.benproject.org/en 
 
Russian National Statistics Committee Reports (GOSKOMSTAT) 
 
Russian Reports of Inter-regional and Trans-Regional Cooperation (Basa Dannih po 
Regionalnomu Tosrudnichestvu) 
 
EU External Delegation to Russia resources, available at  
http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/index.htm 
 
Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, 4 June 1999, p. 1, available at 
http://www.ena.lu/europe/european-union/common-strategy-european-union-1999-cfsp.htm 
 
Common European Economic Space, Concept Paper, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit11_03/1concl.pdf 
289 
 
Customs Control Department, Ministry of Finance, Russian Federation, 2004 report 
 
ESA permanent mission in Russia, available at  
http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/ESA_Permanent_Mission_in_Russia/SEMT5XVLWFE_0.html ). 
 
EU Commission’s Delegation/ EU and Russia/Economics and Trade, available at 
http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/p_216.htm 
 
The EU-Russia Archive; official documents and declarations, available at 
http://www.bits.de/EURA/EURAMAIN.htm 
 
EU-Russian relations, 2005, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm 
 
EU/Russia: The four “common spaces”, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_11_04/m04_268.htm 
 
Russian regional reports of foreign initiatives 
 
Southern Federal District and its subjects 
http://ufo.gov.ru/ 
 
Northwestern Federal District and its subjects 
www.szfo.ru/ 
 
 
Websites of provinces: 
 
The Northwestern Region 
 
St. Petersburg (Leningrad) oblast 
http://www.lenobl.ru/ 
 
Novgorod oblast 
http://region.adm.nov.ru:8082/wps/portal 
 
 
Vologda oblast 
http://www.vologda-oblast.ru/ 
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Arhangelsk oblast (excluding Nenets Autonomous District) 
http://www.dvinaland.ru/ 
 
Pskov oblast 
http://www.pskov.ru/ 
 
Republic of Karelia 
http://www.gov.karelia.ru/ 
 
Murmansk oblast 
http://www.gov-murman.ru/ 
 
Kaliningrad oblast 
http://www.kaliningradobl.ru/ 
 
 
The Southern Region 
 
Rostov oblast 
http://www.donland.ru/ 
 
Astrakhan oblast 
http://www.astroblduma.ru/ 
 
Krasnodar Krai 
http://admkrai.kuban.ru/ 
 
Stavropol Krai 
http://www.1777.ru/ 
 
Republic of Adygeya 
http://www.adygheya.ru/ 
 
Kabardino-Balkar Republic 
http://www.nalnet.ru/ 
 
Karachaevo-Cherkessk Republic 
http://www.spektr.info/info/karachaevo-cherkessiya/ 
 
Republic of Kalmykiya 
http://www.kalm.ru/ru/ 
 
Republic of North Osetia 
http://www.rso-a.ru/ 
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Newspapers (Russian, Baltic, Nordic, German)- for the regional cooperation and the energy data:  
 
Vechernii Krasnodar 
Va Bank 
Volnaya Kuban 
Krasnodarskie Izvestia 
Stavropolskaya Pravda 
Stavropolskie Gubernskie Vedomosti 
Severkii Kavkas 
Vesti Slavian Uga Rossii 
Novaya Gazeta 
Gazeta Uga 
Kabardino-Balkarskaya Pravda 
Slovo Osetii 
Severokaspiiskaya Pravda 
Privolzhskaya Gazeta 
AIF v Astrakhani 
Stepnaya Nov 
AIF na Donu 
Vesti Pridonia 
Komsomolskaya Pravda na Donu 
Nobaya Azovskaya Gazeta 
Priazovskii Krai 
Vedomosti 
Nevskoe Vremia 
St Petersburg Times 
Novosti Peterburga 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta 
Novgorodskie Vedomosti 
Novaya Novgorodskaya Gazeta 
Novgorodskii Universitet 
Region Baltika 
Gazeta Karelia 
Karelskaya Gubernia 
Petrozavodskii Universitet 
Avangard 
Vesti Arhangelskoi Oblasti 
Velskie Vesti 
Dvinskaya Pravda 
Pomorskii Kurier 
Novii Arhangelsk 
Pskovskaya Pravda 
Kurier pskov-Velikie Luki 
Pskovskaya Kolokolnya 
Vechernii Murmansk 
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Niva 
Pechenga 
Polyarnaya Pravda 
Ärileht (Tallinn)  
Äripäev  
Õpetajateleht  
Baltische Rundschau (Vilnius)  
Eesti Ekspress  
Eesti Kirik  
Eesti Päevaleht  
Lääne Elu  
Maaleht (Tallinn)  
Meie Maa  
Molodjoz Estonii  
Narvskaya Gazeta (Narva)   
Nelli Teataja  
Põhjarannik  
Postimees  
SIRP  
SL Õhtuleht (Tallinn)  
Võrumaa Teataja  
Nasha 
Latgales Laiks 
The Baltic Times 
Litovskij Kurier 
Baltic News 
Helsinki Sanomat International 
Aftenbladet 
Aftenposten 
Bellona 
Nettavisen 
Berliner Morgenpost 
International Herald Tribune 
The local 
Der Spiegel 
 
 
Specifically for the energy data: 
 
Websites of the energy companies: 
 
General website: http://www.oilru.com/ 
 
Gazprom 
http://www.gazprom.ru/ 
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Rosneft 
http://www.rosneft.ru/ 
 
Russneft 
http://www.russneft.ru/ 
 
Transneft 
http://www.transneft.ru/ 
 
Tatneft 
http://www.tatneft.ru/ 
 
Lukoil 
http://www.lukoil.com/ 
 
Kalmneft 
http://www.oilcapital.ru/info/companies/comp1/63424/private/63454.shtml 
 
Donskie Nefteprodukti 
http://www.rosbalt.ru/2008/04/14/474673.html 
 
Krasnodarneftegaz 
http://krasnodarneftegaz.ru/ 
 
Volgodonsknefteprodukt 
http://www.nge.ru/abonents_card_51313.htm 
 
Dongazdobycha 
http://www.oilru.com/news/52581/ 
 
Kaspiiskaya Neftyanaya Kompania 
http://www.lukoil.ru/press.asp?div_id=1&id=118&year=2000 
 
 
Other websites: 
 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/oil_chechnya.shtml 
http://old.arba.ru/ru_press/1/articles/2000328-3.html 
http://www.diptex.ru/firms/extraction_of_crude_oil_and_oil_passing_gas/single/a/ 
http://www.ngv.ru/show_release.aspx?releaseID=2764 
http://www.top-r.ru/journal/a4776.html 
http://www.prime-tass.ru/news/show.asp?id=726771&ct=news 
http://www.regnum.ru/news/1137168.html 
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Other Information sources:  
 
Russia/Finland, Border Crossing at Svetogorsk, available at  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/tacis/publications/general/case_studies/project_04.
pdf 
 
Razvitie Gosudarsvtennogo Upravlenia v Uzhnom Federalnom Okruge, information available at 
http://gosupravlenie-yfo.ru/ 
 
Egorov. V, The basis for the EU-Russian interaction, The Moscow Times, May, 2003, 4 
 
Khristenko, V., Doklad Ministra Promyshlennosti I Energetikji RF Viktora Kristenko na 
Vserossiyskoy Nedele Nefti i Gaza, Press-riliz, October 2004, Ministerstvo promyshlennosti I 
energetiki, available at www.mte.gov.ru/docs/1/2166.html. 
 
Russia’s Statistics Committee Report, 2004  
European Policy Summit: Russia and Europe, May 14, 2004 - La Bibliothèque Solvay, available 
at 
http://www.friendsofeurope.org/index.asp?http://www.friendsofeurope.org/conf_prog.asp?ConfI
d=333&frame=yes~bas 
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Southern Cooperation Network 1999 
Degree centrality 
indexes 
Betweenness Centrality 
indexes (normalized)  
Eigenvector Centrality 
indexes  
Closeness centrality 
indexes 
Krasnodar gov (71) Krasnodar gov (42.1) Rostov gov (0.45) Krasnodar gov (64) 
 Rostov gov (63) Rostov gov (28.3) Krasnodar gov (0.44) Rostov gov (61) 
Stavropol gov (41) Stavropol gov (26.2) Stavropol gov (0.24) Stavropol gov (56) 
Astrakhan gov (40) Astrakhan gov (22.7) Astrakhan gov (0.18) Astrakhan gov (56) 
Maikop gov (25) Maikop gov (10.1) Maikop gov (0.15) Elista gov (53) 
Cherkessk gov (18) Cherkessk gov (8.3) Cherkessk gov (0.13) Cherkessk gov (52) 
Elista gov (18) Elista gov (6.5) Elista gov (0.12) Maikop gov (52) 
Nalchik gov (16) Nalchik gov (5.9) Kuban university (0.09) Vlad gov (51) 
Kuban University (15) Vlad gov (2.4) Nalchik gov (0.08) Nalchik gov (49) 
Vlad gov (12) Kuban University  (1.9) Vlad gov (0.07) Stavr University 
(46) 
 Southern Cooperation Network 2006 
Degree centrality 
indexes 
Betweenness Centrality 
indexes (normalized) 
Eigenvector Centrality 
indexes  
Closeness centrality 
indexes 
Krasnodar gov (78) Krasnodar gov (41.3) Krasnodar gov (0.48) Krasnodar gov (66) 
 Rostov gov (73) Rostov gov (27.3) Rostov gov (0.46) Rostov gov (63) 
Stavropol gov (71) Stavropol gov (26.2) Stavropol gov (0.25) Stavropol gov (58) 
Astrakhan gov (56) Astrakhan gov (24.7)  Astrakhan gov (0.22) Astrakhan gov (56) 
Elista gov (33) Elista gov (14.4) Maikop gov (0.18) Elista gov (54) 
Cherkessk gov (25) Region obr (12.2) Cherkessk gov (0.15) Cherkessk gov (54) 
Kuban University (18) Cherkessk gov (10.1) Elista gov (0.13) Maikop gov (53) 
Maikop gov (16) Maikop gov (7.5) Assotsiatsia NKO (0.12) Vlad gov (51) 
Region obr (15) Kuban University  (2.4) Kuban University (0.12) Nalchik gov (50) 
Ekologika (14) Ekologika (1.9) Vlad gov (0.08) Ekonom (48) 
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Northwestern Cooperation Network 1999 
Degree centrality indexes Betweenness Centrality 
indexes (normalized) 
Eigenvector Centrality 
indexes  
Closeness centrality 
indexes 
Transphere (31) Transphere (20.3) Transphere (0.21) Transphere (41) 
Vneshtorgbank (29) Vneshtorgbank (19.2) Vneshtorgbank (0.19) Vneshtorgbank (40) 
ATV (25) ATV (17.2) St University (0.17) ATV (40) 
St University (24) NCMB (14.5) NCMB (0.15) Logist part (37) 
NCMB (21) Assotsiatsia sots org (13.8) ATV (0.15) Vneshtorgbank (35) 
St Petersburg gov (19) St University (11.9) St Petersburg gov (0.12) St Petersburg gov 
(31) 
Novgorod gov (18) St Petersburg gov (10.5) Logist part (0.11) Novgorod gov (29) 
Logist part (16) Logist part (9.8) Novgorod gov (0.09) St University (27) 
Assotsiatsia sots org (15) Novgorod gov (7.3) Assotsiatsia sots org 
(0.07) 
Assotsiatsia sots org 
(25) 
RSB (14) Shkola prav (5.1) RSB (0.06) RSB (21) 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 2006 
Degree centrality 
indexes 
Betweenness Centrality 
indexes (normalized) 
Eigenvector Centrality 
indexes  
Closeness centrality 
indexes 
North-West Assoc (17) North-West Assoc (9.2) North-West Assoc (0.13) North-West Assoc (25) 
Econ Dev (16) Econ Dev (8.4) Econ Dev (0.11) Econ Dev (23) 
Cult Init (16) Cult Init (7.9) Cult Init (0.11) Cult Init (22) 
Sev prirodoohran (14) Sev prirodoohran (7.6) Sev prirodoohran (0.09) Transphere (19) 
St University (13) St University (7.3) Transphere (0.08) Journalism CT (18) 
Petrozavodsk Univ (12) Journalism CT (7.1) Journalism CT (0.08) Sev prirodoohran (18) 
Resource Center (12) Transphere (6.9) Resource Center (0.07) St University (17) 
Journalism CT (11) Petrozavodsk Univ (6.7) St University (0.06) Petrozavodsk Univ (15) 
Transphere (10) Resource Center (6.4) Petrozavodsk Univ (0.06) Resource Center (14) 
St Petersburg gov (9) St Petersburg gov (6.1) KulturKontakt (0.05) St Petersburg gov (11.1) 
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Betweenness centrality
Degree centrality
Southern Cooperation Network 1999/ Centrality Measures
 
Southern Cooperation Network 2006/ Centrality Measures
Betweenness centrality
Degree centrality
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Northwestern Cooperation Network 1999/ Centrality Measures
Eigenvector centrality
Closeness centrality
 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 2006/ Centrality Measures
Eigenvector centrality
Closeness centrality
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Southern Cooperation Network 1999/ Centrality Measures
Eigenvector centrality
Closeness centrality
 
Southern Cooperation Network 2006/ Centrality Measures
Eigenvector centrality
Closeness centrality
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Northwestern Cooperation Network 1999/ Centrality Measures
Betweenness centrality
Degree centrality
Northwestern Cooperation Network 2006/ Centrality Measures
Betweenness centrality
Degree centrality
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Northwestern  Cooperation Network   1999     
Power Scores 
Southern  Cooperation Network   1999        
Power Scores 
Transphere (27) Rostov gov (64) 
Vneshtorgbank (25) Krasnodar gov (60) 
St University (23) Astrakhan gov (58) 
NCMB (20) Stavropol gov (56) 
ATV (18) Maikop gov (50) 
St Petersburg gov (16) Cherkessk gov (47) 
Logist part (15) Elista gov (42) 
Novgorod gov (15) Nalchik gov (40) 
Assotsiatsia sots org (12) Kuban University (30) 
RSB (10) Vlad gov (26) 
 
 
 
 
Northwestern  Cooperation Network   2006     
Power Scores 
Southern  Cooperation Network   2006        
Power Scores 
North-West Assoc (14) Krasnodar gov (71) 
Econ Dev (14) Rostov gov (69) 
Cult Init (14) Stavropol gov (65) 
Sev prirodoohran (13) Astrakhan gov (54) 
Transphere (12) Maikop gov (52) 
Journalism CT (11) Cherkessk gov (50) 
Resource Center (11) Elista gov (45) 
St University (10) Assotsiatsia NKO (43) 
Petrozavodsk Univ (8) Kuban University (40) 
KulturKontakt (8) Ekologika (38) 
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Southern Energy Network 
Southern Energy 
Network 
Closeness Centrality 99 
Southern Energy 
Network 
Closeness Centrality 06 
 
Southern Energy 
Network 
Betweenness 
Centrality 99 
Southern Energy 
Network 
Betweenness 
Centrality 06 
Lukoil (73.3) 
Gazprom (61.9) 
Rostov gov  (55) 
Astrakhan gov  (55) 
Krasnodar gov  (55) 
Stavropol gov (54) 
Rosneft (52.4) 
Transneft (52.4) 
Elista  gov (51.1) 
Tatneft (51.1) 
Gazprom (98) 
Karsnodar gov (81.4) 
Rosneft   (81.5) 
Astrakhan gov (78.8) 
Lukoil  (74.7) 
Rostov gov  (74.7) 
Stavropol gov   (68.9) 
Elista gov  (51.9) 
Kaspiiskaya Neft K (51.9) 
Maikop gov (50.7) 
 
 
Lukoil (81.2) 
Gazprom (32) 
Krasnodar gov (31.3) 
Astrakhan gov (30.05) 
Rosneft (25) 
Stavropol gov (18.3) 
Rostov gov (15.7) 
Elista gov (15) 
Tatneft (12.3) 
Transneft (7) 
 
Gazprom (59.1) 
Rosneft (35) 
Karsnodar gov (25.5) 
Astrakhan gov (20.2) 
Lukoil (19.2) 
Stavropol gov (17.8) 
Rostov gov (16.4) 
Elista gov (5.6) 
Maikop gov (4.2) 
Tatneft (3.6) 
 
 
 
 
Northwestern Energy Network 
Northwestern Energy 
Network 
Closeness Centrality 99 
Northwestern Energy 
Network 
Closeness Centrality 06 
 
Northwestern 
Energy Network 
Betweenness 
Centrality 99 
Northwestern Energy 
Network 
Betweenness Centrality 
06 
Russneft (13.4) 
Gazprom (11.1) 
Rosneft (10) 
Tatneft (8) 
Lukoil (8) 
Kaliningrad  gov (6) 
Murmansk gov (4.7) 
St Peterburg gov (4.4) 
Petrozavodsk gov (4.3) 
Novgorod gov(4.2) 
 
Gazprom (12.2) 
Rosneft (12.2) 
Lukoil (12.2) 
Tatneft (10) 
Russneft (10) 
St_Peterburg gov (9.2) 
Novgorod gov (7.6) 
Kaliningr gov (7.2) 
Petrozavodsk gov (7.1) 
Murmansk gov (6.9) 
 
Russneft (15) 
Gazprom (12.9) 
Tatneft (9.05) 
Lukoil (8.12) 
Kaliningrad gov(8.4) 
Murmansk gov (7.3) 
Rosneft (3.5) 
St Peterburg gov 3.1) 
Novgorod gov (2.1) 
Petrozavodsk gov (2) 
Gazprom (14) 
Lukoil (13)  
Russneft (10) 
Novgorod gov (9) 
St Petersburg gov (9) 
Rosneft (6.3) 
Gazprom (6.3) 
Murmansk gov (2.4) 
Petrozavodsk gov (2.3) 
Kaliningrad gov (2.1) 
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Northwestern  Energy  Network   1999         
Power Scores 
Southern  Energy Network   1999            
Power Scores 
Russneft (16) Lukoil (70) 
Gazprom (15) Gazprom (68) 
Rosneft (14) Rostov gov  (62) 
Tatneft (13) Astrakhan gov  (60) 
Lukoil (13) Krasnodar gov  (59) 
Kaliningrad  gov (9) Stavropol gov (50) 
Murmansk gov (7) Rosneft (42) 
St Peterburg gov (6) Transneft (41) 
Petrozavodsk gov (4) Elista  gov (38) 
Novgorod gov(4) Tatneft (32) 
 
 
 
 
Northwestern  Energy Network   2006         
Power Scores 
Southern  Energy  Network   2006            
Power Scores 
Gazprom (14) Gazprom (96) 
Rosneft (14) Karsnodar gov (94) 
Lukoil (13) Rosneft   (93) 
Tatneft (11) Astrakhan gov (92) 
Russneft (11) Lukoil  (90) 
St_Peterburg gov (10) Rostov gov  (89) 
Novgorod gov (9) Stavropol gov   (87) 
Kaliningr gov (8) Elista gov  (50) 
Petrozavodsk gov (7) Kaspiiskaya Neft K (48) 
Murmansk gov (7) Maikop gov (46) 
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APPENDIX C. 
CHAPTER V  
 
 
LIST OF RESPONDENTS 
 
Andrey Bogdanov, leader of the Democratic Party of Russia (that proposed a Russian 
referendum for joining the EU), and candidate for the 2008 presidential elections. 
 
Gregory Amnuell, Russian State Duma official and specialist in the Russia-Baltic relations. 
 
Alexander Druzhinin, PhD, North Caucasus Research Institute of Economic and Social Problems, 
professor of regional geography and a social leader.  
 
Oxana Karnauhova, PhD, Southern Federal University, professor, assistant director of the 
Masters Programs, southern regional expert. 
 
Oxana Frolova, Stroimateriali, economic expert and a business leader. 
 
Tatiana Zakharova, Youth Human Rights Network, Volunteering Strategies, regional social 
worker and social expert. 
 
Maxim Golubev, Tatneft, Communications Department, regional energy expert. 
 
Boris Maximenko, Krasnodar Oil Refinery, manager. 
 
Elena Sedukova, PhD, Inter-regional Institute of Social Sciences, Culturology Department, 
senior researcher and professor. 
 
Andrey Kirillov, PhD, Southern Federal University, Philosophy and Culturology Department, 
professor, assistant to dean. 
 
Arsen Matarin, public official, Astrakhan region. 
 
Nikolay Trapsh, PhD, Southern Federal University, History Department, professor, dean, 
specialist in regional cooperation with the EU. 
 
Maria Chufistova, director of Cossack cultural heritage association, Krasnodar region. 
 
Oxana Svetlitsina, representative of ACT Telecommunications Company, Adygea republic. 
 
Maria Dementieva, manager of Cherkessk environmental NGO, Cherkessk. 
 
Alla Voloshina, PhD, Southern Federal University, professor, director of the Masters Programs, 
southern regional expert. 
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Dmitry Karpuhin, representative of the Southern Sea Port Systems. 
 
Alexey Ulesov, civil society specialist and regional NGO leader, Krasnodar Region. 
 
Andrey Potapov, PhD, Severozapadniy Institut, historian and regional expert. 
 
Alexander Konkov, Murmanskoe Televidenie, journalist and social leader, Murmansk region. 
 
Alexei Suvorov, director of human rights school and council, Novgorod region. 
 
Anonymous senior manager, Sintal Corporation, southern, central, and northwestern branches. 
 
Mikhail Burtsev, representative of Charities Aid Foundation Russia 
 
Marina Udaltsova, public official, St Petersburg region. 
 
Viacheslav Morozov, representative of the nongovernmental environmental organization Priroda 
i Molodezh, Murmansk region. 
 
Irina Chistiakova, Social Institute, program coordinator. 
 
Alexey Poliakov, PhD, Arkhangelsk University, historian and researcher. 
 
Galina Ustinova, Kalevala tsentr, ethnographer, the northwestern republic of Karelia. 
 
Levada Analytical Center representatives (5 short interviews further united in one). 
 
Ruslana Chernigovskaya, public official, Vologda region. 
 
Sergey Ustinov, public official, Rostov region. 
 
Maxim Bystryakov, Transneft Energy Company, Strategic Planning Department, manager. 
 
Polina Fomina, northwestern regional expert and journalist, St Petersburg region. 
 
Elena Kudriavtseva, regional entrepreneur, director of series of hotels and Sem Morei Tourism 
Company, St Petersburg region. 
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EXAMPLES OF QUESTIONS 
 
• Your region is involved in the Northern Dimension (Black Sea Synergy) initiative. What 
is your assessment of the ND/BSS programs in your region?  What are the implications 
of the ND/BSS partnership for the development of your region? In general, how would 
you estimate the importance of this partnership for the region? 
 
• Is your region involved in all the ND/BSS institutional structures? If not, what are the 
reasons for your non-participation in some of the ND/BSS institutional arrangements and 
partnerships and what implications does your non-participation have for the regional 
politics? 
 
• Do cooperation projects with the EU in your region have an impact on the regional 
policies? If yes, could you please describe this impact and specify what kind of projects 
have the biggest influence on the regional policy-making (civil society, environmental, 
education, economic, business)? 
 
• Could you please give examples of the most successful cooperation projects in your 
region? Have those projects generated any policy events? What was their impact on the 
regional governance? How did they benefit the society? How many people were involved 
in the projects? How many were impacted? 
 
• What is the institutional structure for the regional cooperation with the EU? What are the 
main organizations in your region involved in cooperation with the EU? Do they interact 
with the regional administration? If yes, what are the mechanisms of this interaction, how 
does this interaction occur? How would you assess the efficiency of this interaction?  
 
• Could you please comment on the Russia-EU May 2007 first “direct partnerships” 
agreement that will help to establish and support direct contacts between the Russian and 
EU regions, bypassing national governments? Why do you think north-west region was 
chosen a ‘testing ground’ for this agreement? What impact will this agreement have on 
the regional politics and strategic planning in your region? Have the number of regional 
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cooperation initiatives increased in your region? Are there any new cooperation activities 
that did not exist before the 2007 agreement?  
 
• How could you please explain the phenomenon that despite the fact that both south-west 
and north-west regions are involved in the regional dimensions of the EU neighborhood 
policy (which main goal is to foster democratization and improve governance in the 
neighboring countries), the strength of cooperative activity (the number of projects, the 
number of actors involved in each project) is significantly higher in the north-west than in 
the south-west of Russia? To what extent this could be explained by the local factors (e.g. 
geopolitical, cultural)? Can EU policies or interest be a possible explanation? Do you 
think EU’s interests are different in the north-west region than in the south-west region?   
 
• How much does the region depend on the revenues from the energy sector? How 
important is energy trade with the EU for the regional budget? How many energy 
companies are there in the region? What kind of impact do they have on the policy-
making in the region? In what ways are the EU and other international actors involved in 
the energy sector in the region? Could you please speak about EU-related energy projects 
in your region (Southstream/Nordstream)? What is the institutional structure for these 
projects and to what extent are regional authorities involved in design and management 
of those projects? How would you assess the EU influence in the regional energy policy 
domain? 
 
• Could you please comment on the phenomenon of the regional administration 
representatives serving on the board of directors of the energy companies or informal ties 
between energy companies and public-sector actors? How would you assess lobbying 
activities of the energy companies in the regional administration? What implications does 
this have for the governance in the region? 
 
• How have Putin’s “vertical of power” reforms impacted policy-making in your region? 
How do local factors interplay with the federal government directives in designing 
regional policies? What implications do these reforms have for the regional cooperation 
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with the EU? How important is the EU factor in the regional decision-making processes? 
Is there a difference between the EU-Russia regional and national dynamics? 
 
• What are the limitations of the EU-Russia regional cooperation? Could you please speak 
about possible scenarios of the future of the EU-Russia regional cooperation?  
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